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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON SOCIO-INSTITUTIONAL ECOSYSTEMS & LABOR STRUCTURE 
February 2021 
Jonathan Donald Jenner, B.A. Earlham College 
M.A., University of Massachusetts Amherst
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Directed by: Professor Mwangi wa Gĩthĩnji
In three essays, this dissertation explores the relationship between the social and 
the economic, with an eye to how social and institutional formations affect economic 
outcomes. In the first essay, I construct a theoretical base by developing the metaphor of 
‘ecosystem’ as a frame for thinking of the various interrelations between social processes 
and economic phenomena – the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis. In invoking 
ecosystem as a central metaphor, this dissertation calls into focus the interaction between 
the economic and the non-economic, recognizing the multiplicity of causal inter- and 
intra-relationships between the two. 
I deploy this analysis in two substantive case studies. The second essay explores 
labor regimes in colonial East Africa, examining how the British authorities who sought 
to occasion a paid labor agricultural force faced different possibilities and constraints in 
Kenya (a Crown Colony) and Tanganyika (a League of Nations Mandate Territory). It 
explores how the more repressive Kenyan regime led to increased proletarianization 
through the Great Depression, while Tanganyika saw an increase in peasantization, and 
how these developments affected the long-term historical trajectories of both countries. 
The third essay examines the appearance and distribution of worker cooperatives 
in the United States as a function of their proximate socio-institutional environments, and 
finds that political ideology of the surrounding area correlates heavily with the presence 
of worker cooperatives, and explores what this means for policy and for economic theory 
of worker cooperatives. 
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In three essays, this dissertation explores the relationship between the social and 
the economic, with an eye to how social and institutional formations affect economic 
outcomes. In the first essay, I construct a theoretical base by developing the metaphor of 
‘ecosystem’ as a frame for thinking of the various interrelations between social processes 
and economic phenomena – the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis. In biology, 
ecosystemic thought analyzes the interaction between organisms and their non-living 
environments, examining the layered ways in which both exert influence on each other. 
In invoking ecosystem as a central metaphor, this dissertation calls into focus the 
interaction between the economic and the non-economic, recognizing the multiplicity of 
causal inter- and intra-relationships between the two. I deploy this analysis in two 
substantive case studies, looking at labor force structures in Depression-Era East Africa 
and the presence of worker cooperatives in the contemporary United States. Both case 
studies explore how social and institutional structures form and condition possibilities for 
workers through ecosystemic interaction with economic structures.  
In each case I compare how different socio-institutional ecosystems through 
which economic activity occurs play a central role in determining the nature and 
substance of economic activity. Comparison forms a fundamental part of my method for 
exploring the two case studies, by looking at factors which vary across socio-institutional 
ecosystems and seeing how those differences inflect and condition economic phenomena. 
So, in my exploration of labor force structures in colonial Kenya and Tanganyika, the two 
colonies represent different socio-institutional ecosystems stemming to their different 
colonial charters: Kenya was Crown Colony and Tanganyika a League of Nations 
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Mandate Territory. Though both states colonized comparable pre-colonial formations of 
the continental and Swahili coast admixture and focused on agricultural export through 
settler agriculture, their different colonial charters led to very different policies and social 
formations which had deep effects on the possibilities for Africans in Kenya and 
Tanganyika.  
My next case study treats 57 different megaregions of the United States as 
discrete socio-institutional ecosystems and explores features of those ecosystems which 
make them amicable to worker cooperatives. Most economic theory treats question of the 
prevalence of worker cooperatives as a function of the internal qualities of democratic 
firms vis-à-vis capitalist firms. This approach treats the prevalence of particular type of 
firm as a function of the external social and institutional contexts and finds evidence that 
socio-institutional ecosystems are important for the prevalence of worker cooperatives, 
with a particular focus on the ideological composition of that ecosystem.  
But why adopt the socio-institutional ecosystem as a mode of analysis for 
understanding economic phenomena? First, economics has paid too little attention to 
social and institutional structures as formative aspects of economic phenomena. When the 
discipline has considered different types of sociality, those considerations have largely 
been understood as superficial, or secondary to ‘economic fundamentals.’ Second, 
ecosystemic thought takes primary importance in this dissertation because of its departure 
from economics’ main metaphorical frame, the machine. Though often not explicit, 
‘machine’ metaphor is central to economics; a model is a machine whose various parts 
affect an outcome in a prescribed, channeled way. While this helps focus on particular 
causal relationships, its requirements dull other investigative possibilities. Ecosystems are 
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full of feedback loops – dialectic causalities – which are not possible in the 
independent/dependent variable schema of causality enabled by machinist thought. This 
dissertation does not claim that machinist thought is wrong, rather that economists’ 
fidelity to machinist thought has obscured other truths which frame and structure 
economic phenomena, and that those truths can be better understood in a socio-
institutional ecosystemic frame.  
Thus, by grafting from various traditions in the social sciences and economics to 
put together a socio-institutional analysis, this focus on the ecosystemic interrelation 
between the social and the economic marks a point of departure from various schools of 
more conventional economic theory, and allows for new observations about economic 
life to come to the fore. For example, economic historiography of colonialism has 
focused on topical categorizations which operate along particular axes, focusing on 
mutually exclusive domains of extractive vs. inclusive economies, or markets vs. states, 
which cause effect x or y to vary across space and time. A socio-institutional ecosystem 
analysis allows us to examine and appreciate how mezzo-level social and institutional 
differentiation can echo back across various effects, and how small differences in 
qualitative aspects of a system – i.e. the social conditions which engender a market in a 
particular way – can have large economic reverberations across space and time. In the 
case of worker cooperatives in the United States, a focus on socio-institutional 
ecosystems allows for consider of the rich nexus of relationships in a firm’s environment 
as factors in their survival, beyond the algorithmic interaction of agents in abstract, de-
socialized space. The third essay finds compelling evidence that the ideological 
composition of a socio-institutional ecosystem matters greatly in the prevalence of 
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worker cooperatives. Yet, conventional economic theorizing on worker cooperatives a 
priori precludes such an observation.  
This dissertation contributes a mode of socio-ecosystemic analysis to economic 
though as well as substantive observations about labor force structures in colonial East 
Africa and worker cooperative prevalence in the United States. The socio-institutional 
ecosystemic analysis, itself articulated from extant traditions and schools throughout the 
social sciences, can be marshaled to the study of all economic phenomena, because all 
economic phenomena happen within a particular social context. Truths about those 
phenomena, obscured by machinist models in economics, become visible through the 
socio-institutional ecosystem analysis, which includes both a theoretical posture and a 
mixed methods approach. Second, this dissertation contributes substantive knowledge 
about the topics for each case study. Landless rural workers, and sharp inequalities in 
land distribution and income have marked Kenya from the colonial era to now, while 
Tanzania has been marked by peasant dominance, lower national income, yet greater 
social equality. The second essay of this dissertation finds the roots of this in the social 
and legal setups of the two colonies, which are compounded and refracted by the Great 
Depression, continuing in a path dependent form from there. The third essay takes up 
ideas which have heretofore only been gestured at by economists and finds convincing 
evidence that external social and institutional environments do matter for the prevalence 
of worker cooperatives. This new knowledge and framing can improve policy and 
strategy for dignity and liberation.  
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THE SOCIO-INSTITUTIONAL ECOSYSTEM ANALYSIS: 
METAPHOR, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND METHODOLOGY 
 
By Jonathan Donald Jenner 
This essay lays out a framework for socio-institutional ecosystem analysis in 
economics. The approach seeks to appreciate the dynamism of the relationship between 
the social and economic in economic inquiry. This essay: animates a case that 
ecosystemic metaphor has positive contributions to make within economics; articulates 
the socio-institutional ecosystem as a central unit of analysis; explores the 
epistemological foundations of the frame, and considers attendant methodology 
appropriate for such inquiry. The basis for this intervention comes from two notions: 
economic theory has long tarried in thoroughly de-socialized space, where ‘economy-as-
machine’ functions as a foundational metaphor, while actual economic activity occurs in 
the thoroughly socialized society we inhabit. In lieu of machine, this essay argues that 
‘ecosystem’ can more readily capture the complexity of the interrelation between the 
social and economic, and in so doing add insights to economic processes. Precedent 
exists within the discipline (and economics-adjacent social sciences), which is 
demonstrated along with substantive examples showing the breadth and depth of the 
interrelation. Emergent characteristics of the social-economic interpenetrative 
relationship – dialectics, path dependency, resistance to formalization – are used to 
evaluate existing economic thought. The descriptive areas of dynamism in the social-
economic interchange that economics has missed are explored in light of Cullenberg’s 
epistemological classification. This essay then marshals that classification towards a 
positive articulation of the socio-institutional ecosystem, pulling together strands from 
economic geography and economic sociology. This essay then explores how 
methodological pluralism can serve, not obfuscate, clarity as a methodology for the 
socio-institutional ecosystem analysis, while also reflecting on what the relationship 
between knowledge and power means for methodology. In doing so, this essay seeks to 
establish a way for economics to understand the ways that social forces shape economic 
realities, as economic forces shape social realities.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
THE MONIAC, KENYA ONE, AND MACHINE DEPARTURES 
In 1949, William Phillips disassembled an airplane to build a machine which 
could model an economy. Two decades later, Morris Tito Gachamba assembled an 
airplane from various machine parts, which would later focus debate over the possibilities 
of an economy. Phillips’ hydraulic machine in London, England – the MONIAC 
(Monetary National Income Analogue Computer) – pumped tinted water into various 
tanks to model the flow of the British economy. For example, the savings flow eventually 
became the investment flow after collecting in the financial institution tank, tax rates 
could be changed by calibrating the tax flow, and so on (Holmes, 2013; Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand, 2007). Gachamba, a bicycle mechanic who never returned to school after 
receiving a beating from his standard two teacher, used scrap metal, canvas, and a scooter 
engine in the 1960s to build his airplane Kenya One, in Nyeri, Kenya (Weru, 2015).  He 
flew his airplane for nine miles, before crash landing as a branch caught his wing on the 
landing approach to the airstrip. Today, Phillips’ original machine is at Leeds University 
and about a dozen other machines were built and distributed to various universities and 
Figure 2: Philipps & the MONIAC Figure 1: Gachamba & Kenya One 
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central banks. Economists found Phillips’ machine instructive and used it to both model 
economic change and to teach economics. Building from this, Phillips would go on to 
describe the relationship between unemployment and inflation, referred to by economists 
today as the Phillips Curve.  
And while Gachamba’s airplane has been lost to history, eminent scholars have 
drawn out important economic lessons as well. After Gachamba’s flight, the Attorney 
General of the young Kenyan Republic, Charles Njonjo, quickly banned him from flying, 
because Gachamba had no aviation license. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, reflecting on this 
interaction years later, first notes the different linguistic communities of Gachamba and 
Njonjo as markers of their social position, values, and vision. Njonjo’s British accented 
English signaled his education and power, but also his deference to global power 
hierarchies. Gachamba’s juakali1-inflected Gĩkũyũ signaled the talent and industrial 
potential of a newly independent nation. Ngũgĩ characterizes their conflict as one that 
cuts right to the heart of the developmental trajectory of post-independence Kenya: 
Gacamba’s vision says, Africa can make things. Njonjo’s says, Leave that to 
Europe. Instead of the capable, traveled Kenyan coming to the aid of a man 
with raw talent who’d never left Kenya, Njonjo crashed Gacamba’s dream. 
The result, whether intended or not, was that Gacamba’s invention would no 
longer function as a model and vision of what could be done within Kenya by 
ordinary Kenyans (Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o 2016). 
This is a big claim. Ngũgĩ argues that Njonjo’s education embedded him in a 
social system of values which upheld the industrial and agricultural trade balance 
between Kenya and the Global North. Moreover, the power illustrated by Njonjo’s 
actions have affected the development trajectory of Kenya, and thus the lives of millions 
 
1 A handyman in Kiswahili, though literally ‘fierce sun,’ the craft taking its name from the direct sunlight 
under which the juakali works.   
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of Kenyans. The questions that Ngũgĩ raises – of industrial development, terms of trade, 
and path dependency – are central to the concerns of economics. But is the discipline of 
economics capable of assessing Ngũgĩ’s claim in a meaningful manner? 
Put differently, can the powered social interaction between Gachamba and Njonjo 
over Gachamba’s brilliant machine be modeled in Phillips’ brilliant machine? Machine 
has long been a metaphor for the economy in the discipline of economics, and even 
throughout the social sciences (Scott, 1997). Mirowski’s More Heat than Light 
demonstrates how the history of economic thought has been melded to physics, casting 
economics as ‘social physics’ on a quest to uncover of the ‘universal laws’ which govern 
economic life through agents and markets (Mirowski, 1991). Neoclassical theory, in 
particular, has sought to understand the atomistic motions of agents and has built its 
understanding of the whole economy up from the foundations of rhythmic movements of 
agents, who operate in a larger machine. This metaphor persists throughout the discipline, 
and has for some time. Krugman has said, for example, that he was attracted to social 
science by “the beauty of pushing a button to solve problems,” (Thomas, 2009). Phillips’ 
MONIAC was a concrete manifestation of the persistent metaphor of machine. While 
machine-as-metaphor and the associated epistemologies and methodologies that come 
with it has been fruitful to sections of economic of economic inquiry, it has also left the 
discipline wanting.  
The problem: fundamentally de-socialized machines seek to describe a very 
socialized world. They can perhaps model some forms of social power and sociality, but 
they do so in the context of the rules of the machine. “All markets, whether liquid or not, 
are combinations of human beings and physical objects,” writes MacKenzie, “it may 
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seem too obvious to need saying (until one realizes that few analysis of the markets 
develop the point), but human beings have bodies, are bodies,” (MacKenzie, 2008, p. 
15). Those bodies are housed in society and bounded by culture, institutions, power 
hierarchies, and a vast array of social constellations. And while machine-as-metaphor can 
do well to trace the exchange and flow of objects and cash, they are fundamentally 
incapable of modeling social power and sociality in its myriad of forms that undergird the 
thoroughly peopled economy in which we exist. “Lacking an appropriate theoretical 
framework,” argues Greif, “economists and economic historians have paid little attention 
to the relations between culture and institutional structure,” (Greif, 1994, p. 912). This 
essay, then, is motivated by the idea economics is capable, as a discipline, of considering 
the social in its relation to the economic – like the power between Gachamba and Njonjo 
and the economic possibilities of the young Kenyan Republic. We need a framework 
capable of this fundamental relationship. To do that, we will need different metaphors, 
epistemologies, and methodologies.  
ECOSYSTEMS 
Instead of machine, this essay proposes ‘ecosystem’ as a metaphor for the 
economy and sets about to articulate an epistemology and methodology appropriate to 
that frame. This essay insists that through the metaphor of ecosystem and the articulation 
of an appropriate epistemology – built from peripheral but extant sections of thought in 
economics and the social sciences – we can consider the centrality of the interplay 
between economic goings-on and the social and institutional features of society which 
shape and condition those phenomena.   
An ecosystem is comprised of a community of organisms and their non-living 
surroundings in a locale which interact together as a system. Ecologist and botanist 
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George Tansley proposed the term in the 1930s to better understand plants by 
highlighting the ways in which environmental context, the flow of energy and materials 
between organisms and their environment, formed a central methodology to know and 
understand plants. “Though the organisms may claim our primary interest,” he wrote, 
“when we are trying to think fundamentally we cannot separate them from their special 
environment, with which they form one physical system,” (Tansley 1935, 299). Scientists 
regard ecosystems as one level of organization of matter, ranging from subatomic 
particles to the universe as units of analysis. As such, ecologists call upon ecosystems as 
a unit of analysis not because the frame holds universal truths, but because the frame 
scales analysis to a level most appropriate for some of their key questions.  
For economics, to deploy ecosystemic metaphor means to adopt a framework 
which considers the inter-penetration of the economic with the non-economic. Like 
Tansley’s thoughts on the study of organisms, this essay explores a mode of analysis 
where economic phenomena are understood in the context of systemic intra- and inter-
relationships of the economic and non-economic in a particular location. An ecosystemic 
framework in economics makes use of a particular scale as a unit of analysis which 
zooms out from solely economic phenomena to understand those very economic 
phenomena in dynamic relationship to other features of their context. Such positioning 
doesn’t claim a universal truth to understanding economic phenomena, but does hold that 
viewing economic phenomena in light of that analysis does allow for insights to be made 
about those economic phenomena that are not available at other scalar units of analysis. 
In this essay, I explore what I term the socio-institutional ecosystem, calling attention to 
the social and institutional features of societies which interact with, condition, and are 
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conditioned by economic phenomena. In so doing, I outline a methodology taken up in 
the subsequent essays of this dissertation.  
Three features of biological ecosystems stand out which will be of central 
importance in this essay’s use of ecosystemic metaphor: feedback loops; the notion of 
disturbance and succession; and a resistance to formal modeling of the ecosystem as a 
complex system. In a biological ecosystem, feedback loops mean that organisms affect 
each other, and affect the non-living environment, just as features of the non-living 
environment affect each other and the organisms within them. These feedback loops 
mean that causes are effects, and those effects simultaneously affect causes. In that way, 
dialectic causality becomes an important feature of socio-institutional ecosystem analysis. 
The dynamics of biological ecosystems change over time, through processes of 
disturbance (an external prime mover) and succession (an internal prime mover). In the 
way that the re-introduction of just twenty wolves changed stream patterns and fish life in 
the entire Yellowstone basin, the social and economic activity which happens inside a 
socio-institutional ecosystem can radically shape the very structure of the ecosystem 
(Farquhar, 2019). Like their biological counterparts, socio-institutional ecosystems are 
subject to tectonic, epochal shifts which radically alter social and economic realities. Just 
as I glance at the biological ecosystem out the window from where I write, were I to 
move through past eons, I would first see the oak forest give way to beech grove 
accelerating then to glacial ice, mountain tops, and sea floor. Equilibria – to the extent 
that they exist – are ephemeral and subject to large machinations of history and path 
dependence, in both biological and economic ecosystems. Finally, biological ecosystems 
are complex systems. While individual relationships – oxygen metabolism of a carp, 
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onyx rates of reproduction – the entire system holds a web of relationships which 
encumber formal modelling. So cumbersome, in fact, that “the special characteristics of 
complex systems lead to additional challenges in both effectively modeling them and in 
validating the models,” (Petty, 2018, p. 1). While modeling will constitute an important 
part of the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis, the analysis renders modeling itself as 
an incomplete way to describe all that occurs in a socio-institutional ecosystem.  
These features depart in important ways from the machine metaphor of 
economics. Machines generally do not contain feedback loops. In machines, causality 
flows one direction, as one process causes other effect, or several processes converge to 
cause an effect, but effects do not affect their causes. (Or, when they do, it is understood 
as a wastefulness or failure of the machine, as when an overheating engine prevents 
further piston locomotion). As such, causality in machine metaphor cannot be dialectical. 
As opposed to the succession and disturbance of biological ecosystems, the structures of 
the machine do not change over time. The machine functions today as it did yesteryear. 
Thus, machine-as-metaphor dampens an appreciation of history’s ability to rewrite the 
very rules of the machine in economics and leads to a particularly ahistorical posture. 
Finally, because the machine is eminently modelable in its granular and universal aspects, 
machine metaphor becomes particularly conducive to formal, mathematical modelling. 
While this has been particularly useful for some insights in economics, it can lead to an 
over-reliance on formal modeling, even to where the machine-as-metaphor is less 
appropriate. In so doing, this frame may miss out on important phenomena which are less 
amenable to formal modeling, along the lines of Kaplan’s streetlight or drunkard’s 
search principle, where a drunk man searches for his housekey not where he thinks it fell, 
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but where the streetlight shines (Kaplan, 1973, p. 11).  
This departure from machine-as-metaphor and intentional use of ecosystem-as-
metaphor seeks to contribute an analytical method to economic inquiry which aids our 
understanding of economic phenomena as resultant from the dynamic and systemic 
interaction of the economic and the non-economic, with a particular focus on the social 
and institutional. Yet, this essay marshals ecosystemic metaphor in order to augment 
understanding, not to universalize economic truth. More, this essay does not seek 
absolute conformity of economic systems to biological ecosystems, but to develop a 
theoretical posture which centers the actually existing and various interactions between 
the social and the economic, and to extend out a methodology from that posture. The task 
of this essay is to articulate a theory which can fully consider the interaction between 
economic phenomena and the socialized contexts those phenomena inhabit. Indeed, it 
should allow us to consider fundamentally economic claims nestled in relationships of 
social and institutional power, like those made by Ngũgĩ about the relationship between 
colonial power and development possibilities in the young Kenyan Republic.   
STRUCTURE OF THIS ESSAY 
The next section, Section II, takes up the question, “Why is the socio-institutional 
ecosystem useful for economic inquiry?” It begins with the notion of ‘embeddedness’ 
read through the writing of Marx, Polanyi, and Granovetter, as an entry point to the 
consideration of the social fabric in which economic activity occurs. Next, this essay 
examines many examples of interaction between the social and economic spheres to 
demonstrate the breadth, depth, and quality of interaction from these two. These 
examples serve to establish and name actual relationship before proceeding to a more 
abstract discussion. Three characteristics emerge from these examples, which are posited 
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as characteristics of the relationships socio-institutional ecosystem, which are: (1) 
dialectic causality; (2) path dependency and historical inertia with no tendency towards 
an a priori endpoint; and (3) mechanisms which are difficult to formally model. Those 
characteristics then frame an inquiry into various economic schools of thought, as a way 
to think about how economic theory can – and cannot – capture the various elements of 
the social-economic interaction. While various theoretical groups in economics can 
reveal important economic facts, a widespread inability to grapple with the important 
characteristics of the socio-institutional ecosystem persists in many modes of thought in 
economics. To make sense of why, this essay turns to Cullenberg’s epistemological 
categorizations to frame these approaches in terms of Cartesian and Hegelian totalities, 
and the section concludes by exploring the notion of a decentered totality as an 
epistemological base for the socio-institutional ecosystem.  
Having animated the case that the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis can 
reveal important insights into economic reality and possibility, Section III sets about 
articulate a positive theory of the socio-institutional ecosystem. This section explores a 
variety of contributions from economic geographers and economic sociologists. Of 
particular importance are the notions of ‘space’ from economic geographers, and 
‘networks’ from economic sociologists. These contributions give structure to the 
previously considered characteristics of the social-economic interchange, which have 
been largely ignored by economists. This section concludes with a fuller articulation of 
the socio-institutional ecosystem.  
Given this theoretical grounding, what kinds of methodologies are appropriate for 
socio-institutional ecosystem analysis? Section IV considers which methods can most 
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adequately capture the machinations of a socio-institutional ecosystem. Because of the 
various relationships at stake, this section explores methodological pluralism, and how, 
while holding onto a commitment to pluralism, various postures can serve clarity instead 
of clouding it. Because of the epistemological foundations explored in the previous 
section, methodology for socio-institutional ecosystem analysis must confront the 
interface between power and knowledge. While this problematic may be seen by some as 
a complication to inquiry, this essay takes the posture that in addition to ethical necessity, 
careful consideration of the interface between knowledge and power ultimately reveals 
clearer truths in the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis, and thus serves clarity in 
economics.  
Finally, the conclusion pulls together these strands into a cogent restatement of 
socio-institutional ecosystem analysis and its possibilities in economics. 
II. WHY THE SOCIO-INSTITUTIONAL ECOSYSTEM? 
The socio-institutional ecosystem analysis makes an intervention into economic 
inquiry which highlights the interaction between economic phenomena and social 
structures. This interaction forms a crucial part of understanding those very economic 
phenomena, which conventional economic theory has not been able to fully capture. To 
animate the case for such an analysis, this section deploys several invocations of the idea 
of ‘embeddedness’ as an entry point for the consideration of the socio-institutional 
ecosystem. A series of empirical examples of the myriad of relationships contained in the 
socio-institutional ecosystemic frame the case for the centrality of the social-economic 
relationship implied by the entry point of ‘embeddedness,’ and serve to ground future 
discussion in the concrete.  From this, three characteristics of the relationships in the 
socio-institutional ecosystem are drawn out: (1) dialectic causality; (2) contingency, or no 
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tendency towards an a priori endpoint; and (3) mechanisms which are difficult to 
formally model.  Considering these characteristics, this essay examines how other 
schools of thought in economics have been able to capture these characteristics. The 
analysis of Cullenberg brings clarity to this exercise, by categorizing the epistemologies 
of Cartesian and Hegelian totalities in economics, before offering a third decentered 
totality which can resolve some of the limits present in capturing the dynamics of a socio-
institutional ecosystem (Cullenberg, 1999) . This section demonstrates the necessity of 
socio-institutional ecosystem analysis by showing that the relationships at stake are 
central, not peripheral, to economic life. Given the characteristics of these relationships, 
conventional economic approaches cannot capture the elements of the socio-institutional 
ecosystem. However, a decentered epistemological frame can capture the set of 
relationships.  
ENTRY POINT: EMBEDDEDNESS FROM MARX TO POLANYI TO GRANOVETTER 
Three varied notions of ‘embeddedness’ offer an entry point for the consideration 
of the socio-institutional ecosystem: Marx’s Gesellschaftsform, the 
‘embeddedness/disembeddedness’ of Polanyi, and Granovetter’s ‘embeddedness,’ (Marx 
1857; Polanyi 2001; Granovetter 1985). In the introduction to The Grundrisse, Marx is 
concerned about the tendency of economists to generalize their descriptions of 
contemporaneous economic phenomena to the whole of society and to history. 
Economists aim to “present production […] as encased in eternal natural laws 
independent of history, at which opportunity bourgeois relations are then quietly 
smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on which society in the abstract is founded,” 
(Marx, 1857, chap. 1). His answer to this tendency is as straightforward as it is simple: 
“all production is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual within and through 
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a specific form of society,” (Marx, 1857, chap. 1, emphasis mine). Marx lays out the 
characteristic common to all production – the appropriation of nature – but insists that 
this happens everywhere within the specific set of social relationships in which that 
production occurs. This Marxian concept of Gesellschaftsform – or ‘specific form of 
society’ – forms a fundamental foundation to his economic analysis, and not a peripheral 
consideration. As such, this idea appears again in the first chapter of Capital Volume I, 
where commodities are explained as a particular set of social relationships from which 
the value form of capitalism descends (Marx, 2010). Indeed, it is only the specific social 
relationships of the capitalist mode, dependent on the market to produce and exchange 
commodities, which engender the analysis of value that is to follow (Cangiani, 2011). As 
such, the universality of economic activity for Marx can only register at its highest 
abstraction – a metabolism between humans and nature – while the understanding of any 
more granular economic activity requires an understanding of the social context which 
embeds that activity.  
Polanyi first relates social sphere and economic sphere to each other through the 
notion of embeddedness, which he deploys to describe the epoch-defining transformation 
of modern capitalism. Prior to modern capitalism, the economic sphere was embedded 
within the social sphere. People understood economic activity as a subset of a larger web 
of social relationships and hierarchies. The great transformation that brought about 
modern capitalism was the process of the economic sphere disembedding from the social 
sphere. In so doing, the economic sphere existed independently and for itself, and even 
created social institutions embedded within it to prop up this structure. As argued by 
Machado, Polanyi’s economic sphere is not the formalist approach which renders 
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economic activity to market interactions between homines economici, but the 
substantivist “supply of material means to satisfy human needs,” which universalizes 
economic activity of humans (like Marx, at a high level of abstraction) and allows for 
comparison between systems (Machado, 2011, p. 121). Polanyi’s thought distinguishes 
modern capitalism from previous systems by the ordering of the relationship between the 
two spheres. In previous systems, the economic sphere was embedded within the social 
sphere, but the transformation of capitalism was to reverse that relationship: “instead of 
economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the 
economic system,” (Polanyi, 2001, p. 77). Scale of analysis matters here: Polanyi deploys 
the notion to distinguish the paradigm shift between systems and does not argue that the 
‘disembeddedness’ of the great transformation means that the economic sphere, as a 
descriptive fact, actually stands in isolation. As argued by Cangiani, “The fact that being 
“disembedded” constitutes a general and permanent feature of the market economy does 
not clash with the fact that a perfectly self-regulating and perfectly competitive market 
never existed and could not exist,” (Cangiani, 2011, p. 191). 
Granovetter invokes ‘embeddedness’ to show that all human activity, including 
economic activity, takes place in the embedded context of social structures, though not, 
as Polanyi argues, to draw distinctions between systems of economic and social 
organization. Granovetter’s ‘embeddedness’ asserts that mainstream economists have 
assumed social structures to be frictional, but that in fact “[sociological] analysis reveals 
central, not peripheral, features of these [economic] processes,” (Granovetter, 1985, p. 
505). Confusion may result from the differential deployment of ‘embeddedness’ between 
economic sociologists and scholars in Polanyi’s tradition. Cangiani writes that “the 
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problem is to distinguish different meanings, in order to avoid an improper reference to 
Polanyi, resulting in the entanglement of his embedded/disembedded distinction in the 
‘sociological’ concept of ‘embeddedness,’”(Cangiani, 2011, p. 191).  
This essay does not seek to resolve the tensions in various uses of the notion of 
embeddedness in Marx, Polanyi, and Granovetter. However, through the divergent uses 
of embeddedness a key similarity emerges: the social and the economic deeply intertwine 
and exert influence on the other. The notion of a deeply interwoven relationship between 
the social and the economic has deep precedent in economics, and economic-adjacent 
social science. In these renderings, each sphere requires the other in order to comprehend 
it. With that entry point, this essay turns attention to examples of these interactions, to 
explore their breadth and depth as well as to ground further discussion in real-world 
examples before examining some of the abstractions which frame these.  
EXAMPLES OF INTERACTION BETWEEN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
What kinds of relationships, and at what scales, do we mean for the socio-
institutional ecosystem to consider? Below, this section explores a range of co-formative 
relationships which move between the social and the economic in both directions. 
Consideration of a range of examples at various scales will help to illustrate the point. 
The various examples below are not intended to thoroughly tell complex social and 
economic stories, but to ground discussion in the concrete range of possibility. This 
section, similarly, does not attempt to locate original causes, but simply to name causal 
relationships examined across economics, history, and other social sciences.  These 
examples to demonstrate the breadth and depth of the social-economic interchange.  
From the Social to the Economic 
Social structures – including racial stratification, networks, group behavior, and 
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cultural views of agriculture – effect economic phenomena. For example, Bertrand and 
Mulainathan show that in the contemporary United States, otherwise identical job 
resumes submitted to job openings with white sounding names are 50 percent more likely 
to receive callbacks for job interviews than those resumes submitted with black sounding 
names. They convincingly argue that “differential treatment by race still appears to still 
be prominent in the U.S. labor market,” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004, p. 991). Kang, 
DeCelles, Tilcsik, and Jun extend this, and document a range of strategies that racial 
minorities adopt in the US labor market to “avoid discrimination by concealing of 
downplaying racial cues in job applications, a practice known as ‘resume whitening,’” 
(Kang et al., 2016, p. 469). Because of the way that gender roles and stereotypes are so 
written into society, hurricanes with feminine names result in higher death tolls and more 
damage than hurricanes with masculine names, because “they lead to lower perceived 
risk and consequently less preparedness,” (Jung et al., 2014). Lohr describes how social 
relationships amongst Japanese businessmen are of fundamental importance to Japanese 
economic and social life, and make it harder for other business people to initiate business 
relationships (Lohr, 1982). Granovetter argues that for someone coming in from the 
outside, without such a relationships, the relationships amongst Japanese businessmen 
may constitute a trade barrier (Granovetter 1985, 495). Gĩthĩnji and Perrings argue that 
policy interventions in Kenya and Botswana were not as successful as designed because 
of a failure to comprehend the social institutions they encountered: “[the policies] took 
little account of the role of the institutions they were intended to replace in guaranteeing 
the social security of individual resource users […] the new policies were compromised 
precisely because they were not socially sustainable,” ( Gĩthĩnji and Perrings 1993, 110). 
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Importantly, this work focuses on codetermination between social, ecological, and 
economic structures, and how policy failed to grasp these codeterminative features and 
thus failed. Salamon conducted long term ethnographic studies of farming communities 
in rural Illinois, and she observed important differences between ‘Yankee’ farmers and 
German-Catholic farmers, over generations (Salamon, 1995). German-Catholic farmers 
saw agriculture as a way of life, and had bigger families, smaller farms, and a more labor 
intensive choice of crops, whereas Yankee farmers say agriculture primarily as a 
business, with bigger farms, smaller families, and capital-intensive crop selection (Boyd 
and Richerson, 2005).  
Of course, formal institutions – laws, political forms, historical power 
arrangements, and firm structure – also affect economic outcome. Seminal studies feed 
intense debate, like Card and Krueger’s study on state minimum wage laws and 
unemployment, or Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s ‘reversal of fortune’ hypothesis 
(Card and Krueger 1994; Acemoglu et al. 2002). You need not look far, though, for 
studies which continually examine the effect of formal social institutions on economic 
phenomena. Gubernick writes about  how ‘ban the box’ legislation positively impacts 
employment prospects for former felons (Gubernick, 2017). Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 
et al. on union membership rates affect inter- and intra- gender wage equality (Card et al. 
2004). Pencavel and Craig on how type of firm affects efficiency in the plywood industry 
(Craig et al., 1995).  
On another space and time scale, era defining social relationships, such as the 
colonial encounter, have seeded profound economic change.  When the Portuguese 
arrived in the western Indian Ocean in the 16th century and attempted to monopolize the 
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trade that the Swahili city-states maintained with Arab and South Asian merchants, the 
volume of trade dropped precipitously. Whether this was a result of solely of Portuguese 
naval might, or aided by other factors of the economic landscape (e.g., a famine in India, 
a drop in European demand for imports), the decline in trade severely depopulated 
Swahili city states and upset an embedded order of production and distribution with the 
hinterland, coast, and Indian Ocean (Sinclair and Hakansson, 2000, p. 476). Gaspar de 
São Bernandino, a Portuguese Franciscan traveler, wrote of Mombasa in 1606 that the 
“inhabitants are Moors who, although formerly rich, now live in utter poverty,” 
(Freeman-Grenville, 1962, p. 167). Issa Shivji writes that “capitalist relations in Tanzania 
were not part of the process of organic development of the Tanzanian society…they were 
introduced as a result of imperialist invasion and subsequent colonization of the country,” 
(Shivji, 1986a, p. 239). Azhar demonstrates how pre-colonial land tenure systems affect 
contemporary development in South Asia (Azhar, 2016). Khan, Morrissey, and Mosley 
find that extractive colonial economies negatively affect post-independence political 
inclusion and wealth equality in Sub Saharan Africa (Khan et al., 2019a). Bowden and 
Chiripanhura show how the early presence of settlers in African colonies has adversely 
affected poverty reduction today (Bowden et al., 2008a).  
From the Economic to the Social 
In other instances, the economic sphere exerts tremendous influence over social 
agents and social structures. The shape and structure of economies and individual 
economic outcomes conditions social attitudes and beliefs. Using data from the World 
Values Survey, Doepke and Zilibotti show that a country’s national inequality affects 
parenting style – parents are more likely to emphasize ‘hard work,’ even to young 
children, if national income inequality is higher (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2019). Piff, 
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Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, and Keltner show across various studies that wealth 
increases unethical behavior, from listening less to poorer people, to stopping less at 
crosswalks for pedestrians (Piff et al., 2012). Peterson, summarizing this and other 
similar research, writes “these aren’t just inherited traits, but developed ones[,] money, in 
other words, changes who you are,” (Peterson, 2012). Allen, Bartiloro, Gu, and 
Kowaleski find that different economic bases – manufacturing and services – result in 
different financial structures and attendant laws for the financial system, in panel data of 
108 countries (Allen et al., 2018) 
Other macro trends in economies condition sociality in particular ways. 
Emigration and movement often springs from economic necessity, and calls a series of 
social norms, idioms, and reactionary attitudes. Media Lengua, a language with Spanish 
words spoken in Quechua grammar by semi-urbanized indigenous workers formed as a 
distinct feature of urbanization and job opportunities in Ecuador 20th century Ecuador 
(Velupillai, 2015). This is not dissimilar from other forms of pidginization and 
creolization created initially for economic purpose – such as Tok Pisin or Papiamentu - 
and now imbibed with universes and worldviews present in all languages (McWhorter, 
2018). Xenophobia, and its attendant laws, attitudes, and violent repression, finds roots in 
many phenomenon, including actual or perceived job insecurity as demonstrated by Cea 
D’Ancona in Spain (Cea D’Ancona, 2016). The development of racist social attitudes and 
laws has had a material element to it. Pulling from the work of Geschwender’s Racial 
Stratification in America, Bohmer writes that “the ideology of black inferiority developed 
as a rationalization or justification for slavery; it was not the cause of slavery,” (Bohmer, 
from Whitehead & Harris, 82). This kind of materialist historiography has been used to 
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explain differences in structures of racism, such as the legal one-drop rule in the 
American South (Louisiana & coastal South Carolina notwithstanding), compared to the 
juridical colorism of the Caribbean, which conferred ‘mulatto’ not just a social, but legal 
category (Hickman, 1997; Law and Tate, 2015; Reece, 2018). Wolfe, referencing 
Australia, Brazil, and the United States,  discusses miscegenation as “the struggle over 
differentiation…defining any social system – who exploits whom in the production and 
reproduction of power, wealth, and privilege?” (Wolfe, 2001, p. 905). Yet locating 
original cause remains debated. West critiques the notions that racial inferiority only 
descends from the material exigencies of slavery and capitalism. He argues that these 
theories “subsume racism under the general rubric of working-class exploitation,” and 
demonstrates the development of racist ideologies well before the rise of modern 
capitalism: “it can easily be shown that although racist practices were shaped and 
appropriated by modern capitalism, racism itself predates capitalism,” (West, 1986, p. 
1,3). 
Clearly, a multitude of various interactions – at a range of scale and time – 
comprise the web of relationships between the social and the economic. Yet, these 
examples demonstrate that the relationship between the social and the economic is by no 
means peripheral or frictional, but central and fundamental to a range of economic 
phenomena, where both act on each other as cause and effect. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOCIAL & ECONOMIC 
Given the basic insight from Marx, Polanyi, and Granovetter and the examples 
laid out above, several key characteristics to emerge, which this essay provisionally 
posits as key features of the socio-institutional ecosystem. This essay then deploys these 
characteristics as a standard of measure in consideration of various forms of economic 
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theory, in order to appraise the capability of economic theory in understanding the 
relationship between the social and the economic.  
This essay posits the socio-institutional ecosystem as an analytical unit for the 
study of economic phenomena. The use of this unit focuses on constitutive and causal 
relationships between social structures and economic phenomena. We use ‘ecosystem’ as 
metaphor to call upon the multiplicity of relationships which act as a vessel for economic 
activity, much as all biological activity occurs not in a vacuum but in the ether of an 
ecosystem. We focus on three features – closely interrelated – which emerge from 
consideration of the range relationships in a socio-institutional ecosystem:  
• Dialectic Causality: the social and the economic both affect each other; 
• Path Dependency and Historical Inertia: the various relationships of the system 
unfold according to its own trajectory, not a pre-given telos; 
• Troubles Formality: in many cases, the location, quality, and volume of various 
trends and causes resists easy mapping and measurement in mathematical 
formality;  
These three features do not comprise – or even attempt to comprise - the totality 
of characteristics of the socio-institutional ecosystem. Rather, they are seen as three key 
characteristics, and features which present trouble for traditional economic 
epistemologies and methods, explored below. 
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 
This section works through each of the three features as a point of departure from 
conventional economic theories and seeks to understand how various schools of 
economics have approached the relationship between the social and the economic.   
 
- 26 - 
 
Dialectic Causality: Neoclassicals & New Institutionalists 
This essay has argued that the socio-institutional relationship contains 
relationships which operate on each other as both cause and effect. More, causal features 
are simultaneous and multiple. Yet even when neoclassicals and new institutionalists 
have given explicit consideration to the interaction between the social and the economic, 
both have failed to appreciate the dialectic causal relationships between the social and the 
economic. Take, for example, Becker’s work on discrimination, The Economics of 
Discrimination, which is a good example of neoclassical thought on the relation between 
institutions and economics. For Becker, discrimination exists as an a priori and 
individual preference: “if an individual has a ‘taste for discrimination,’ he must act as if 
he were willing to pay something, either directly or in the form of reduced income, to be 
associated with some persons instead of others,” (Becker, 2010, p. 14). The social process 
of discrimination happens during economic action as employee discrimination, employer 
discrimination, consumer discrimination, but the preferences are rendered as pre-given 
(exogenous) and relatively fixed, according to the neoclassical playbook. There is no 
reckoning with what may occasion a taste for discrimination may come or if it has a 
relationship to economic phenomena, or even if an agent’s utility-space constitutes an 
appropriate theoretical vessel to model discrimination. There is no reckoning with how 
‘the market’ and ‘competition’ themselves may be sites molded and shaped by 
discrimination. Yet, the rhetorical (and political) brilliance of Becker’s argument lies 
precisely in this confinement of discrimination to an individual’s utility space; capitalist 
processes are not only divorced from their relationship to discrimination, but they are the 
solution to it. As people who have a taste for discrimination have to pay for it, they will 
be outcompeted, in the conditions of perfect competition, by other consumers, workers, 
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and employers (Becker, 2010). An individual’s preferences cannot be changed, but they 
can be marginalized by the market. It remains unclear what this does to the next iteration 
of discriminating agents, and how a ‘taste for discrimination’ is seeded and transmitted 
socially. Within this model, one can only say that the economy itself cannot affect an 
individual’s preferences, as they are prior to the model. As such, this representative 
approach of the neoclassical school’s modeling of social effects remains incapable of 
thinking how the economic exerts influence on the social.  
The New Institutional Economics, which takes social institutions seriously, flips 
the causal map of Becker, and most often explains various institutions as the result of 
some arrangement of preferences and first principles. That is, the new institutionalists 
marshal some set of economically feasible priors to explain why a particular institution 
exists. North argues that transactions costs – in particular measuring value, costliness of 
exchange, and enforcement – shape various institutions which exist to minimize 
transactions costs (North, 1987). Similarly, Williamson argued that vertical integration of 
business resulted from the objective of decreasing transactions costs (Williamson, 1971). 
Later, North et al. (2009) argue that institutions of governance descend from their 
primary objective – to minimize violence (North et al., 2009). In these renderings, social 
institutions exist as the outcome, or dependent variable, of some fundamental economic 
process, given a set of primary conditions. Jackson writes that the “new institutional 
economics seeks to explain institutions through methods compatible with the 
mainstream” (Jackson, 2013, p. 819). One of the persistent criticisms of the New 
Institutional Economics is that it simply explains the existence of institutions using 
neoclassical theory – it doesn’t incorporate sociality into its framework in a way that 
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meaningfully appreciates the richness of social and economic spheres.  
Path Dependency and Historical Inertia: Macroeconomics, SSA Theory, RCTs in 
Development Economics 
Other theories grant a primacy towards the resolution of their model – often 
equilibrium though also other forms of telos, such as a historically necessary similarity 
between similar structures. This essay argues there is no a priori reason that the 
relationships in the socio-institutional ecosystem ought to tend towards toward anything. 
That is, the effects of interaction in a socio-institutional ecosystem display no tendency 
towards convergence, equilibrium, or telos. Yet this epistemelogical imprint is a feature 
to several schools of economic thought, where the outcome being explained obtains as 
the inevitable result of a particular process. “If the market is genuinely perceived as an 
open-ended, nondetermined evolutionary process in which the essential driving force is 
human choice,” argue Buchanan and Vanberg, “any insinuation, however subtle, of a 
‘telos’ towards which the process can be predicted must be inherently misleading,” 
(Buchanan and Vanberg, 1994, p. 325).  
The tendency to guide economic thinking towards a telos is based in an 
understanding of economics as the discernment of fundamental laws of economic 
activity, which can be discovered and described, like a machine. The metaphor of 
economy-as-machine – widespread through the discipline – stands out as a stark example 
of this, though others exist. In mainstream macroeconomic models of growth, machine-
like models lead to some form of equilibrium. We see this from the Solow growth model 
(growth as a function of population and capital accumulation) to the Romer growth 
model (growth as a function of technological change), where the methodologies seeks to 
obtain a long run equilibrium growth rate from a series of bounded causes (Romer, 1989; 
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Solow, 1956). The same holds in the world of neoclassical microeconomists also focus 
on equilibrium, from Walras’ law of equilibrium to the general equilibrium model fully 
articulated by Arrow and Debreu (Arrow and Debreu, 1954; Walras, 2003).  
Yet, we can still find teleological thinking farther afield. Social Structures of 
Accumulation Theory (SSA), a Marxian theory that seeks to explain periods of growth in 
capitalist economies was first applied to the US, and then extended further afield. It has 
focused on the “institutional arrangements that help to sustain long wave upswings,” 
(Lippit, 2006, p. 1). Yet, these conceptualizations tend towards a pre-given object – 
“[SSAs] can best be understood as institutional structures that (temporarily) stabilize 
class contradictions,” (Wolfson and Kotz, 2009, p. 2). Why do social structures, in a 
nation, across time, need to be imbibed with the task of stabilizing class contradictions? 
We could compare this to the ‘spatial-fix’ theory of Harvey, who simply argues that 
contradictions may find (contemporaneous) life elsewhere. While the thrust of SSA 
theory towards a fuller grasp of Marxian socio-institutional thought – particularly how 
mezzo-level institutions mediate macro-structural accumulation – have been valuable, the 
theory still holds that there is a particular directionality, or purpose, to the unfolding of 
economic and social phenomena. This argue that like the machine equilibria of 
neoclassical models, there is no tendency for the interaction of the social and the 
economic to produce a pre-given outcome. As argued by Buchanan and Vanberg: 
All conceptualizations of the market process which suppose, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, a “something” toward which the process is moving 
are, by this very fact, teleological, whether that “something” is specified as an 
equilibrium or otherwise. This applies to the notion of a mechanical 
equilibrium as implied in the standard textbook models of intersecting 
demand and supply curves, as well as to the thermodynamic equilibrium 
concept that is implied where the market process is interpreted in terms of 
exhaustion of potential games from trade.” (Buchanan and Vanberg, 1994, p. 
325). 
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Indeed, history itself functions as a cause on current scenarios. Such a proposition 
finds quarter in much of the social sciences, but can be hard for economics to process, 
because of the dominance of the economy-as-machine metaphor in the social sciences, 
which, as argued above, dampens appreciation of history’s ability to act as a present 
cause. The socio-institutional ecosystem hypothesis allows for a shifting terrain upon 
which economic and social phenomena occur, the shifts subject to the movement of those 
very phenomena. However, much of economics insist that that space remains 
fundamentally the same, leading to approaches which do not take history seriously. 
Chang writes about how development economics, because of influence from the 
neoclassical school, has seen a shift away from context-specific historical data to a 
“contemporary discussion on economic development policy-making which has been 
particularly ahistorical,” (Chang, 2002, p. 7). Since the rise of and domination of 
Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) in development economics, this trend has come to 
even more prominence. Consider this quote in a TED Talk from Nobel prize winning 
economist Duflo: 
“It’s not the Middle Ages anymore, it’s the 21st century. And in the 20th 
century, randomized controlled trials have revolutionized medicine by 
allowing us to distinguish between drugs that work and drugs that don’t work. 
And you can do the same, randomized controlled trial for social policy. You 
can put social innovation through the same rigorous, scientific tests that we 
use for drugs. And in this way, you can take the guesswork out of policy-
making by knowing what works, what doesn't work and why” (Duflo, 2010). 
The necessary equivalence for this epistemological approach to function is that 
the economy must be to economics what the human body is to the medical sciences – a 
machine with universal qualities experienced anywhere. Policy functions just like 
medicine, and then economic maladies function like disease. So, can we study poverty in 
the way we study polio? For that to be the case, the production of poverty must have a 
 
- 31 - 
 
universal ‘sameness’ to it. Perhaps there are features of poverty which hold common, 
though certainly there are those which do not. “The experimental approach, initially 
developed to investigate natural phenomena, problematizes poverty as an ahistorical and 
non-systemic issue that does not need to be related to previous events or states of the 
world, nor be understood as embedded in a global order,” argues Abdelghafour, which 
thus “circumvents north-south relationships and macroeconomic policy as potential 
explanations for poverty, and considerably reduces the subversive potential of anti-
poverty action,” (Abdelghafour, 2017). Van der Linden’s work cautions that such 
epistemological priors are dangerous and cloud the ability to comprehend the reality of 
situation while focusing on the least important parts. Arguing that such ahistorical 
approaches “superimpose ‘forced abstractions’ on history” Van der Linden that that these 
methodologies “are not grounded in a thorough analysis of its concrete specificities, and 
which, therefore, are to a large degree arbitrary and superficial, or even purely subjective 
preferences,” (van der Linden, 2010, p. xi). 
Problematizing Formality: Post-Walrasian Game Theory & Applied 
Microeconomics 
This essay argues that while many relationships amongst elements of the socio-
institutional ecosystem are describable, they can be hard to formalize. In part, this has to 
do with the dialectic nature of phenomena as both cause and effect. More, certain 
elements of the cultural and social ecosystem prove impossible to measure, and that much 
more difficult to model.  
Take racism. As a potent social force, racism is clearly an important part of 
modern society which affects economic life, and economists have grappled with how to 
apprehend it for some time. We saw above that Becker modeled discrimination as 
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individual preference. Indeed, for economists, individual utility space – where 
preferences are formally modellable before agents interact – has dominated as the site for 
economic consideration of racism, even outside the bounds of strict neoclassical though. 
For example, this continues to in the post-Walrasian evolutionary game theory of Bowles, 
who describes residential segregation  as a result of preferences between blues and greens 
(a further abstraction in its own right) (Bowles, 2009, p. 66). Of course, this formal 
modeling of agent interaction can be a helpful tool – Darity, Mason, and Stewart deploy 
evolutionary game theoretic modeling based on individual preference and strategy 
selection, and are clear that this modeling represents one way of understanding racism 
and economic phenomena (Darity et al. 2006). Their work shows that almost any result 
can obtain, and makes up just one piece of a much larger oeuvre dealing with the 
interaction between racism and economic outcome. Yet when we step back, can we really 
say that agent-based modelling presents the best way to model the complexities of a 
social force like racism? Practitioners and scholars of race and racism do not describe 
racism as confined to the domain of an agent’s utility space. Woods, deploying 
ecosystemic metaphor, writes: 
Racism is an insidious cultural disease. It is so insidious that it doesn’t care if 
you are a white person who likes black people; it’s still going to find a way to 
infect how you deal with people who don’t look like you. Yes, racism looks 
like hate, but hate is just one manifestation. Privilege is another. Access is 
another. Ignorance is another. Apathy is another. And so on. So while I agree 
with people who say no one is born racist, it remains a powerful system that 
we’re immediately born into. It’s like being born into air: you take it in as 
soon as you breathe… It’s a set of socioeconomic traps and cultural values 
that are fired up every time we interact with the world. (Woods, 2014). 
It is hard to formally model racism as the air in which we move – especially when 
economists model agents in a substance-less ether – and so economists are more wont to 
model it as a set of individual preferences. This commitment to mathematical formalism 
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not only affects economic theory, but our empiricism. A good example of how this 
formalism narrows the scope to a limited set of interactions comes from applied 
microeconomics. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales use an applied microeconomic approach 
to ask a fundamentally important question: “Does culture affect economic outcomes?” 
(Guiso et al. 2006). After (correctly) establishing that economics has ignored questions of 
culture, they write that “without testable hypotheses […] there is no role for culture in 
economics,” (Guiso et al. 2006, 23). New data and techniques, they argue, allow the 
possibility of identifying systemic preferences related to culture which “suggests an 
approach to introducing culturally-based explanations into economics that can be tested 
and may substantially enrich our understanding of economic phenomena,” (Guiso et al. 
2006, 23). They begin to model the ways in which culture may inflect economic 
outcomes by narrowing the definition of culture and outlining a mechanism for the ways 
that culture affects outcomes. Culture is defined as “those customary beliefs and values 
that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to 
generation,” (Guiso et al. 2006, 23). That is, they only focus on the static elements of 
culture, and on the elements which accord tightly to ethnic and religious groups. They 
model a tripartite causal mechanism: culture influences preferences, preferences 
influence economic outcomes, and, importantly, economic outcomes do not influence 
culture. This has clear relation to dialectic causality – the foundations of applied 
microeconomics are neoclassical – but this posture requires the elimination of the last 
causality in order for the causal interpretations of the formal econometric model. 
Therefore, their investigation can only consider a static rendering of culture. They claim 
to be able to isolate the cultural components of a belief system by using only religion and 
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ethnicity as instrumental variables for culture. So, using data from the World Values 
Survey, they show that ‘thriftiness’ is more likely to be taught by religious parents than 
nonreligious parents (from 2.7 percent more likely for Protestant parents to 7.2 percent 
for Buddhist and Hindu parents, with no statistical difference between Muslims and 
nonreligious people). They then go on to show that attitudes about teaching thriftiness 
affect the savings rate of a country – a “10 percentage point increase in the share of 
people who think that thriftiness is a value that should be taught to children is linked to a 
1.3 percentage point increase in the national savings rate,” and that that “cultural 
explanation for national saving is quite comparable in size to the power of the celebrated 
life-cycle model,” (Guiso et al. 2006, 39). We are left with a description of one very 
particular channel of the ways in which some cultural practices inflect cultural outcomes, 
and this may be a useful economic fact. But when we consider the grandness of the 
question – does culture affect economic outcomes? – we depart with an answer so 
necessarily stripped down by the required formalizability of the applied microeconomic 
approach that the broad view implied by the initial question leaves the analysis dearly 
wanting.  
In consideration of the three emergent features of the socio-institutional 
ecosystem – dialectic causality, path dependency and historical inertia, and the troubling 
of formality – the shortcomings of conventional economic theories become apparent. 
This is not to argue that conventional economic theory has been wrong, rather it 
highlights that conventional economic theory has missed out on some fundamental 
relationships which condition economic phenomena by constricting its view to limit 
interaction of the economic and the social. In the next section, this essay explores some 
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of the deeper epistemological roots of this, and considers an appropriate epistemological 
base for the socio-institutional frame. 
CULLENBERG’S EPISTEMOLOGIES OF TOTALITY 
This essay makes use Cullenberg’s (1999) categorization of epistemological 
trends in economics according to their conceptions of totality to make sense of various 
trends in economic thought explored above, and to build the epistemological base for a 
positive theory of socio-institutional ecosystems. Cullenberg names Cartesian totality, 
Hegelian totality, and decentered totality as three organizing frames form economic 
epistemology, categorizing most theories in the first two totalities, and positing the third 
decentered totality as a frame which escapes some of the flaws of the previous two.  
Cartesian & Hegelian Totalies  
In a Cartesian totality, “parts are given independent to and prior to the social 
whole,” (Cullenberg, 1999, p. 801). Reductionist thought underlies Cartesian totalities, 
where society is distilled to its atomistic level. This is perhaps best shown through the 
methodological individualism, which finds quarter throughout economics, but 
particularly in neoclassical economics. An individual agent is endowed with a series of 
properties – a utility function, initial endowments, etc. – and a set of rules for interacting 
with other agents, from which the social whole – from micro-markets modeled by the 
Edgeworth box to macroeconomic growth projections – can be formally and 
fundamentally shown and known. In addition to the neoclassical school, Cullenberg also 
places Neo-Ricardian thought, and Analytical Marxism in the category of Cartesian 
totality.  
In some capacities a reversal of the Cartesian totality, a Hegelian totality 
demarcates a frame where “the social whole is understood as ontologically prior to the 
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individual agents,” (Cullenberg, 1999, p. 802). The contradictions of Hegelian thought 
lace through the social whole which resolve through the dialectical mode – the ‘law of 
motion of the totality’ – through a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Yet despite these 
ruminations, the social whole still fundamentally determines the nature of the individual 
in this whole. Cullenberg argues that Classical Marxism and Keynesian economics, and 
older historical economics subscribe to the Hegelian totality.  
Both approaches – the Hegelian and Cartesian totalities – contain endpoints which 
descend from their first principles. They tend towards a telos. “While each of these 
approaches to totality differs in many and varied ways, each shares a reductionist 
methodology wherein social explanations are ultimately constructed on the basis of a 
rock-bottom essence, whether that be the logical structure of a pregiven whole or the 
rationality of a fully self-constituted agent,” Cullenberg writes, “in these approaches, 
attention to contingent and varied institutional contexts, social embeddedness, and the 
mutual determination of structure and agent is avoided,” (Cullenberg, 1999, p. 804). If we 
desire an epistemological basis for which to consider the various and layered interactions 
between the social and the economic, we ought to avoid epistemologies which preclude 
that consideration.  
Decentered Totality 
Cullenberg offers a third totality a way to escape from some of the traps above, 
and can serve as an epistemological base which can capture the three emergent 
characteristics of the socio-institutional ecosystem in economic analysis. Using the work 
of Althusser as a point of departure, read through Resnick and Wolff, the decentered 
totality hinges on the idea of overdetermination, which Cullenberg defines as “a theory of 
existence that states that nothing exists in and of itself, prior to and independent from 
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everything else, and therefore all aspects of a society exist only as the result of the 
constitution (mutual determination) of all of society's other aspects,” (Cullenberg, 1999, 
p. 812). The concept of overdetermination gives quarter to the notions of “blind drift, 
emergent economies (totalities), process, cultural embeddedness, non-progressive 
evolutionary theories of change, and so on,” (Cullenberg, 1999, p. 812) This posture 
allows for the characteristics of the socio-institutional ecosystem explored above – 
dialectic causality, path dependency and historical inertia, with elements difficult to 
formalize,– to find an epistemological base which can avoid the pitfalls of other 
prominent epistemological totalities in economics. From this base, a further articulation 
of the socio-institutional ecosystem becomes possible. 
What are we left from these initial indications, problematics, preliminary 
categorizations of the relationship between the social and the economic? This section has 
shown that there exists a strong basis for in economic (and economic-adjacent) theory to 
deal with the relationship between the social and the institutional through the work of 
Marx, Polanyi, and Granovetter. The indications of this entry point are matched by an 
empirical record which displays a large range of causal and co-formative relationships 
which appear to be central, not peripheral to causation in economics. From here, this 
section pulled out three characteristics which require further consideration – dialectic 
causality, path dependency and historical inertia, and with elements difficult to formalize. 
These characteristics qualify extant economic theory, and demonstrates that many of the 
methodologies in economics are incapable of dealing with these characteristics of the 
socio-institutional ecosystem. Cullenberg’s epistemological categorization helps us 
understand why, and at the same time provides the ‘decentered totality’ as a base from 
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which to mount a positive theory – or, as positive a theory as possible – for the socio-
institutional ecosystem.   
III. FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIO-INSTITUTIONAL ECOSYSTEM 
If we can document the ways in which economics has de-socialized itself, and 
show that there are a plethora of reasons to situate socio-institutional ecosystems as a 
central component of economic theory, we must ask: what does a positive theory of 
socio-institutional ecosystems look like? While economics went through a long period of 
desocialization in its theory, other disciplines in the social sciences kept sociality at the 
forefront. Thus, this section looks at the disciplines of economic geography and economic 
sociology, to stitch together the antecedents and elements of socio-institutional ecosystem 
analysis. This task remains complicated, as theory in these disciplines has avoided 
convergence. However, the multiplicity of thought and approach to the relationships that 
flow between the social and the economic turns out fruitful, and this section concludes 
with a synthesis of these disparate modes into a multipronged understanding of the socio-
institutional ecosystem.  
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHERS 
Beginning with Soja, the ‘socio-spatial turn’ in economic geography has been 
concerned with theorizing how economic structures interface with spatial structures. 
Soja’s intervention waded into Marxist debates between Harvey and LeFebvre, which 
turned on causality between space and the social relations of capitalism. LeFebvre, in his 
work on the revolution of urbanism, gave a pre-eminent role to spatial relations in 
understanding modern urbanism, while Harvey’s criticism hinged on situating spatial 
relations as an effect of underlying social relations of capitalism. Soja’s intervention was 
to insist on the dialectic nature of the relationship between economic processes and the 
 
- 39 - 
 
spatial relations. That is to say, “the structure of organized space is not a separate 
structure with its own autonomous laws of construction and transformation, nor is it 
simply an expression of the class structure emerging from the social (i.e. aspatial) 
relations of production[…] it represents, instead, a dialectically defined component of the 
general relations of production, relations which are simultaneously social and spatial,” 
(Soja, 1980, p. 208). This turn set off an incredibly fruitful debate that has continued to 
resonate through to today. 
Martin follows this trajectory of economic geography and tracks the animus for 
geographers to understand socio-institutional space that comes from a desire to 
understand the geographical unevenness of capitalist development. The central question 
of the institutional turn in geographical economics has been to answer the question: “to 
what extent and in what ways are the processes of geographically uneven capitalist 
development shaped and mediated by the institutional structures in and through which 
those processes take place?” (Martin, 2002, p. 79). Geographers and others in the 
conversation began to concern themselves with questions of path dependence, 
institutional environments, and delimiting the independence of social context 
(Rutherford, 1995; Setterfield, 1997; Sunley, 1996; Thrift and Olds, 1996). Martin traces 
this turn in institutional economic geography to three perspectives, each which defines an 
institution in a particular way. The first perspective, rational choice institutionalism, 
defines an institution as those entities which “structure individual actions through 
constraint, information, or enforcement,” (Martin, 2002, p. 83). A second perspective, 
sociological institutionalism, views institutions as “culturally specific social networks of 
trust, reflexive co-operation and obligation which underpin economic behavior and 
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relationships,” (Martin, 2002, p. 83). A third perspective that Martin explores, historical 
evolutionary institutionalism, understands institutions as “systems of social, economic, 
and political power relations which frame the regulation and coordination of economic 
activity,” (Martin, 2002, p. 83).  A consensus began to emerge from this work that the 
“institutional environment” was front and center to economic analysis. Martin defined the 
“institutional environment” as: 
“the systems of informal conventions customs, norms, and social routines 
(such as habitual forms of corporate behavior, consumption cultures, 
socialized work practices, transaction norms, and so on), and the formal 
(usually legally enforced) structures of rules and regulations (for example, 
laws relating to competition, employment, contract, trade, money flows, 
corporate governance, welfare provision) which constrain and control 
socioeconomic behavior,” (Martin, 2002, p. 80). 
The combination of this this two-way causality between economic organization 
and socio-institutional space means that the directionality of spatial development of 
forms of production proceeds in locally specific ways, as the socio-spatial dialectics of 
particular places continually interact to form unique trajectories.  This work tracked onto 
the project of “rethinking economy” from J.K. Gibson-Graham, which “advocates a move 
away from ‘strong theory,’ with its ‘embracing reach’ and ‘reduced, clarified field of 
meaning’ toward ‘weak theory,’ which, though ‘little more than description,’ powerfully 
attends to nuance, diversity, and overdetermined interaction,” (Gibson-Graham, 2014, pp. 
S148-9). The relative speeds of the various machinations are choppy, with what 
Setterfield has called “institutional hysteresis,” (Setterfield, 1997). For Martin, 
institutional hysteresis “focuses on the complex interaction between institutions and 
economic activity in a way that recognizes the importance of current behavior in shaping 
future institutions, but which at the same time takes account of the extent to which this 
behavior is constrained by pre-existing institutional structures,” (Martin, 2002, p. 86).  
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ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGISTS 
Mirroring this trajectory in economic geography was a transition in economic 
sociology. Beginning in the 1980s, economic sociology began to examine economic 
theory in light of its own trajectory, and grapple for a theory which could help to explain, 
without essentializing, the relationship between sociality and economic life. Swedberg 
locates Granovetter’s 1985 paper “Economic Action and Social Structure: the problem of 
embeddedness” as a manifesto for the “new economic sociology,” (Swedberg, 1997). 
Granovetter starts with the simple and important claim that “people’s economic activities 
are embedded in their networks of social relations,” (Granovetter, 2011). Yet, 
Granovetter was motivated by navigating between various different reactions in the social 
sciences. At one extreme lay the Hobbesian rational, atomic, and self-interested homo 
economicus and at the other, borrowing from Wrong, the ‘oversocialized’ conception of 
man that was taking hold as reaction in sociology (Granovetter, 1985; Wrong, 1961). 
Granovetter began by looking at trust and malfeasance in organizational life through the 
lens of Williamson, an economist in the New Institutional Economics School who 
deployed a transactions cost approach a la Coase (Williamson, 1981).  
Granovetter found that rather than taking institutions seriously in their own right, 
Williamson simply explained institutions as the result of efficient solutions to economic 
problems. In his own investigations, Granovetter found sociality – particularly networks 
– to be central to trust and malfeasance in organizational life, and moreover, that this was 
a prominent feature that analysis required, writing that “all market processes are 
amenable to sociological analysis and that such analysis reveals central, not peripheral, 
features of these processes,” (Granovetter, 1985, p. 505). While Granovetter was 
particularly interested in networks, later sociologists, pushed this analysis further. Zukin 
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and Dimaggio analyzed the role of culture, political power, and institutions and how they 
effected the organization and structures of the economy in their seminal Structures of 
Capital (Zukin and Dimaggio, 1990).  They focused on articulating mechanisms of 
formal institutions – e.g. financial and political institutions – as subject to machinations 
of social processes, which were themselves shape by the necessities of capital 
accumulation.  
Swedberg and others continued this push through the 1990s, identifying three 
crucial points of intervention which the new economic sociologists brought to economic 
analysis: networks theory, organization theory, and cultural sociology (Swedberg, 1997). 
These approaches built the foundations for the idea of a ‘social construction of the 
economy,’ a phrase deployed from earlier sociologists Berger and Luckman’s Social 
Construction of Reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Swedberg, 1997). Like 
embeddedness, this idea held that the mechanisms of economic life could be obtained by 
tracing their social origins, and which then became actors in their own right. This had 
methodological implications – for example it expanded formalist and mathematical 
networks theory to examine the ways in which networks could be ‘congealed’ as an 
institution, and go on to exert causal force in their own right, greater than the sum of the 
network’s causal force.  
SYNTHESIS 
These developments in both economic geography and economic sociology – 
which began to take shape in the 1980s – have by no means led to a unified theory. Yet, 
this essay attempts to take some of the insights on ‘space’ from economic geographers 
and ‘networks’ from economic sociologists towards a positive theory of a socio-
institutional ecosystem. At various times different authors have stressed important 
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elements of social life, economic life, and spatial relations, as well as questions of scale 
(space, time, networks), to draw attention to various aspects of socio-spatial relations. 
Thinkers like Hudson and Cresswell brought attention to the notion of space as a socially 
constituted sphere with nestled layers of influence and with feedback loops to economic 
production and distribution (Cresswell, 2004; Hudson, 2001). The particular ways in 
which state and territory bounded and influenced space became the focus of a new 
discussion then (e.g. Taylor 1994; Agnew and Corbridge 1995). Scale became another 
entry-point, with theorists concerned to delineate at which levels of scale analysis was 
appropriate, and in which ways economic and structural change led to scale-making and 
scale-jumping processes (Collinge, 1999; Swyngedouw and Baeten, 2001). Finally, 
networks which are related to, but traverse, space have become an important frame for 
analysis, with focus pointed toward connections and encounter with rhizomatic metaphor 
(Amin, 2002; Grabher, 2006). These various efforts have been illuminating, and theories 
which attempt to account for the various dynamics have been proffered. Particularly 
noteworthy amongst the is the framework laid out by Jessop, Brenner, and Jones. In their 
TPSN framework, they seek “a more systematic recognition of polymorphy – the 
organization of sociospatial relations in multiple forms – within sociospatial theory[…] 
specifically, we suggest that territories (T), places (P), scales (S), and networks (N) must 
be viewed as mutually constitutive and relationally intertwined dimensions of 
sociospatial relations,” (Jessop et al. 2008, 389). This is distinct from the network 
analysis of economics, which often focuses on utility flows between consumers and firms 
who consume a particular commodity or input (e.g. Shy, 2011). The range of multiple 
analytical foci and lack of a unified theory can feel disorienting, though the development 
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of theory in this way conforms to the very supposition that there is no tendency towards 
telos in socio-institutional ecosystems (or thought!). All these contributions, set about by 
the epistemological and methodological interventions of economic geography and 
economic sociology, have called attention to the scale, complexity, and depth of the 
socio-institutional ecosystem. From there, these various contributions give a footing and 
epistemological base from which to give a fuller and more articulated overview the socio-
institutional ecosystem.  
As such, this essay defines the socio-institutional ecosystem as the interaction of 
social and institutional constellations with economic phenomena, specific to a space and 
time which operate together as a system.  Economic activity occurs within and is 
conditioned by the social and institutional fabric of a socio-institutional ecosystem, and 
that activity acts upon those very social and institutional constellations. These social and 
institutional arrangements include: cultural norms, beliefs, attitudes; inter-personal and 
inter-group expressions of social power; laws and legal regimes; formal institutions of the 
state and people; and the socio-institutional forms taken by economic factors such as 
firms and provision of labor. The socio-institutional arrangements of the ecosystem 
fundamentally shape the economic activity that occurs through it by ascribing the 
boundaries of possible economic activity and refracting ongoing economic phenomena 
and its interpretation according to the qualitative substance of the socio-institutional 
ecosystem. Yet causality flows both ways – the very structure of socio-institutional 
ecosystem, and its constituent constellations, molds to the machinations of economic 
phenomena which occur in a particular socio-institutional ecosystem.  
The interaction of the social and the economic in the socio-institutional ecosystem 
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analysis invites consideration to a complex set of relationships. This essay highlights 
three prominent characteristics which emerge, shaped by the economic geographers and 
economic sociologists, which can help guide analysis from the socio-institutional 
perspective. Their insights give a basis to the three provisional characteristics explored in 
Section I. Going back to the three characteristics explored in the preceding section, the 
contributions of the economic geographers and economic sociologists allow us to frame 
those characteristics. First, Soja’s initial dialectical interpretation is in line with the 
dialectical interplay between the social and economic, where both act as causes upon 
each other. The hysteresis and unique trajectories explored by Martin and Setterfield push 
against the tendency for teleological social science and economics and the historical 
evolutionary institutionalism methodology of the economic geographers helps to address 
the two characteristics of history and no tendency towards a telos. Finally, the focus on 
informal conventions and customs, especially by Granovetter and Swedberg, validates the 
characteristic that even though some social elements may resist easy formalization in 
models, they are fundamentally important as causes in both the social and economic 
spheres. Together, these contributions provide a positive description of the socio-
institutional ecosystem.  
IV. METHODOLOGY – SOCIO-INSTITUTIONAL ECOSYSTEM ANALYSIS  
What methodologies, then, does the socio-institutional hypothesis require? It may 
seem, initially, that one advantage of those epistemologies for which ‘machine’ forms the 
central metaphor is that a straightforward methodology emerges from the very 
epistemological foundations. Straightforward doesn’t mean easy - the machine (or parts 
of it) must be described and modeled accurately, and then empirical work consists of 
collecting data on the parts of the model and testing its conformity to the model and/or 
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effect on various outcomes. That is, the methodologies deployed have a proximate 
relationship to the base worldview. Yet, this section argues that the methodologies 
necessary for socio-institutional ecosystem analysis also descend from the complexity 
and variety of relationships that the frame implies. Because there are complex and 
multiple modes at stake with a ‘decentered’ totality as an epistemology for the socio-
institutional ecosystem, multiple and variate methodologies are required to describe the 
very relationships of the socio-institutional ecosystem.  Thus, this section first explores 
methodological pluralism, and how the blending and varied use of qualitative and 
quantitative methods is not just helpful, but fundamental, as a methodology for socio-
institutional ecosystem analysis.  
However, another feature of ‘decentered’ totality as an epistemology regards the 
way in which power itself shapes observations and descriptions of reality. Rather than the 
empiricist claim of some kind of universal objectivity, or the rationalist claim of 
observable reality subject to a particular theory, the decentered epistemology understands 
the description of reality as shaped by a multitude of forces, including social power. 
Thus, methodologies of socio-institutional ecosystem analysis must prioritize 
understanding the ways in which power shapes reality, and descriptions of reality, in that 
analysis. The second section takes up that charge.  
METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM 
Methodological pluralism emerged in economics within the heterodox, as a 
response to the domination of neoclassical models and empiricism within the discipline. 
At its core, the idea is that different methodologies reveal different economic facts, and as 
such a variety of methodological approaches are necessary. Mantaining clarity presents a 
challenge, especially “as diversity based on inconsistent paradigms might descend 
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towards incoherence: the paradigms might talk past each other, pursuing separate 
research agendas and building their own theoretical systems,” (Jackson, 2013, p. 16). As 
such, active steps must be taken to explicitly demarcate the advantages and disadvantages 
of a pluralist methodology. As noted by Dow, often the underlying schools of thought 
which undergird a methodology are not examined – “Alongside this development [of 
methodological pluralism], there has been a growing reluctance to refer to schools of 
thought in economics,” (Dow, 2004, p. 275). Lawson argues that this avoidance of 
philosophical foundations leaves the biases of those foundations unexamined, and ends 
up cluttering understanding: “any methodological pluralism that does not encompass such 
a critical orientation can only serve as a device to make, and so to preserve, the state of 
incoherence and disarray  that constitutes the status quo,” (Lawson, 1997, p. 30). His 
argument is to make explicit the biases and blind spots of various methodologies to 
preserve clarity about which elements of economic and social reality are being 
highlighted, and which go unnamed.  
This can happen in the Q2 (quantitative x qualitative) approach that has been 
popularized as a combinatory methodological intervention by economists and others. As 
shown by Kanbur and Shaffer, in the Q2 approach, “there are important differences 
between approaches to poverty which operate at the levels of epistemology and 
normative theory. These differences have implications for the numerical transformation 
of data, the selection of validity criteria, the conception/dimension of poverty adopted 
and interpersonal comparisons of well-being,” (Kanbur and Shaffer, 2006, p. 183). Useful 
reflections on how the formalism of economics and the consideration of contested 
metaphors and power relations in economics come from Kanbur and Riles’ (2009) 
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conversation in “The Contested Commons: Conversations between Economists & 
Anthropologists.” Yet it remains eminently possible to preserve clarity and speak to real-
world complexity, given explicit consideration of the biases involved.   
Vakulabharanam and Motiram thoroughly take up this charge in their piece 
“Understanding Poverty and Inequality in Urban India since Reforms: Bringing 
Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches Together” (Vakulabharanam and Motiram, 
2012). They explicitly note the blind spots – that qualitative studies (using ethnography, 
participant observation, and social mapping) suffer from the divergent tendencies to 
either hyper-specify exact context and miss macro-trends, or to universalize a micro-
context and substitute particular understandings for universal conceptualizations. At the 
same time, quantitative studies whose statistical inference operates from macro-data rely 
on data presented as ‘objective’ alongside serious allegations of inaccuracy (e.g. defining 
poverty, undercounting poverty), and are also unable to capture the structural and 
historical context of Indian urbanism. But by naming these shortcomings (instead of, say, 
implicit reference to a universal platonic notion of ‘poverty’), Vakulabharanam and 
Motiram bring these approaches into meaningful, clarity-serving conversation with each 
other. They argue that “ these two (that is, quantitative and qualitative) approaches have 
captured different dimensions of the complex Indian urban process, even if they have 
rarely made an effort to speak to each other,” (Vakulabharanam and Motiram, 2012, p. 
45). This requires conceptual movement from both methodologies – quantitative 
methodologies will need to “to move out of their comfort zone of observing/analysing the 
world through large databases, to analysing the field through  an expanded conceptual 
apparatus,” while “qualitative scholars should better attempt to integrate analyses of 
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microcontexts with the larger structures in which they are located,” (Vakulabharanam and 
Motiram, 2012, p. 51). In methodological pluralism, the various approaches allow 
different parts of the truth to reveal themselves. With conscious effort to bring the 
multiple approaches in conversation with each other about shared definitions and points 
of divergence, clarity is served, and important relationships of the socio-institutional 
ecosystem can be described.  
POWER AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE DESCRIPTION AND INSCRIBING OF REALITY 
As a methodological pluralist approach produces knowledge, knowledge itself 
requires recognition as a constituent part of the socio-institutional ecosystem. As such, 
social power in the socio-institutional ecosystem conditions the very knowledge that is 
produced, which, among other things, can counter, provoke, or serve prevailing structures 
of social power. Since knowledge functions as an interpretation of reality, that very 
interpretation wields tremendous power. DeMartino explores the relationship between 
knowledge and power through an ethical lens, and the way which the discipline of 
economics has ignored these questions, arguing that economists need to be explicit about 
the ethical implications of their work (DeMartino, 2011). The obvious violent production 
of knowledge in the academy, from phrenology to eugenics to orientalism, is well 
documented by critical theory. Riles writes that “students of colonialism have pointed to 
the articulation between the models of economics and the models of anthropology as a 
crucial nexus of colonial knowledge and power,” (Kanbur and Riles, 2005, p. 12). But 
because the interface between knowledge and power constitutes a fundamental piece of 
the production of knowledge, this tendency must be consciously addressed.  
What does ethical consideration of the relationship between power and knowledge 
augur for socio-institutional ecosystem analysis? In the socio-institutional ecosystem 
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analysis, for example, historical work becomes particularly important. In archival work, 
despite the myth of objectivity, Schwartz and Cook write that “archives are established 
by the powerful to protect or enhance their position in society […] through archives, the 
past is controlled[, and certain stories are privileged and others marginalized,” (Schwartz 
and Cook, 2002, p. 1). Gikandi probes the problematics of the archive even further, with 
reference to slavery in the Atlantic world in his “Rethinking the Archive of 
Enslavement.” Trying to find a narrator of historical events, Gikandi notes archives house 
three temporalities at which power can alter the original shape of the event – witnessing 
an event, initial recording of the event, and the recreation of event be a reader. “The 
literature of witnessing was always framed by three temporalities with different demands: 
there was the time of enslavement, then there was the recall of this time in writing, and 
then this time was reimagined in the scene of reading,” writes Gikandi, “Confronted with 
this tripartite structure, those trying to discern the point of black beginnings in the 
Americas come face to face with the problem of the slave as a witness: where is the voice 
of the witnesses to be found?” (Gikandi, 2015, pp. 90–91). 
For example: In my own work on Great Depression-era labor structures in East 
Africa using socio-institutional ecosystem analysis (the proceeding essay of this 
dissertation), I engage methodological pluralism by using archival reports from the 
colonial era to document unemployment and try to appreciate the quantity and quality of 
capitalist unemployment in East Africa during the Great Depression, as the colonial blue 
books and statistical abstracts were never particularly interested in quantifying African 
unemployment.  More, much of the archival records are still written from the perspective 
of colonial power and congeal those power relationships, even as they record knowledge. 
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Below are two examples from District Officers of the British colonial apparatus, first 
from Central Province, Kenya and then from Tanga Province, Tanganyika: 
“For still another year the lack of employment in European areas has been 
severely felt by Reserve natives and many settled areas have a floating 
population of natives looking for work that are proving a decided nuisance 
and difficult to cope with,” (Central Province PC, 1933, emphasis mine). 
“Large numbers of natives have left the district. The numbers will not be 
known with accuracy until next March but I think 5000 is a conservative 
estimate. Many of these were accustomed to obtain a livelihood partly from 
labour and partly from family agriculture on smallholdings. They are now 
untraceable,” (Tanga Province, 1933, emphasis mine) 
To apply Gikandi’s schematic here is to be aware of the inflections of power 
involved in a Province Commissioner witnessing an event, writing that event in a formal 
report to the governor (to be passed on to the foreign office in London), and finally my 
reading of the report in a lonely archive room in Dar es Salaam (or a busy archive room 
in Nairobi) . Awareness of these inflection points allows to unseat particular archival 
texts as the arbiters of objective reality, and probe other routes to find witnesses to 
economic events of the Great Depression in East Africa. If the archives were to speak 
from the perspective of unemployed workers in Kenya’s Central Province and formerly 
employed peasants in Tanganyika, new data, and new ways of understanding that data 
would emerge. Unemployed people do not see themselves as a nuisance to cope with, and 
former wage workers might appear as untraceable from the perspective of sites of capital, 
but of course not to themselves. In this instance, and in many others, such archives are 
available – they exist in African (and South Asian) language newspapers of East Africa, 
the firsthand accounts of (increasingly older) people who lived colonialism, and various 
other documents not housed in the colonial archive. The question of power troubles the 
most easily accessible data and invites methodology to consider that powered data 
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changes the very way a reality can be described. They are traceable with work, but 
consideration of power in the production of knowledge occasions interventions which 
trouble powered knowledge as the vessel of objective truth, and actively seeks out other 
witnesses. As with other features of the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis, the 
consideration of power and the production of knowledge complicates methodology as 
compared to traditional economic methodologies. Yet with that comes the opportunity for 
a much richer consideration of economic facts and tendencies and their relationship to the 
socialized world.  
Two connected issues remain for methodology to consider with respect to 
knowledge and power – an ethical and a scientific claim. The first is that the power 
produced and refracted by academic knowledge, including economic knowledge, has 
been used to reify and intensify extant relations of unequal power. This assaults human 
dignity, and as such is ethically objectionable. Scientifically, accepted knowledge holds 
the power to inscribe and name the categories and units of analysis, to determine which 
data is useful and which is not, and to privilege which stories are told as fact and which 
as whisper. This clouds truth. Centering the dialectic between economic knowledge and 
power allows us to seek other forms of knowledge which reveal a fuller truth from other 
perspectives. For the same reason, methodological pluralism is fundamental to 
understanding the relationships of the socio-institutional ecosystem. Indeed, the 
methodology of the of the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis should “attempt to 
examine causal structures that blend various levels of being - the spatio-temporal nature 
of global capitalist dynamics, national political and economic regimes, and the local 
aspects of political economy and culture.” (Vakulabharanam and Motiram, 2012, p. 51). 
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As such, the methodology of the socio-institutional ecosystem can better probe the 
various relationships between the social and economic. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We can now state: the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis centers the 
interaction between economic phenomena and the non-economic social and institutional 
environment in which economic activity occurs and makes visible dynamics which have 
been obscured by other forms of economic analysis. In thinking through the dynamics of 
this interaction, the socio-institutional ecosystem pays particular attention to: dialectic 
causality, path dependency and historical inertia, and dynamics which complicate 
formality. This approach can be epistemologically founded in the decentered totality 
explored by Cullenberg. A mixed methodology is most appropriate to the socio-
institutional ecosystem analysis, as various dynamics will be suited to different modes of 
inquiry. In particular, the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis should think of power, 
and the power present in the creation of new knowledge, as central to the socio-
institutional ecosystem itself, and seek more clarity on the ethical ramifications of such 
knowledge production.  
This essay began with a problematization of the machine as a central metaphor in 
economic analysis and proposed ecosystem as a metaphor which could better capture the 
dynamism of the relationship between the social and the economic. The task has been, 
then, to develop an epistemological base and methodology consistent with ecosystemic 
metaphor. And yet while machine-as-metaphor has dominated the discipline, there exists 
a strong base for ecosystemic thought, advanced variously by Marx, Polanyi, and 
Granovetter and used as an entry point for this analysis. After then exploring a range of 
empirical examples of the interaction between the social and the economic, across a range 
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of space and time scales, this essay focused on three emergent themes of the socio-
institutional ecosystem: dialectic causality, path dependency and historical contingency, 
and the problematization of mathematical formalism. Using these themes as benchmark, 
this essay evaluated a range of economic schools of thought and theories, finding 
widespread inability to deal with the dynamism of sociality in economics. Cullenberg’s 
epistemological taxonomy helped to frame the philosophical foundations of the inability 
of economics to apprehend this dynamism, but also offered a way to think this through by 
invoking the Marxian concept of overdetermination within the frame of a decentered 
totality. Using this base, the substantive, positive contributions of economic geographers 
and economic sociologists helped to develop a fuller articulation of the socio-institutional 
ecosystem. This essay defined that as the malleable constellation of social and 
institutional arrangements, specific to a particular space and time, upon which economic 
activity takes place, which continuously shapes, and is shaped by, that very economic 
activity. This led to a discussion about the methodology required for the socio-
institutional ecosystem analysis and focused on how to proceed with methodological 
pluralism while serving clarity, as well as the interface between knowledge and power in 
the epistemological frame. From this frame, we can bring economics, the discipline, to a 
fuller range of economic thought which takes place well beyond the bounds of the 
discipline. The approach can bring us closer to considering Ngũgĩ’s economic thought to 
consider how power, wrapped in sociality, inflects the economic and social world in 
which we live. 
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THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND LABOR FORCE DIVERGENCE  
IN COLONIAL KENYA & TANGANYIKA: 
A SOCIO-INSTITUTIONAL ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO ECONOMIC TRAJECTORIES 
 
By Jonathan Donald Jenner 
Though Tanzania and Kenya have quite different economic contours today, 
Tanganyika and Kenya were comparable British colonies in the 1920s, with economies 
based on agricultural export from European estates with African workers. Using socio-
institutional ecosystem analysis, this essay traces how differences between the two 
colonies in the 1920s shaped their later historical inheritances by looking at different 
labor market structures conditioned by the socio-institutional environments of each 
colony. Kenya, a Crown Colony, engaged a more repressive set of policies to transform a 
peasantry into an agricultural proletariat. Tanganyika, a Mandate Territory under the 
eye of the League of Nations, extracted agricultural surplus through a variety of 
mechanisms that left a robust peasantry. This difference remained below the surface 
through the 1920s. However, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the collapse of 
global demand for East Africa’s agricultural exports laid bare these structural 
differences, particularly in terms of employment, unemployment, and peasantization. 
Agricultural paid labor fell in both places, but only Kenya saw sustained unemployment 
of rural landless workers as Tanganyikans were absorbed into an ascendant peasant 
cash cropping sector. A bird’s eye view of the Great Depression reveals a moment which 
intensified peasantization in Tanganyika and proletarianization in Kenya. Consistent 
with socio-institutional ecosystem analysis, these effects became causes, as different 
parties – Africans, settlers, and the state – responded to these differential changes, 
compounding and congealing the divergent trajectories of Kenya and Tanganyika. This 
essay demonstrates this, with a preponderance of qualitative and quantitative evidence 
from primary sources from the Kenyan, Tanzanian, and British archives. From the late 
1930s through the rest of the colonial era, Kenya was marked by settler dominance, 
landless rural proletarians, and sharp inequalities in land and income while peasant 
economic dominance and urban proletarianization were the prominent markers of 
Tanganyika. These profiles still outline cleavages in East Africa today. Much literature 
ties issues of contemporary economic structure to colonial institutions. This essay, using 
socio-institutional ecosystem analysis, adds to that literature by laying out the early 
divergence of the of the socio-institutional ecosystems and economic structures in 
Depression-Era Kenya & Tanganyika.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
KANG’ETHE & MERINYO 
In 1930, Joseph Merinyo, head of the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association 
(KNPA) in Tanganyika, and Joseph Kang’ethe, president of the Kikuyu Central 
Association (KCA) in Kenya, met in Nairobi to discuss mutual concerns, such as the 
detention of activist Harry Thuku(Rogers, 1974). The KCA, defined primarily by 
ethnicity and politics, represented the interests of Agĩkũyũ coffee workers and the KNPA, 
defined primarily by region and production, was concerned with the plight of Chagga 
coffee farmers. Prior to European colonization, the Agĩkũyũ and the Chagga, both 
different groups of Bantu-speaking farmers, had settled and farmed on rich volcanic soils 
on the slopes of Mt. Kenya and Mt. Kilimanjaro, respectively (Kenyatta, 2015; Moore 
and Puritt, 1977). The rich soils and moderate climes of their respective lands meant that 
they found themselves in the center of the European colonial project at the turn of the 20th 
century. After land seizures where Africans were violently pushed aside, many were then 
coerced back to that very land as paid labor on European agricultural estates, or as small 
producers for supply chains managed by European capital. The Chagga and the Agĩkũyũ 
found themselves at the center of this. Merinyo came to Nairobi interested to learn from 
Kang’ethe more about the KCA’s deployment of the concept of ‘Gĩkũyũ Unity,’ and how 
something similar might be adopted against colonial power in Tanganyika (Rogers 1974). 
However, despite raising the alarm of the European Association of Tanganyika, 
Merinyo’s efforts with Kang’ethe went no further. Ultimately, though he admired 
Kang’ethe and the work of the KCA, Merinyo felt like the differences between the 
situations of the Gĩkũyũ and the Chagga were simply too different for them to 
successfully work together (Rogers, 1974). With that, perhaps, an early moment of 
 
- 57 - 
 
international pan-African cooperation was lost.  
Yet the chasm in circumstance between two close groups of coffee cultivators that 
Merinyo observed was quite real, and widening, in 1931. Though both groups lived under 
British rule in East Africa, with economies directed at cash-cropping for export and 
significant settler communities engaged in latifundia-style plantation agriculture, the 
socio-institutional ecosystems and attendant labor regimes of Kenya and Tanganyika 
were markedly different. Kenya’s status as a Crown Colony and Tanganyika’s 
designation as a League of Nations Mandate under British rule lay at the root of this 
divergence, which had profound effects over the ways Africans were induced into the 
labor force in colonial East Africa.  These structures then influenced both the daily lives 
and political organizations of Africans struggling for dignity in their colonial contexts.  In 
Kenya, a colonial regime closely (though not completely) allied to the desires of the 
European settler class and only responsible to London was able to create an institutional 
environment that heavily pushed and coerced Africans into the paid labor sector. 
Meanwhile, the Tanganyikan colonial state reported to a nascent League of Nations 
which was keen to not let Britain pry undue advantage from the former German territory. 
Even as it induced a labor force that would meet the requirements of the European settler 
class, Tanganyikan authorities were not able to pursue this goal with the intensity of the 
Kenyan institutional regime, and had to pursue other strategies for agricultural surplus 
extraction. The distance between the contexts of Merinyo’s KNPA and Kang’ethe’s KCA 
was an early indication of some of the structural and institutional divergence in the 
trajectories of Kenya and Tanganyika. Other African, state, and settler responses to the 
ground realities and differential economic structures of the colonial projects took a range 
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of forms, which in turn altered the range of economic possibility and the trajectories for 
both Kenya and Tanganyika. Today, Kenya has a high degree of land, income, and 
wealth inequality, yet maintains the highest GDP/capita in the region. Tanzania2 has been 
lauded for its degree of equality which translates to higher social equality but has stayed 
relatively poor compared to its northern neighbor. This essay tracks some of the 
important historical roots of these stylized facts. 
SITUATING THIS WORK 
There are several topical areas that this essay engages with in the economics, 
political economy, development, and economic history literature, and those engagements 
have helped frame and shape many of the ideas in this essay. The socio-institutional 
ecosystem analysis of this essay alternatively marks a point of departure or a point of 
convergence from some of these topical engagements. Economic anthropologist Jean 
Ensminger has challenged: “it is one thing to say that institutions matter; it is another to 
say how they matter,” (Ensminger, 1992, p. 11). This essay uses a socio-institutional 
ecosystem approach by centering the ecosystemic relationship between the economic and 
the social and focusing on three qualities: their dialectical interpenetration, path 
dependency and historical inertia, and an openness to elements which resist easy 
formulations, as explored in the first essay of this dissertation. This means that this essay 
identifies the ways in which the consecration and consequences of labor forces in 
Depression-era Kenya and Tanganyika fed back, inflected, and drove the continued 
divergence through the colonial and postcolonial eras. In so doing, it interacts with 
several kinds of literature in a variety of ways. 
 
2 Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged in 1961 to form Tanzania.  
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Scholarship has taken heed of the pull of historical institutions – particularly those 
initiated by colonialism – as causal factors for structural and policy possibilities today 
(Acemoglu et al., 2002; Bowden et al., 2008b; Brett, 1973; Khan et al., 2019b). Some of 
this literature appreciates the dialectical dynamism and interplay in the pull of historical 
institutions on present outcomes. Others, particularly Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson’s work treats institutions as a one-time treatment with monodirectional 
causality over centuries. This work, consistent with the socio-institutional ecosystem 
analysis, situates itself with the side of this literature which appreciates frequent feedback 
loops between institutional arrangements and economic outcome, as processes which 
continue to inform each other and play out in path dependent ways.  
This essay also interacts with the literature on African proletarianization. Two 
guideposts frame this literature: the post-independence Marxian literature which argued 
that the colonial state caused African proletarianization following a generalized script of 
primitive accumulation and another  more recent development which argues that market 
‘pull’ factors were more causative in African labor force development than dispossession 
and immiseration The post-independence Marxian literature focused on how the state 
actively created a proletariat by dispossessing Africans, immiserating them, and priming 
the cash economy in such ways that the sale of their labor-power became the sole option 
for Africans, (Ochieng and Maxon, 1992; Rodney, 1981; Shivji, 1986b). The other recent 
trend in economic history of colonial Africa has been to focus on how markets dominated 
as opposed to colonial states. This position takes shape from two claims by its 
proponents: that colonial states do not appear to be as all powerful as was formerly 
thought, and that colonization of Africa was never particularly profitable, in a direct 
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sense, for European powers (Frankema et al. 2016, Fibaek and Green 2019). For 
example, looking at Nyasaland, Green and Bolt argue that “market forces rather than 
colonial policies shaped the development trajectory,” and suggest that this position is 
generalizable to British Africa (Bolt and Green, 2015, p. 217). This recent trend has 
responded to the earlier generation of postcolonial scholars trying to understand the 
colonial contexts, who wrote about how colonial states built up an institutional edifice to 
compel labor and extract value throughout colonial Africa. This essay argues that while 
different conditions defined different colonies, colonial authorities institutionally 
structured labor markets in such a way that gave Africans either less or even less choice 
in their participation. Markets operated and functioned, but they were constructed and 
undergirded by colonial institutional structures. Put differently, markets and states have 
often been treated in such a way as the presence of one signals the absence of the other; 
this essay rejects that notion and focuses in on the different ways that the colonial states 
of Kenya and Tanganyika constructed institutional arrangements that qualitatively 
conditioned markets along different trajectories. So, though markets may have recently 
been shown to be prominent, this essay takes the position that this does not negate 
previous Marxian scholarship, and explores the idea of institutional primitive 
accumulation. This essay compares the ways in which the mezzo-level state institutional 
formations built to occasion paid labor differed between Kenya and Tanganyika, paying 
attention to how labor markets were called into being, and how these formations affect 
the nature of the markets and the long term trajectories of paid labor in East Africa.  
Finally, another tendency in economic scholarship of colonialism, particularly in 
Africa, has been to focus on general categories amenable to grouping and stratification. 
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This tendency cuts across various approaches and methodologies, and some of the broad 
groupings include those colonies which were extractive or non-extractive, also settler or 
non-settler (Acemoglu et al., 2002; Anyang’ Nyong’o, 2017); French, British, Belgian, 
Portuguese, German, Italian, or Spanish rule (Firmin-Sellers, 2000; Grier, 1999); Africa 
of the colonial economy, Africa of the concession companies, and Africa of the labor 
reserves (Amin, 1972).  This scholarship has been helpful in calling attention to the large 
divisions and fissures in the colonial experience, and in understanding some of the macro 
trends of the post-colonial experience. Yet as in any movement towards the general, 
subtlety and particularity are lost. A hyper-particularity lives at the other end of the 
spectrum of scholarship on African colonialism, focusing on very specific interactions 
between Africans and colonial powers, usually at a district level (Mackenzie, 1989; 
Mandala, 1984). This scholarship, too, has helped us understand how the large 
machinations of colonialism played out in concrete form as they encountered the diverse 
social and political constellations of Africans. The challenge from this level of 
specificity, then, is to pull generalizable patterns from the granular. In line with the 
fundaments of socio-institutional ecosystem analysis, this essay seeks a middle ground 
which focuses on mezzo-level institutional formations of neighboring state policy 
conditioned the socio-institutional ecosystem for arrangements of labor forces in both 
Kenya and Tanganyika in the colonial era. The essay attempts to pay attention to specific 
institutional contexts of Kenya and Tanzania, between micro-level particularity and 
macro-generality, appreciating how small but significant differences in the institutional 
architecture of the two colonies led to substantial differentiation. Both Kenya and 
Tanganyika were British East African colonies, with significant settler populations, 
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oriented around agricultural export. And yet, their governance structures, and ability to 
compel a labor force, varied, and led to significant differentiation, explored in this essay.  
STRUCTURE OF THIS ESSAY 
After this introduction, Section II situates the pre-colonial and early colonial 
contexts in what became Kenya and Tanganyika. Section III outlines the differences 
between the charters of the Tanganyika Mandate and the Kenya Colony before exploring 
how this affected the colonial project of creating an agricultural proletariat from an 
African peasantry. This section shows that the Kenyan colonial apparatus had a more 
repressive role in compelling an African peasantry into the paid labor sector than in 
Tanganyika. Section IV postulates theoretical ‘labor flow circulation schema’ to theorize 
how socio-institutional ecosystem dynamics influenced labor force induction. The 
Kenyan labor force was held more tightly in place in the paid labor sector by this 
institutional labor regime, as opposed to their Tanganyikan counterparts who more easily 
circulated between pre-existing production, peasant cash-cropping, and wage work. 
Section V describes the paid labor sectors in Kenya and Tanganyika in the 1920s. While 
both Kenya and Tanganyika turned out an agricultural labor force in the 1920s more or 
less sufficient to the demand of settler estates, structural differences lay just below this 
surface similarity. These differences were laid bare by the external shock of the Great 
Depression, explored in Section VI. The Great Depression struck down agricultural 
commodities prices, hurting first East African export sectors and affecting other parts of 
the two economies. The Tanganyikan peasant sector could more successfully absorb lots 
of members of Tanganyikan agricultural labor force who had lost employment owing to 
drops in agricultural output during the Great Depression. This helped usher in an era 
where the Tanganyikan peasantry rose to prominence. Kenya’s levels of agricultural 
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employment through the Great Depression bore little relation to agricultural output 
because the labor force was held more strictly in place through institutional channels 
which didn’t fluctuate with demand. Workers were either paid less or laid off, but they 
weren’t easily able to leave the labor force. Thus, unemployment was a persistent feature 
of the Great Depression in Kenya. These phenomena are evidenced with a range of 
statistical data gathered from the Blue Books of Kenya and Tanganyika, as well as 
qualitative archival sources. For example, though ‘unemployment’ was not a category 
statistically recorded by colonial authorities, this essay demonstrates its presence (and 
absence) with narratives from official reports, letters, and articles. Section VI gestures at 
how the divergences exposed by the Great Depression continue to reverberate through 
history as the socio-institutional ecosystems responded to the new realities, and have 
continued to resonate through the historical trajectories of Kenya and Tanganyika 
(Tanzania) through colonial era, the independence era, and up until today. In so doing, 
this essay contributes both to an understanding of the effects of historical differences in 
colonial structure in East Africa and buttresses the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis 
as a mode of inquiry.  
II. BACKGROUND 
PRE-COLONIAL ECONOMIES OF EAST AFRICA 
In the era prior to European colonization, a wide array of economic activity and 
extensive networks of trade existed throughout East Africa. While the Swahili coast had 
been involved in cosmopolitan trade for the previous millennia, earlier economic 
historians and anthropologists, such as Wrigley, often cast pre-colonial East African 
economic structure as primitive, with subsistence production dominating, capital 
minimal, and division of labor ‘rudimentary,’ (Wrigley, 1957). Corrective histories have 
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shown a wide array of trade and specialization both on the coast and throughout the 
interior, amongst and between African societies and ethnic groups throughout East Africa 
(Austen, 1971; Gray, 1970; Newbury, 1980). Iliffe, looking at various accounts of early 
travelers and writers, notes the immense variety of currencies which were common from 
cowry, cobs, and calico to Austrian dollars and Indian pice (Iliffe, 1979).  Different 
production modes often engaged in local trade (such as pastoral/agricultural trade 
between sections of the Maasai and Agĩkũyũ or Luo and Gusii), at the same time that 
longer trades route, particular in salt, hides, food, and iron manufactures were organized 
around East Africa, and particularly in stratified societies like in Buganda (Van 
Zwanenberg and King, 1975). The nineteenth century was an era of intense dynamism for 
the East African economic structures, particularly as trade networks which funneled 
interior trade through Swahili city states (chiefly Zanzibar) to the rest of the world came 
to predominate, with fractal local networks built along these routes. A variety of imports 
changed East African production patterns, killing some industries while bringing new life 
to others. For example, 150,000 iron hoes came through Tabora in 1891 for ‘domestic’ 
re-export and transformed agricultural practice, and cloth imports began to diminish the 
indigenous textile industry (Iliffe, 1979). To balance this importation, East Africa 
increasingly began to specialize in the export of ivory and slaves. Iliffe argues that East 
Africa was perhaps the only place in the world that saw an increase in the slave trade 
through the nineteenth century. More, this was marked by a qualitative shift in the nature 
of this slavery as well, from a “system of personal dependency” to one where a slave was 
a “stranger acquired by economic means and utilised for economic purposes,” (Iliffe, 
1979, pp. 72–73). While East Africa had already been somewhat land-rich and people 
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poor, the export of slaves, and the large amounts of labor-power involved in a system of 
long-distance networked trade exacerbated the problem of a shortage of labor-power 
amongst an abundance of land. 
These machinations set the stage for the East African economic structures that 
European powers would come to interact with and try to profit from. Iliffe argues that 
nineteenth century pre-colonial economic history in East Africa had two overarching 
implications. First, there was a specific form of underdevelopment as the specialization in 
ivory and slaves crowded out other industry only to collapse in the colonial era. Second, a 
specific institutional ecosystem grew out of the turbulence and trade of the nineteenth 
century. Just prior to colonization, many Africans were engaged the caravan trading 
system by trading agricultural surpluses (e.g. foodstuffs, rubber, sisal). As these trading 
networks opened up the cash-crop option-set of African farmers, wage labor began to 
make some footholds in both an agricultural and urban setting (Iliffe, 1979, p. 77). 
Though the rhythms and types of production and life in pre-colonial East Africa were not 
homogenous, several important phenomena emerged in the territories which would 
become Kenya and Tanganyika: agriculture which was, or easily could be, oriented 
towards export; the rise of Kiswahili as a lingua franca over an area of large ethnic and 
linguistic diversity; and a familiarity of people with the various complex elements and 
movements of goods and people through long distance networks of trade.  
GERMAN & BRITISH EAST AFRICA: INFRASTRUCTURE, LAND, SETTLERS, & LABOR 
At the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, European powers agreed to which territories 
in Africa would be colonized by which colonial powers. German East Africa was 
established by the German East Africa Company in 1885, under an imperial charter from 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, and compromised the land area that would become 
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Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi, after Germany lost its colonial possessions after World 
War I. The land that would become Kenya was brought into Britain’s colonial orbit as the 
British East African Protectorate in 1895. Amongst several competing visions, both 
regimes soon came to imagine their colonies as agricultural exporting dominions based 
on settler plantation agriculture. The idea was that this would generate profit both for 
Germany and Britain, as well as the individual settlers who would appropriate African 
surplus in the colonies. Four crucial pieces would prop up this vision: infrastructure, land, 
settlers, and labor. Early governance and institutional architecture sought to harness these 
elements into the orbit of empire.  
Both regimes quickly went about the work of building the infrastructure for 
agricultural export. In the British East African Protectorate, the Uganda railroad was 
begun in 1895 and completed in 1901 connecting Kisumu on the shores of Lake Victoria 
to Mombasa, an Indian Ocean port city. Nairobi sprang up 1899 as a city midway 
between Kisumu and Mombasa. In German East Africa, a railroad to connect the port 
town of Tanga to Lake Victoria was begun in 1893, but faced many complications, only 
ever reaching Arusha under British administration in 1929. The more important central 
line, began by the Germans in 1905, finally reached Kigoma on the shores of Lake 
Tanganyika in 1914, just prior to World War I. “The railroads that colonial powers built 
were not like the networks that tied together various parts of Europe, or even India,” 
writes Cooper, “they were drainage networks, mostly single-track, narrow-gauge lines 
linking interior points with a coastal port,” (Cooper, 2015, p. 564).   
The colonial project needed to harness the land being used by Africans, and did so 
with a mix of direct violence, intervention in local conflict, and legislative coding which 
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dispossessed Africans on usufruct grounds and then transferred absolute land rights to 
settlers.  
In Kenya, after a 1904 massacre of Africans in Kisii in British East Africa, 
Otenyo Nyamaterere led an uprising against British troops (“The Legend of Otenyo,” 
2015). Mekatilili (née Mnyazi) wa Menza led an uprising against the British in Giriama 
in 1912 (Carrier and Nyamweru, 2016). British intrusion in Maasai conflicts, such as the 
1890s Morijo War, led to the confinement of the Maasai to areas desired by the British 
(Waller, 1976). In 1897, two years after the establishment of the protectorate, Europeans 
were permitted to purchase 21-year land certificates in the British East Africa 
Protectorate. Settlers were particularly powerful in early Kenya and pushed hard for more 
land rights. The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 allowed for 99-year leases, which by 
1915 was extended to 999 years. ‘Crown Lands’ were officially designated as ‘unused’ 
land. Africans had rights to land they used for agriculture and grazing, though in practice 
it was easily ignored. Though the most fertile territory – what would become known as 
the White Highlands – were not officially designated as ‘unused land’ initially, it was 
made known to European settlers that they were for their exclusive use (Kimaiyo, 2004; 
Van Zwanenberg and King, 1975). 
In German East Africa, a similar pattern of violence and legislation disposed 
Africans of their land. In the 1880s, after several attempts to take advantage of 
internecine conflict and war among the Chagga with little understanding of the power 
dynamics of different Chagga factions, “the solution was to wage war against the 
Chagga,” (Silayo, 2016). A decade after those conflicts ceased, the Germans killed 
between 250,00 and 300,000 Africans in German East Africa in the Maji Maji Rebellion 
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from 1905 to 1907. In German East Africa, land was bought from local (German) 
commissioners in a rather piecemeal way by settlers, but by 1911 a regularized system 
operated district by district which moved Africans to a small portion of land (4 hectares 
per African family) after meeting with a village headman and paying a few shillings to 
the displaced family. The vacated land was then declared Crown Land from which 
German settlers could purchase 25 year leases from the government (Iliffe, 1979).   
Next, there was the issue of attracting settlers to farm in East Africa. By the first 
decade of the 20th century, both German East Africa and British East Africa were well on 
the way to becoming settler economies, even if that was not the initial plan of each 
colony. In 1905, London revoked the governorship of Charles Eliot, then governor of 
Kenya, for his over-enthusiastic efforts at bringing settlers to Kenya while the Crown was 
interested in settlers going to Canada and Australia (Van Zwanenberg and King, 1975). 
Early German East African Governors, Graf von Gotzen and Reichenberg, encouraged 
‘experimental’ settlement of Boer refugees and poor Germans from the periphery, but 
regarded the concept as a failure. Finally, Governor Schnee became more sympathetic to 
settlement as official policy. Though there were small numbers of Europeans initially, by 
1913 there were 4,998 Europeans in German East Africa, of whom 882 were engaged in 
agriculture. Crucially, Iliffe notes that “the numbers were small, but they were 
comparable to Kenya’s at the same date,” (Iliffe, 1979, p. 141) 
Upon securing land, overland transport, and settlers, what remained for the 
European project in East Africa was labor. The main obstacle: Africans neither needed 
nor wanted to work in European enterprise. The East Africa in which European powers 
found themselves was land- rich and people-poor, a significant departure from the Europe 
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which was land-poor and people-rich which had gone through a process of 
proletarianization beginning a century and a half prior (Kitching, 1980). Thus, while not 
the most preferable option, even when European powers pushed Africans off of their 
preferred land, some other land was available, and Africans could participate in the 
networks of production, trade, and exchange independent of the European plantations 
cropping up around them. In general, wages were low, and not a sufficient pull factor 
alone to attract Kenyan workers to fields (Zwanenberg, 1975). Thus, tremendous effort 
was put into establishing a system to reliably turn out a labor force for the British East 
Africa Protectorate and the German East Africa, which would soon become Kenya and 
Tanganyika, respectively. However, Tanganyika and Kenya would come to inherit 
different legal and institutional situations on the international stage and were bound by 
different limits in the pursuit of turning out labor. While they shared some similarities, 
this resulted in divergent strategy sets. These different institutional arrangements that the 
British colonial authorities used in Tanganyika and Kenya to occasion a labor force 
would not only drive contemporaneous difference between the colonies, but it would 
come to affect the long term trajectories of those colonies, and later countries, through the 
colonial and post-independence eras.  
III. DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL CONSTELLATIONS & MODES OF LABOR COMPULSION 
IN KENYA & TANGANYIKA 
In the aftermath of WWI, the political future of Britain’s East Africa possessions 
was solidified until the era of independence in the 1960s. Kenya was formed as a Crown 
Colony in 1920, taking the place of the East Africa Protectorate. Tanganyika was formed 
as a League of Nations Mandate in 1922, carved from the largest portion of German East 
Africa, and constituting what is now mainland Tanzania (the British first occupied the 
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territory in 1916). On paper, the interests of Africans were supposed to be the primary 
concern of both colonies. This was not the case in either colony, though it was even less 
the case in Kenya, owing to different institutions of international accountability. This 
meant that the Kenyan colonial regime had a wider range of tools from its colonial 
toolbox which it would be able to use to induce a labor force.  
The 1923 Devonshire White Paper served as official policy for the Kenya Colony, 
and stated that “primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty’s Government 
think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the 
African natives must be paramount and that if, and when, those interests and the interests 
of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail,” (Maxon, 1993, p. 
276). However, the Devonshire White Paper, didn’t actually seek to ratify the 
paramountcy of African interests; it rather represented a “clever compromise by which 
the British government was able to extricate itself from a longstanding controversy 
surrounding Indian claims for equality with European settlers in Kenya,” (Maxon, 1991, 
p. 259). Tanganyika, on the other hand, was founded as a League of Nations Mandate 
under Article 22 of the League of Nations. This founding declaration stated that the 
colony was to be governed as a mandate for the benefit of natives. While Article 22 of the 
League of Nations contained stronger language on the role of European settlers than the 
Devonshire White Paper did in the Kenyan context, both documents had substantial 
similarity: they established the interests of Africans as paramount and placed those 
concerns ahead of concerns for European settlers and agricultural interests.  
The main difference between these lay in their enforcement. The Kenyan 
government was held accountable to the British Crown only, while the Tanganyikan 
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colonial government was held accountable to the nascent League of Nations. Article 22 
of the League of Nations came with the enforcement capability of the League of Nation, 
which was a new postwar organization that Britain did not want to trouble. In the 1924 
Report by Britain to the League of Nations, the British Government needed to 
demonstrate that labor was free in the territories, and settler land did not come at the cost 
of African land desires, and that the colony was actively trying to provide for the welfare 
of Africans, including with a required appendix answering questions common to a 
mandates (Annual Report for Tanganyika Mandate, 1924, 1925). Britain’s report was 
subject to scrutiny from other member states – as evidenced by questioning from 
Yugoslavia and the Czech Republic, who didn’t want Britain to obtain unfair advantage 
from its newfound protectorate, and from the newly formed International Labour 
Organization (“Supply of official documents by the Mandatory Power,” 1933). 
Meanwhile, Britain had only advanced the Devonshire paper in Kenya as a convenient 
ploy and had no intention of ever enforcing it. Thus, Britain was forced to merge word 
and deed in Tanganyika with respect to African rights, in a way that it could conveniently 
ignore in Kenya. The difference hinged on different colonial institutional arrangements 
and international accountability in the context of interwar international relations. 
One of the big differences between Kenya and Tanganyika was the role of 
settlers, and their ability to petition the state to coerce a labor force to their needs. These 
differences were inscribed formally by law as well as informally by networks between 
settlers and colonial officials and were externally influenced by different kinds of 
international accountability mechanisms. In Kenya, British settlers petitioned a British 
government, while German, Greek, British, Indian, Arab, estates had to petition the 
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British colonial regime in Dar es Salaam. In 1921, there were 4,298 Europeans in Kenya 
(Annual Report on Kenya Colony and Protectorate, 1921, 1922). Of course, not all 
Europeans in Kenya (or Tanganyika) were settlers. But by 1930, there were 16,842 white 
settlers in Kenya, there were approximately 5 million Kenyans, who owned 1/3 of the 
arable land in Kenya (Annual Report on Kenya Colony and Protectorate, 1930, 1931). In 
1921, Tanganyika had 2,447 Europeans, though this number had grown to 8,000 by 1931, 
and approximately 4 million Tanganyikans (Annual Report for Tanganyika Mandate, 
1924, 1925; Annual Report for Tanganyika Mandate, 1931, 1932). While settlers were 
more numerous in Kenya than in Tanganyika, they were by no means marginal in 
Tanganyika, and Tanganyika had significant plantation estates owned by Arabs & 
Indians, who were neither African nor European. Both settler and planter populations had 
similar goals and mechanisms: to make profit through export-led plantation cash 
cropping (coffee, tea, sisal, pyrethrum, etc.), on land provided cheaply from the crown, 
with a labor force of comprised of Africans who would be turned out to work with help 
from the state.  
So, where was this labor to come from in the post WWI era? European 
commercial production in colonial Africa – from the extractive economies of the southern 
mining belt to the agriculture holdings across the continent – required workers. They 
were faced with the initial problem that African labor neither needed nor wanted to work 
in European commercial production. African labor did not need to work in European 
commercial production because there were no factors directly pushing them there – 
Africans were largely engaged in stable economies and systems of trade which met their 
needs, and land grabs by colonial powers weren’t a sufficient push factor (yet) on the 
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land-rich and people-poor continent. At the same time, there were few pull factors – 
wages were not particularly high and though cash was used, there was little desire to 
increase participation in the cash economy of the agricultural estates. The colonial states 
of Kenya and Tanganyika intervened at this juncture to induce a labor force for the needs 
of European plantations, and the socio-institutional ecosystems of labor compulsion 
began to take shape.  
In these states, both settler and African farmer interests petitioned the various 
colonial regimes in Africa for access to land and labor (Frankema et al., 2016). In this 
schema, environmental conditions (e.g. volcanic soils with plentiful rain) form the base 
upon which European and African farmer interests lie. However, the colonial state 
decides the conditions upon which land will be apportioned and a labor force encouraged 
through state policy. It was here that the legal charters of the Tanganyika Mandate and 
the Kenya Colony came to the fore. The Kenya Colony, responsible only to London, had 
much more laterality to compel labor, and allied itself closely (though not entirely) with 
the desires of the European settlers. The Tanganyika Mandate, responsible to the League 
of Nations, had much less room to compel labor for colonial estates, although that power 
was still substantial.  
The rest of this section explores modes of labor compulsion in Tanganyika and 
Kenya. Some modes were common to both Kenya and Tanzania: the Hut & Poll Tax, 
various forms of coerced labor, and vagrancy laws. But the Kenyan state went further 
with an institutional ecosystem aimed at inducing a labor force: it effectively banned 
Africans from growing the major cash crops which pushed peasant cash croppers into the 
labor force; it instituted the Crown Lands and Native Reserve system which put land 
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pressure on African peasants; it passed legislation that required squatters (Africans living 
on Crown Lands) to work for estates; and it instituted a registration system, the kipande, 
which regulated African movement, pushing it towards areas of labor demand, and thus 
controlling wages.  
LABOR COMPULSION COMMON TO KENYA & TANGANYIKA 
Across the continent from the late 19th century until independence, European 
powers sought to induce African labor with a whole variety of mechanisms, from use of 
the penal system and legal architecture to exploitation of phytosanitary conditions. Here, 
we focus on a basic architecture consisting of two elements: a system of taxation which 
would obligate participation in the cash economy – a proportion of which would be in the 
paid labor sector, and a system of coerced labor and vagrancy laws for the state to build 
infrastructure and to inculcate the rhythms of capitalist labor to a potential labor force. In 
Kenya and Tanganyika, both systems existed.  
Hut & Poll Taxes 
Taxes were levied on African men of working age in many parts of the continent 
to turn out a labor force which would be available for European commerce. Of course, 
these taxes were also an important source of revenue for colonial authorities, and the 
revenue motivation provided cover for colonial authorities, who did generally not want to 
admit that taxes were a part of their desire to requisition a labor force. In 1898, German 
authorities instituted the first general system of taxation in German East Africa, With 
their Hut & Poll Tax Ordinance of 1912, and the British Government carried this over in 
Tanganyika to their Hut & Poll Tax of 1922 (Shivji, 1986b, p. 12). The British East 
African Protectorate imposed a Hut Tax in 1901, which was updated to a Hut & Poll Tax 
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in 1910 (Zwanenberg, 1975, p. 76). Error! Reference source not found., below, shows 
a Hut & Poll Tax receipt from Tanganyika in 1933-34.  
Despite official accounts that held that taxes were strictly for state revenue, and 
thus in line with the norms of constitutional liberalism, evidence demonstrates that its 
purpose was to occasion a labor force. For one, colonial authorities admitted it at times, 
such as Percy Girouard Governor of the East African Protectorate in 1913:  
We consider that taxation is the only possible method of compelling the 
native to leave his reserve for the purpose of seeking work. Only in this way 
can the cost of living be increased for the native…and it on this that the 
supply of labour and the price of labour depends,” (Ochieng and Maxon, 
1992, p. 262). 
Other actors and documentarians to the colonial project, such as J.H. Oldham, a 
radical Scottish missionary, and Norman Leys, a socialist colonial official, frequently 
write of tax as a mode of labor compulsion in British Africa (Leys 1918). In addition, 
unlike other tax regimes, hut and poll taxes were levied independent of wealth holdings 
(i.e. a percentage of value of property) or level of income (i.e. as a percentage of total 
income). Exclusions were given to the infirm (those unable to work) as well as to those 
already employed in the colonial police or military (Shivji, 1986b, p. 12). In Nyasaland 
(present day Malawi), where settlers were particularly powerful and given that Africans 
Figure 3                        Tanzania National Archives 
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could earn money in other capacities (i.e. the sale of cash crops), the tax rate was doubled 
for peasants vis-à-vis workers on European estates, demonstrating the preference of the 
state that taxes result in an increase in agricultural labor (Leys, 1921). Shivji writes that  
“Unlike the system of advanced capitalism where taxation is predominantly a 
system to earn revenue, the ‘hut and poll tax’ was primarily a system aimed at 
extracting labour. The colonialists knew this and consciously used it for the 
purpose. New migrations of labour were stimulated by imposing or increasing 
taxation…in many cases the district administration actually planned their tax 
drives so as to flush out labour during periods when employers needed it the 
most,” (Shivji, 1986b). 
Though the creation of a labor force was a driving force behind the system of 
taxation, it had other results as well. For example, because Africans were not completely 
obligated to earn the income to pay tax through paid work, many opted to grow and sell 
cash-crops (though in Kenya this was effectively banned by state practice). This became 
harder in regions with poor infrastructure, obligating some to engage in migratory labor. 
In areas with good infrastructure, this also led to peasant differentiation and inequality, 
which led to intra-region and inter-region inequality throughout East Africa 
(Zwanenberg, 1975, p. 102).  
Coerced Labor & Vagrancy Laws 
In both Kenya and Tanganyika, colonial states allowed for the government to 
force Africans to labor for the state. Forced labor, by any other name, is slavery, and 
much of Britain’s claims for the legitimacy of colonization – it is civilizing mission – 
came from the fact that it had helped to abolish slavery both globally and in East Africa. 
Hansen argues that “the economic needs of the […] established colonial empire meant 
that slavery was in many areas succeeded by the system of forced labour or corvée labour 
orchestrated by colonial governments, not least the case in the Protectorates of East 
Africa and Uganda,” (Hansen, 1993). Thus, the colonial projects coded this labor in 
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several ways to legitimize its use, as ‘communal,’ ‘tribal turnouts,’ ‘requisitioned,’ or 
‘compulsory’ labor.  
In Tanganyika in 1921, the Native Authority Ordinance recognized ‘communal 
labour’ or ‘tribal turnouts’ where Africans would be required to work for the Native 
Authority for 10-20 days per year clearing roads and bush. On the one hand, this was 
legitimized as prevention for Tsetse flies, but Tanganyikan colonial authorities also 
argued that it was simply the legislation of tribal custom and thus was a formal version of 
voluntary labor (Shivji, 1986b). In Kenya, similarly reasoning was used to justify 
‘compulsory’ labor as a formalization of ‘communal’ labor. In particular, the Ugandan 
practice of kasnavu was used as the African basis for European state authorities to use 
African labor for the building of roads. Okia successfully demonstrates that there was a 
robust presence of forced and communal labor, and further demonstrates that this labor 
was often marshalled towards the private sector through the 1920s in Kenya (Okia, 
2012). Morton agrees that this was present but argues that the macro-effects of such labor 
are not sufficiently demonstrated (Morton, 2013). There were a variety of other modes of 
coerced labor. For example, in Tanganyika there was ‘tax defaulter’s labor,’ where 
Africans could avoid penalties from non-payment of tax by working for the state for an 
average of 36 days, which averaged 25,000 workers per year from 1933-42 (Shivji 1986, 
9). In Kenya and Tanganyika, provisions existed for the conscription of porters to carry 
state goods and supplies, and were used with some frequency, particularly as roads were 
being built. In Tanganyika, 15,000 porters worked in 1927, for a maximum of 60 days 
per year (Shivji 1986, 10). 
Vagrancy laws and other similar legislation also helped enforce labor discipline 
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and oriented Africans to the paid labor sector in East Africa. Under statutes such as the 
Vagrancy Act (1924) in Kenya and similar statutes throughout British East Africa and 
colonial Africa, Africans could be found guilty of not working – broadly defined – and 
then used as penal labor or even leased out to private employers. Speaking of the 
translation of British vagrancy laws to their empire, Burton and Ocobock (2008) argue 
that “vagrancy laws were part of a package of labor regulations designed either to compel 
or to curb entrance into the wage labor market as well as restrict human movement,” (p. 
292). These laws were “used to exploit, frustrate and intimidate Kenyans by restricting 
their right to movement, association and the use of private property,” (Muendo, 2017). 
Bernault, in the context of Francophone Africa, has argued, according to Hynd, that 
“colonizers perceived penal labour not just as a marginal supplement to the ranks of 
African ‘free’ wage earners, but rather as a crucial tool for the creation of colonial 
labour,” (Bernault, 1999; Hynd, 2015, p. 250). Granular evidence for this comes from a 
series of convictions from the Nyashimo Primary Court in Tanganyika in 1952, for which 
convicts were sentenced to penal labor, including: “Roaming about on a working Day,” 
(about 80% of convictions), “Building a House Instead of Cultivating,” “Going 
Swimming Instead of Cultivating,” “Threatening to beat Village Headman,” and “Fishing 
Instead of Cultivating,” (Nyashimo Primary Court Documents, 1952, 1953). 
At times, private capital in East Africa was not happy with coerced labor, as they 
saw it as competition for scant labor power which they needed on their farms (Shivji, 
1986b). Still, several authors point out that the project of forced labor accomplished a few 
different things for the development of an African labor force in East Africa. First, it 
helped to develop the infrastructure upon which private capital would be able to exploit 
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African commercial activity. Second, as argued by Shivji, the “effect of forced labour 
was to instill the habits and conditions wage-labour in the producers who had never 
known it before,” (Shivji 1986, 11). Finally, and particularly in Kenya, there were direct 
– if not official – links between coerced labor and private labor, wherein laborers who 
engaged in ‘compulsory’ labor were forced to sign 6 month employment contracts with 
private employers proximate to state projects at the end of the their compulsory labor 
tenure.   
MODES OF LABOR COMPULSION UNIQUE TO THE KENYA COLONY 
As settlers were stronger in Kenya, and there was no necessity to report back to 
the watchful eye of the nascent League of Nations or the International Labor 
Organization like in Tanganyika, the Kenyan colonial state erected a wider set of tools in 
order to push the African population towards paid labor, in addition to coerced labor and 
the hut and poll tax. There were: (1) effective bans on most cash cropping, to limit the 
option set for raising cash to pay Hut and Poll Tax of Africans in Kenya; (2) the Crown 
Lands & Native Reserves system, which exacerbated land pressure on Africans in Kenya 
and created a huge class of squatters – a legal distinction brought about almost overnight 
to people who were living as they had been – on Crown Lands and in the ‘White 
Highlands;’ (3) ensuant Squatter Legislation (the Resident Native Labour Ordinance) 
which required work from squatters on Crown Lands on European farms; and (4) a 
passbook system (the Registration of Native Labour Ordinance) which regulated 
movement of Africans to control wages and keep laborers in areas of labor demand.  
Effective bans on most cash cropping  
In Kenya, the colonial government frequently passed ordinances restricting the 
ability of Africans to grow crash crops, such as the Crop Production and Livestock Act 
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(1926). While this reduced competition with European cultivators, the more important 
function was to force would-be peasants into paid labor to pay their Hut and Poll Tax. As 
the set of options for paying a tax through cash cropping thinned, paid labor become a 
more plausible alternative. This became a key component to the institutional constellation 
of labor compulsion in Kenya. The Kenyan colonial regime could not outright ban native 
production of coffee, tea, and pyrethrum3 as this would violate the spirit of the 
Devonshire White Paper. But with administrative fees, licensing requirements built up by 
playing on fears of disease spread from potential African production, and other 
phytosanitary bureaucratic measures, they effectively banned Africans from producing 
major cash crops. For a variety of reasons there were cash crops that Africans in Kenya 
did grow, and which the state left alone. They were: cotton, as its harvest schedule didn’t 
interfere with coffee and it was not a successful plantation crop; maize, as an important 
crop for the reproduction of labor and which Europeans by law could buy from African 
farmers cheaply and resell abroad for a higher prices4; and wattle bark, a crop important 
in the processing of leather and which Europeans did not plant, as they saw it too 
unprofitable. But with the major cash crops in Kenya, de facto bans were held in place as 
long as possible (Anderson and Throup, 1985; Waters, 1972). The regime was able to 
enforce a de facto European monopoly on coffee production until 1933, when a limited 
 
3 Or, chrysanthemums, which were used to manufacture insecticides.   
4 The dual price system marks an especially important feature of Kenyan colonization: establishing a 
guaranteed income for settlers in Kenya. By buying maize and other cereals from Kenyan peasants and 
squatters at low prices set by the state, and selling abroad at international prices, European colonists in 
Kenyan could realize this difference by their simple existence on cheap land supplied by the Kenyan 
colonial regime. This meant that colonists in Kenya – often ex-soldiers and displaced Anglo-Irish 
landowners after Ireland’s Easter uprising – did not need previous capital to embark upon colonization and 
did not need to be particularly adept managers to realize accumulation. The dual-price system functioned as 
a direct transfer of value from African peasants to European agri-capitalists engaged in the colonial 
enterprise and made Kenya that much more enticing to settlers and potential settlers.  
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project was tried in North Kavirondo Province, though intentionally stunted by lack of 
infrastructure (Barnes, 1979). African coffee production did not begin in earnest in Kenya 
until the mid-1950s.  
While European settlers in Tanganyika wanted a similar de facto monopoly as the 
one in Kenya, they were simply unable to as they reckoned with the inertia of African 
coffee cultivation under the Germans and what a ban would mean to the League of 
Nations. In the Kilimanjaro Region of Tanganyika in the 1920s, European settlers with 
close networking ties to their Kenyan peers agitated for a ban on African cultivation of 
coffee, just as in Kenya. ‘Native Production’ accounted for more than 50 percent of the 
5,621 tons of coffee output of Tanzania in 1924, compared to the 6,426 tons of Kenya, 
cultivated exclusively by European settlers (Annual Report for Tanganyika Mandate, 
1924, 1925; Annual Report on Kenya Colony and Protectorate, 1931, 1932). After 
petitioning the Dar es Salaam government to restrict African coffee production in the 
mid-1920s, the settlers received a stern rebuke from Moshi District Office Charles 
Dundas, as described by colonial official A.L. Pennington:  
“Suppression of coffee planting was out of the question. The British 
Government could not suppress development initiated under [the] Germans, 
and no rules for the suppression of native enterprise would have been 
permitted by the Government or countenanced by the League of Nations. 
Moreover, no Government could set out to root up trees which had stood for 
fifteen years and were bringing in a secure and ample income. The 
alternatives were to let matters take their own course, or to take a hand in this 
development. . . The main point to be borne in mind is that the encouragement 
or countenancing of coffee cultivation by Wachagga was no ill-considered 
policy, but was due to circumstances which made it almost a necessity,” 
(Pennington, 1933). 
By comparison, the conversation on coffee cultivation by Africans in Kenya 
between the settler community and colonial officials looked very different. Under the 
‘Crops Production and Livestock Ordinance,’ Africans were effectively barred from 
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growing coffee by the Agricultural Commissioner, through licensing fees and other 
measures. In 1932, a new Coffee Industry Bill proposed to remove the licensing fee of 
30/- for Africans, which would effectively allow for the African production of coffee 
(“Debate on Coffee Growing by Natives,” 1932). 30/- approximates 6 months wages for 
farm laborers in 1932, or 3 months wages for skilled laborers. Equivalent to £1.50, it was 
not particularly onerous to settlers. The Coffee Planter’s Union – an organization of white 
settler farmers – voiced its concerns to the state, arguing that this would be dangerous for 
disease, theft, and competition (the arguments which had been used up until that point). 
The Attorney General, acknowledging the subtleties between de facto and de jure law in 
Kenya, responded at length: 
“Under existing legislation there is nothing to hinder any native growing 
coffee. That fact that it has not been grown in the reserves heretofore is 
because we have been well backed up by various governors since growing 
was started, in seeing that it was discouraged among natives…The time has 
come, and some of us realise it, when that discouragement is no longer 
possible. Natives have come to administrative officers with the money in their 
hands to pay license fees for coffee plantations…if a native went to the 
supreme court he would receive a mandamus whereby no District 
Commissioner would be able to refuse to give him a license, in the opinion of 
the Attorney General,” (“Debate on Coffee Growing by Natives,” 1932). 
 Of importance here, note socio-institutional alliance of soft power with legal 
precedence. The Attorney General openly admits that the prevention of African coffee 
cultivation was only possible with the extra-legal support of the governor. The Coffee 
Planters Union agreed that legally, there was little that could be done, but that 
bureaucratically there was. The Attorney General again offered the settlers a way out: 
while the courts could not stop African cultivation, the Director of Agriculture could still 
effectively do that (“Debate on Coffee Growing by Natives,” 1932). In 1933, Kenya did 
allow for African cultivation of coffee, though far from infrastructure in North Kavirondo 
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Province (Barnes, 1979). Before the meeting concluded, the planters registered their 
disdain, and clear the conditions on which they had brought their capital to Kenya. Mr. 
Archer, a coffee plantation owner, said “I doubt very much if I should have embarked on 
coffee growing in Kenya if had not thought the native was completely out of the picture,” 
(“Debate on Coffee Growing by Natives,” 1932, p. 8).  
The effective banning of large sections of African cash cropping in Kenya was a 
large block to the viability of that sector, and effectively was a massive push by the state 
to get more Africans in Kenya into the labor force, at the behest of settlers. That is, since 
coffee was an export crop there was not competition in the product market between 
Africans and Europeans; there was competition in the input market. Cash crop legislation 
turned would be peasants from input market competitors to the very labor power inputs 
that the settlers needed. In so doing, the paid labor economy, vis-à-vis the peasant 
economy, was propped up by the Kenyan colonial regime.  
Crown Lands & Native Reserves 
Native Reserves were a popular African colonial policy, such as the Bantustans of 
South Africa. In Kenya, the Native Reserve system eventually led to the designated of all 
lands (except for the Northern Frontier and Turkana district) as either Crown Lands or 
Native Reserves. Crown Lands were then sold to settlers in what became known as the 
White Highlands, off limits for Indian and African ownership, and would eventually 
comprise one third of arable land in the colony. While the creation of Reserves had been 
discussed since early on in the colonial era, not much was done except in the Maasai 
areas (Van Zwanenberg and King, 1975). By 1920, reserves had become official policy. 
Overnight, Africans outside of the Native Reserves and on Crown Lands were now cast 
into a new legal category – squatters – which came with a whole series of obligations 
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discussed below. On the reserves, Africans who thirty years previously had had plentiful 
land, were now being squeezed into smaller and smaller parcels. Combined with the 
restrictions on cash-cropping, land pressure and immiseration on the Native Reserves 
were an important feeder for the colonial labor force (Ndalilah, 2012). Africans not only 
had to feed themselves but come up with enough money to pay their hut and poll tax. 
This was often by leaving the reserve in search of work (Overton, 1990).  
The Reserve System served to turn out a labor force by making Africans respond 
to the poverty of the Reserves by working on European estates. Norman Leys 
documented the immiseration on the Native Reserves in a 1918 letter to J.H. Oldham: 
“there is a much larger number of natives who have merely just enough ground on which 
to grow their necessary food, to whom it is quite impossible to grow crops for sale, 
wherewith to pay the tax money and to buy trade goods,” (Leys, 1918). While 
immiseration was not wholly sufficient to turn out labor, as shown by Fibaek and Green 
(2019), we know that the colonial authorities noted it in their assessments. In the 1929 
Annual Report, the Governor of Kenya wrote that “The flow of labour was sufficient to 
meet the demand, but this might not have been so had both native and non-native crops 
been good. Many natives turned out to work for wages owing to the loss of their crops 
from locusts and drought,” (Annual Report on Kenya Colony and Protectorate, 1929, 
1930). 
In Tanganyika, Africans did not have the same land pressure which would push 
them into labor on the colonial estates, and such a legal maneuver would have been quite 
impossible given the international oversight and posture of the League of Nations. In 
Kenya, however, the Reserve system served as a mechanism to occasion a labor force by 
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artificially stoking land pressure in a context where there would otherwise not be one.  
Squatter Legislation (Resident Native Labour Ordinance) 
With the establishment of the Crown Lands and Native Reserves systems by the 
end of WWI, all Africans who were residing outside of Native Reserves, and on Crown 
Lands, were declared to be ‘squatters.’ They would come to form the majority of labor on 
European farms (Kanogo, 1987). This was not accomplished through laissez-faire labor 
market principles which pulled African squatters into the employ of European estates, but 
by laws which required labor of all squatters. The Resident Native Labor Ordinance of 
1918 declared that all African men of working age residing on European owned land 
would be obligated to work for 180 days per year for private enterprise as a condition of 
their residence on Crown Lands. In name they were paid (though in practice not always), 
by wages set by settlers themselves. By the end of the 1920s, there were 120,000 
squatters, of whom 35,000 were adult males engaged in paid work on colonial estates. In 
times of harvest, women and children would also be involved – 11,000 in 1925 and some 
30,000 in 1929 (NB: data are incredibly spotty) (Clayton and Savage, 1974; Kenya 
Colony Blue Book 1929, 1930). European estates were obligated to provide land for 
cultivation to squatters, which also acted as a form of control over the well-being of the 
squatter and their families. The land “provided” to squatters was also used to by squatters 
to grow maize, which was often bought by settlers and sold on for a higher price owing to 
a state-initiated dual price system. Wolff argues that “Since not only his wages, but his 
food producing land and his hut could be taken from him, he was for more docile and 
tractable in meeting the demands of his employer,” (Wolff, 1974, p. 127). In that way, 
legislation aimed at obliging labor from squatters functioned directly and indirectly to 
obtain a wage labor force.  
 
- 86 - 
 
Passbook System (Registration of Natives Ordinance) 
Finally, Kenyan authorities instituted a passbook, or kipande5, system which was 
intended to control labor. The passbook recorded each African’s name, age, occupation, 
employer, and wage, as well as all ten fingerprints. It was worn in a metal container 
around the neck of all African men in Kenya. It had to be produced on demand to the 
police, and failure to produce it could result in one month in prison. Clayton and Savage 
write that “the effect of this system, ostensibly one of identification, was in fact to restrict 
a man’s freedom to leave his work and his freedom to bargain with an employer for a 
wage not necessarily related to that of his previous employment,” (Clayton and Savage, 
1974, p. 132). Importantly, the kipande also kept laborers out of urban centers, and 
Nairobi in particular. In Tanganyika, the cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Arusha, and 
Mwanzaa all grew as urban centers and counterbalanced downward wage pressure in 
rural areas by allowing laborers to seek work in urban centers. By preventing most 
Africans in Kenya from living in Nairobi through the kipande system, Kenya increased 
the number of people seeking work in rural areas, and the reserve army helped fill 
vacancies and keep wages low.  
By effectively banning cash crops, squeezing African pre-existing sector 
production and land tenure in the reserves, obligating squatters on Crown Lands to work, 
and by controlling the movement and bargaining power of labor with the passbook 
system, the Kenyan colonial authorities had stitched together a wide ranging socio-
institutional ecosystem in order to occasion a labor force. This was in addition to the 
compulsory labor and hut and poll tax architecture that Kenya shared with Tanganyika. 
 
5 “piece” in Kiswahili.  
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Tanganyikan authorities were unable to take on the extra features of the Kenyan 
institutional ecosystem for occasioning a workforce. The result was that Kenyan workers 
were held more tightly in place as workers, limited from other modes of earning a living, 
such as peasant cash cropping and pre-existing sector production. In the next section, I 
explore a theoretical schema to think through the political economy dynamics of both 
regimes, before examining the empirical record before and after the Great Depression in 
Sections IV & V.  
IV. THEORETICAL VIEW: THE LABOR CIRCULATION SCHEMA 
How can we theorize these, modes of labour compulsion, and think about the 
differences between the labor force of Kenya and Tanganyika in a meaningful way? 
Given such heavy institutional involvement of the state in occasioning a labor force for 
colonial production, we can hardly say that a neoclassical labor supply model built from 
individual decisions allocating time between labor and leisure is an appropriate model. 
The Marxian notion of primitive accumulation here offers us a way to give theoretical 
framing to the question of labor in colonial East Africa. I explore the notion of primitive 
accumulation with respect to labor along its social and institutional axes, and then 
develop a labor flow circulation schema to frame the socio-institutional levers of 
proletarianization in East Africa.  
INSTITUTIONAL PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION? 
Originally, primitive accumulation sought to theorize the question of the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism, by investigating the origins of the elements of 
capitalist accumulation: large amounts of capital in the hands of a would-be capitalists, 
available raw materials, and the presence of labor-power ready to be purchased as labor. 
In East Africa, the colonial equation took care of capital by providing it from previous 
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accumulation (either by peripheral dispossession or core capitalist accumulation), and 
commandeered raw materials by the land seizures of colonialism. Thus, I focus here on 
the aspects of labor and the processes of proletarianization theorized by Marx and other 
Marxists, and which we can see in the East African context.  
A proletarian – someone dependent on the sale of their labor – is created when 
they have been divorced of their means of production, and when something compels them 
to seek work. Often, this is cast as immiseration – the threat of starvation. A simple 
telling of the transition from feudalism to capitalism sees serfs pushed off their lands, 
divorced from their means of growing their own food crops, and then forced to sell their 
labor power as the only means of their survival. And while immiseration forms an 
important part of the story, the historical record is full of other causes and forms of 
coercion which push erstwhile peasants and serfs into ascendant capitalist productions as 
laborers. Even in the English context of moving from peasant based agricultural systems 
to capitalist agriculture, seizing land in the English enclosure movement was not a fully 
sufficient condition to obligate laborers to sell their labor power. Marx summarizes the 
process of proletarianization a process of “the forcible creation of a class of free and 
rightless proletarians, the bloody discipline that turned them into laborers, [and] the 
disgraceful proceedings of the state which employed police methods to accelerate the 
accumulation of capital,” (Marx p. 905, 2013). Though peasants dispossessed of their 
land were often obligated to sell their labor power in order to eat, other forms of state 
coercion – i.e. vagrancy laws – were still necessary to raise a labor force that could meet 
capital’s demands (Marx, 2013; Sweezy, 1964). Earlier, Marx elaborates that the history 
of primitive accumulation and expropriation “assumes different aspects in different 
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countries and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at 
different historical epochs,” (Marx p. 876, 2013). What emerges from this rendering is a 
theory which highlights the social and institutional elements of primitive accumulation 
and pulls into frame a wider view than just the mechanical elements of dispossession and 
immiseration.  
The relative abundance of land in East Africa in the early colonial era set the 
machinations of primitive accumulation apart from earlier European archetypes. In land-
rich and people-poor East Africa, peasants dispossessed of their land still underwent 
tremendous violence, but were not necessarily as obligated to sell their labour power as a 
result of their imminent immiseration (Kitching, 1980). With plentiful land, they could 
participate in the various forms of indigenous economic activity on slightly worse, but 
still sufficient, land. ‘Double freedom’ in the Marxian sense – freedom to sell labor 
power and freedom from the means of production – was only partially achieved by the 
seizure of land, and Africans were able to access their own means of production (land) 
without any obligation to sell their labor power to settler enterprise6. Thus, while the East 
African story follows an arc of Marxian primitive accumulation, this story is heavily 
tilted towards the socio-institutional features – like the vagrancy laws of England – of 
Marxian primitive accumulation. 
In addition to the Hut & Poll Tax common to both Kenya and Tanganyika, 
Kenyan authorities would be able to use a variety of institutional mechanisms to compel 
labor from its African populace. Indeed, whether the colonial authorities had read Marx, 
 
6 Fibaek & Green (2019) have a particularly great discussion of the debate on immiseration as a pre-
condition for occasioning a wage labor force, in conversation with the previous generation of colonial 
scholars, such as Arrighi (1970), Rodney (1981), and Kitching (1980). 
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they understood the insights on proletarianization well. The institutional edifice they 
erected set about to complete what strictly economic conditions in East Africa could not, 
creating mechanisms to push Africans toward paid labor (other than immiseration), and 
squeezing the potential of African means of production beyond the simple act of 
dispossession. The schema below theorizes how institutional constellations of Colonial 
East Africa funneled Africans into the labor force, and how this was more complete, and 
held more tightly in place, in Kenya.  
DIFFERENTIAL LABOR CIRCULATION IN COLONIAL EAST AFRICA 
This essay expounds a graphical schema to visualize the various institutional 
mechanisms that colonial authorities used to induce the African populations of Kenya and 
Tanganyika into the paid labor sector. Consistent with socio-institutional ecosystem 
analysis, the schema explores the pressures and constraints by which the colonies 
channeled African labor towards different sectors in the option-set available to Africans.  
In the generalized schema, East Africans in British East Africa (and in colonial 
Africa more generally) had three general sectors with which to obtain a living from their 
labor: pre-existent production, peasant cash-cropping, and paid labor on large agricultural 
holdings (in other parts of colonial Africa, paid work took place in extractive industries, 
like mining). The pre-existing sector includes not just agriculture, but production of 
commodities (e.g. metallurgy, textiles) oriented towards exchange amongst pre-colonial 
(or extra-colonial) trading networks7. This sector produced surplus, but this surplus was 
not generally incorporated into expanded capitalist accumulation. In the peasant cash-
 
7 I use the term ‘pre-existing sector’ with some trepidation. It’s meant to include the non-colonial circuits of 
value in existence before the particular capitalist penetration concomitant with colonialism, while avoiding 
loaded and misleading terms such as “traditional” or “subsistence” sector.  
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cropping sector, peasants would grow crops on their land (or upon which they had 
usufruct rights) and sell a surplus in exchange for cash. These circuits of exchange 
generally were involved in mercantile or agricultural circuits of capital and capitalist 
expansion. In the paid labor sector, persons would sell their labor power to a capitalist, 
most usually in agricultural production.  
 
As 
a thought experiment for the purpose of comparison, we first explore an (abstract and 
ahistorical) minimalist colonial state, to compare to the range of institutional features 
which conditioned labor circulation in the Kenyan and Tanganyikan States.  In this 
abstract minimalist state, citizens can move freely between the various sectors, 
alternatively cash-cropping, engaged in pre-existing sector production, or in paid labor in 
agricultural estates. This schema is shown above in Figure 4, and the porous boundary 
between sectors denotes the ease of movement between the various according to the 
Figure 4 
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relative benefits and costs in a given time and place.  
The colonial governments of Tanganyika and Kenya were interested in pushing 
Africans to paid labor in the agricultural sector – a precondition for the development of 
robust and viable settler agriculture. More, the paid labor on the agricultural estates 
needed at least to appear as free labor – Britain’s marshaled its role in limiting the slave 
trade as a justification for its colonial enterprise. So, the regimes sought ways to push an 
African peasantry who did not need or want to sell their labor power to do just that, short 
of outright forced labor. As shown in Section II, the two regimes shared some 
commonalities in how they went about this, particularly with their system of taxation. 
These also included forms of coerced labor as well as vagrancy laws. Kenya, however, 
free from watch of the international community and accountability through of the League 
of Nations, had a wider set of tools with which to compel African labor.  
The Tanganyikan mode includes the Hut and Poll Tax as a mode to stimulate an 
African labor force. The Hut and Poll Tax, by demanding that Africans pay in cash, 
served to pressure Africans away from pre-existing sector production, either into 
agricultural work or into peasant cash cropping. Importantly, this pressure pushed 
Africans into the British colonial cash economy. Several currencies had long histories 
throughout East Africa, and until 1921 the Indian rupee was the official currency of the 
colonies. The introduction of the East African Shilling in 1921, and the concomitant 
demand that the Hut and Poll Tax be paid in those shillings, meant that Africans seeking 
to pay their tax needed to participate in circuits of cash which proffered the East Africa 
Shilling. This meant work on agricultural estates or the sale of cash crops to merchants 
operating with the shilling. So, the Hut and Poll Tax added pressure to labor circulation 
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schema, 
pushing Africans in from the pre-existing sector to the paid labor and the cash-cropping 
sectors. The arrows demonstrate this pressure in Figure 5 below, representing 
Tanganyika, demonstrate this pressure.  
 
While the regime in Kenya included the Hut & Poll Tax as an institutional means 
of to pressure Africans into the sectors it wanted, but also had a deeper set of tools to 
compel Africans into the paid labor sector, as shown in Section II. The overall effect of 
this meant that Africans in Kenya had much heavier institutional pressures compelling a 
labor force than did Africans in Tanganyika. For example, all paid labor in Tanganyika 
was wage labor, where workers were not legally obligated to work on any landowners 
particular estate, while the Kenyan paid labor sector was comprised of both free wage 
laborers and semi-feudal squatter labor, who received wages but were not free to choose 
their employer or their duration of contract.  
The Kenyan labor circulation schema is shown below in Figure 6.  
Figure 5 
 




First, effective bans on cash-cropping for the biggest agricultural exports (coffee, 
tea, pyrethrum) seriously delimited peasant cash-cropping as an option to pay tax. While 
the Hut and Poll Tax pushed Africans into the cash sectors – paid labor and cash-
cropping – the bans on cash-cropping pulled many out of cash-cropping and into the paid 
labor sector. Some cash crops were still grown by Africans in Kenya, especially wattle, 
cotton, and maize for sale. Next, the dispossession of African land through the Crown 
Lands Ordinance and the Native Reserve System put land pressure on Kenyans, further 
delimiting cash-cropping (in the crops able to be grown by Kenyans) as well as pre-
existing sector production. As such, land legislation pushed Africans in Kenya from the 
pre-existing sector sector and the cash-cropping sector into the paid labor sector. Then, 
the Resident Native Labor Ordinance (1918, 1925, & 1937) obligated Kenyans who 
resided in Crown Lands (“Squatters”) to work for the settler farmers on who is land they 
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were squatting. This is shown in the labor circulation schema as a subset of paid labor 
called ‘squatter labor,’ which stands in contrast to wage labor. Squatter labor was akin to 
a semi-feudal form of labor; while squatter labor was paid a wage (by the letter of the 
law) and squatters were not legally tied to the land (although familiar, historical, and 
customary ties were present), squatters were required to work for the landowner, in 
exchange for a parcel of land to cultivate for their own consumption or to sell on. This is 
shown as a border around the squatter labor section of the paid labor sector, which forced 
many Kenyans into paid labor on agricultural estates. Finally, the passbook kipande 
system through the Registration of Natives Ordinance (1920) served to control the flow 
of labor and keep wages in the agricultural sector low. This kept Kenyans out of the wage 
opportunities of burgeoning urban centers like Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nairobi, while 
also ensuring information shared amongst settlers via the kipande held wages in check.   
The result of this was that the labor force in Kenya was held in place through a 
series of socio-institutional ecosystemic pressures which practically guaranteed robust 
proletarianization for a crucial part of Kenya’s population. At the same time, 
Tanganyika’s labor circulation pressures exerted a softer pressure pushing Africans 
toward paid labor and remained relatively more porous, allowing Africans to circulate 
more based on the relative costs and benefits of each sector at particular junctures. Two 
different systems emerged with respect to the labor nexus for Africans in British East 
Africa – a porous labor circulation in Tanganyika, and a more impermeable system of 
labor circulation in Kenya.  
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Initially, these systems might vary only slightly, as a quick glance across Kenya 
and Tanganyika in the 1920s would reveal some Africans engaged in pre-existing sector 
production, others engaged in paid work, and still others engaged in some form of cash 
crop production. Yet these surface similarities belied vast subterranean difference. The 
Great Depression served as an external shock which exposed some of the deep 
differences in the institutional ecosystems that underlaid the various modes of labor in 
Kenya and Tanganyika. ‘Social economy’ offenses through the 1920s and 1930s offer a 
peak into how important the socio-institutional pressures were to the priorities of each 
country and are shown above in Figure 5. Social economy offenses included failure to 
pay the Hut and Poll Tax as well as various violations specific to Kenya – the Resident 
Native Labor Ordinance and the Registration of Natives Ordinance. In the beginning of 
the 1920s, Kenya had an offense rate about twice as high as Tanganyika. While 
Tanganyika’s rate stayed steady, the Kenyan offense rate began to climb in the late 20s to 











1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
'Social Economy' Offenses 1923-1940
KENYA TANGANYIKA
Figure 7                                              Source: Blue Books 1923-1938 
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paid labor force than Tanganyika, but its disciplinary apparatus matched that intensity, 
especially in the context of the Great Depression. The next section examines the 
empirical record, and its accordance to the labor circulation schema, leading up to and 
through the Great Depression. 
V. LABOR FORMATIONS OF THE 1920S 
By the mid to late 1920s, Kenya finally began to have a supply of paid labor equal 
to its demand, and the steadiness of the labor supply was assured by the push factors of 
the socio-institutional ecosystem of Kenya. The same could not be said for Tanganyika, 
where the porous labor circulation flow, and dual (but weak) policies to encourage 
peasantization and proletarianization led to much turbulence in the labor supply through 
the 1920s. These trends become apparent through annual colony and district reports. 
While data exist about the numbers of workers engaged in wage work in 
agriculture, there exist no figures for labor demand. However, anecdotal evidence exists, 
from the National Archives of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam), Kenya (Nairobi), and the UK 
(London). In the Kenya Colony Annual Report for 1925,  the author writes that “The 
[coffee] industry is in a sound position and, but for the uncertainty in regard to labour 
supplies, particularly during the picking season, more rapid progress would be made in 
extending the acreage under coffee,” (Annual Report on Kenya Colony and Protectorate, 
1925, 1926). This anxiety had persisted for some time. Yet the next annual report showed 
that those anxieties were disappearing: “The apprehension indicated last year on account 
of insufficiency of labour has been removed to an appreciable degree. African labourers 
have been offering their services in increasing numbers and it cannot be said, except in 
rare cases, that production and development suffered through an insufficiency of 
unskilled labour,” (Annual Report on Kenya Colony and Protectorate, 1926, 1927). The 
 
- 98 - 
 
state had largely solved the labor shortage crisis through coercive measures, and this 
position continued to hold; the 1929 Annual Report simply says “The flow of labour was 
sufficient to meet the demand,” (Annual Report on Kenya Colony and Protectorate, 
1929, 1930). 
In Tanganyika, meanwhile, labor supply was a constant problem for settlers and 
colonial authorities. Elkins and Pedersen write that Tanganyika’s “policy of 
‘peasantization’8 […] enabled Tanganyika to develop a moderately diversified economy, 
usually self-sustaining in food production and with cotton and coffee grown by both 
African peasants and European settlers for export,” (Elkins and Pedersen, 2012, p. 122). 
That Tanganyikan peasants were able to grow their own crops was a worry in the early 
1920s for the Tanganyikan state to be able to secure a labor force, because of labor force 
crowding out. The 1924 annual report states that “During the year under review difficulty 
has been experienced both by private employers and by Government Departments in 
securing a sufficient supply of labour…the increased production of economic crops by 
natives and the development of European-owned estates will, it is feared, presently 
render the labour situation acute,” (Annual Report for Tanganyika Mandate, 1924, 
1925).  
In 1925, the Bagamoyo District Annual Report shows that “the Roman Catholic 
Mission, the Greek plantation owners at Sadana, [as well as] Indian, Baluchi and various 
Arab plantation owners always require labour and there is generally a larger demand than 
supply…because the local natives have a strong objection to working for anybody else 
provided they can grow sufficient crops for their own consumption and tax.” (Annual 
 
8 State support for peasant agriculture – started tepidly in the 1920s and increased in the 1930s.  
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Report, Bagamoyo District, 1925, 1926). The next year, however, the Annual Report 
records that “Labour for non-native copra estates appears to be plentiful in Bagamoyo 
District,” (Annual Report, Bagamoyo District, 1926, 1927, p. 8). In 1927, the District 
Officer writes that there is a “continual demand for labour…it appears that the local 
natives are disinclined to leave the district in search of work provided they can grow 
sufficient food and earn money for their tax," (Annual Report, Bagamoyo District, 1927, 
1928, p. 36). In 1929: “The local native population is reported to turn out irregularly on 
the plantations,” (Annual Report, Bagamoyo District, 1929, 1930, p. 15). 
Africans’ willingness to sell their labor-power dependent on conditions on their 
farms, which in turn depended on the East African climate and seasonality. The Central 
Province (Tanganyika) Commissioner writes in 1928 that:  
“Labour was so plentiful during the dry season that the Engineer i/c [in 
charge] of construction on the Dodoma – Kondoa road turned hundreds of 
labourers away every month. It was very much the same story at Dodoma and 
Mpwapwa as regards railway and PWD requirements. The same cause, 
however, - shortage of food -, which made labour so plentiful when nothing 
could be done in the shambas, made it almost unobtainable when the rains 
were near,” (Annual Report, Central Province (Tanganyika), 1928, 1929, p. 
27). 
This made capital cautious in some areas to develop estates, and some reports 
indicate the haphazard approach of British colonial authorities to the formation of labor 
and ways to pay the hut and poll tax. An example of this haphazardness in 1929 in 
Central Province: 
“In Mkalama, I found Mr. Lyons preaching the gospel of gum […] I heard 
that Ahmed Nasor was prepared to buy gum anywhere […] Word was at once 
sent to everyone to pass the information to each of his headmen with 
instructions to turn out their people to pick the tax from the trees. Gum was 
soon pouring into the markets and, before the crash came, the province had 
benefitted to the extent of #10,000 [10,000 pounds] by the sale of this hitherto 
unexploited commodity,” (Annual Report, Central Province, 1929, 1930, p. 3) 
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However, Tanganyika still managed to turn out a large labor force through the late 
1920s on its large estates, because of a long established institution of migratory labor in 
Tanganyika from the South – Singida, Mbeya, Iringa, and the Southern Highlands, to the 
agricultural holding in central, Northern, and coastal Tanganyika. For example, the 1929 
Manyoni District Annual Report records that “The local Wagogo do not readily offer 
themselves for work even in their own district…the labour demands of the townships 
were met by Wanyaturu from Singida who travel annually to Manyoni District in good 
numbers in search of work,” (District Officer Manyoni, 1930, p. 15). P.H. Gulliver, a 
government sociologist working for the Tanganyikan state, writes that “by 1914 the 
Ngoni had apparently firmly established the habit and custom of labour migration to the 
Tanga region, the Central Line employment areas, and the Coastal region,” (Gulliver, 
1967, p. 1). He estimates that by 1924 6-7,000 men had left Songea – just one Southern 
district – to find work in the paid labor sector (Gulliver, 1967).  Gulliver’s work 
demonstrates that immiseration plus the Hut and Poll Tax was sufficient to push Africans 
into the migratory paid labor sector from the Southern Highlands to Northern 
Tanganyikan plantations – the Southern Highlands lacked infrastructure for robust 
peasant cash-cropping, and Africans needed to work in the paid labor sector in order to 
pay their taxes (Gulliver 1967). The migratory wage workers from the South often went 
to work in a mix of European (particularly English, German, and Greek), Indian, and 
Arab plantations, which reflected older networks from German colonization and the 
coastal trade and influence of the Zanzibar Sultanate.  
Thus, though Tanganyika’s labor induction system had less push than its Kenyan 
counterpart, Tanganyika was able to secure a plantation labor force which met its needs 
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in the late 1920s. In fact, more Tanganyikans were employed in agricultural wage labor 
than Kenyans. In 1928, 170,000 Tanganyikans were employed per day, on average, in the 
agricultural sector, while 92,371 went to work in agriculture in Kenya. Though unclear, 
this number for Kenya does not appear to include squatter labor. From other sources, we 
know that squatters comprised roughly half of the paid labor force in Kenya (Fibaek and 
Green, 2019). Thus, it appears that Kenya was largely on par with the total paid labor 
work force of Tanganyika if both wage workers and squatter labor are counted. 
However, despite some surface indications of a robust and growing agricultural 
labor force, the institutional architecture of the conditions which brought workers to work 
in each country were quite different. With the stock market about to crash in New York 
and global commodity markets soon to be sent into a tailspin, the distance between the 
socio-institutional ecosystems and structures of the labor market Kenya and in 
Tanganyika were about to come sharply into relief.  
VI. GREAT DEPRESSION AS REVELATION 
Viewed from the outside, the macro trade effects of the Great Depression were 
similar for Kenya and Tanganyika, and the Great Depression hit East Africa as an 
external shock. Yet, this external shock affected the internal formations of Tanganyika 
and Kenya differently, and acted as a form of revelation of the emerging divergence 
between the two colonial economies. The machinations of the Great Depression, and the 
divergent responses from Kenya and Tanganyika, played out in ways that confirm what 
one might expect of the labor circulation schema outlined in the previous section. Below, 
we introduce some of the macro effects of the Great Depression, and then go on to 
highlight how that might effect employment, unemployment, wages, and peasantization 
in Kenya and Tanganyika, before exploring those four phenomena in depth with primary  
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source qualitative and quantitative data.  
Global commodities prices and exports dropped precipitously during the Great 
Depression. Figure 6, above, shows global commodities prices for coffee, peanuts, and 
tea, where their 1900 price is indexed to 100, and the effect of the Great Depression 
(Jacks, 2017). Figure 7, below, shows the raw production, and export value, of Kenyan 
and Tanganyikan coffee. While the raw level of production of coffee did not continue to 
grow as fast, it largely plateaued. However, as the price of coffee fell, the total income to 
Kenyan and Tanganyikan coffee producers was intense. As an external demand shock, 
the Great Depression most immediately hurt would be the producers of export cash crops 
– peasants, estate owners, and workers – before those effects were felt by other parts of 
the economy and the socio-institutional ecosystems of East Africa.  
However, the Great Depression fell very differently on Kenya and Tanganyika, 
because of the different forces of the socio-institutional constellations which called the 
Kenyan and Tanganyikan labor forces into existence. The labor flow circulation schema 
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would predict differences, given that sectors linked to global commodities markets were 
held together in different capacities. In Tanganyika, both the wage labor and the peasant 
cash-cropping sectors would be hit, while in Kenya the paid labor sector would be hit, as 
the little cash-cropping that did exist for Africans was not largely linked to the export 
sector. More, given the relative porousness of the Tanganyikan labor schema, we would 
expect that labor could more easily move or shift form in response to the Great 
Depression, while African workers in Kenya would be more tied to the paid labor sector 
to suffer the turbulence of the Great Depression. This section explores the initial 
economic responses to the Great Depression in three ways – employment, wages, 
unemployment, and peasant production: 
1. Employment – The labor flow circulation schema would expect the levels of 
employment to fall in both colonies, but with more drastic drops in Tanganyika, 
as the Great Depression would hit wage ‘pull’ factors common to both colonies 
but wouldn’t affect the ‘push’ factors much more present in Kenya. I show this 












































Coffee Exports from Kenya & Tanganyika 1929-1937
Kenyan Coffee £ Tanganyikan Coffee £
Kenyan Coffee cwts Tanganyikan Coffee cwts
Figure 9                                       Source: Blue Books 1929-1937 
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against total agricultural output. The data show that there was a robust 
relationship between changes in agricultural output and employment in 
Tanganyika, but no relationship at all in Kenya. This accords with the schema, as 
Kenyans were pushed much more than they were pulled by extra-economic 
mechanisms.  
2. Unemployment – The labor flow circulation schema expects that those who lose 
employment in Tanganyika would be able to be better reabsorbed into other 
sectors of the Tanganyikan economy, in particular pre-existing sector production, 
as the peasant cash cropping sector would also be hit hard initially by the Great 
Depression. In Kenya, because of the lack of porousness of the labor circulation 
schema, this essay expects some proportion of those who lose employment to 
remain unemployed – to want work, have no other options, and to not find it. In 
addition, ‘push’ factors from the socio-institutional ecosystem would not be 
affected, and Kenyans would be pushed into the labor force, but not necessarily 
employment, exacerbating structural unemployment in Kenya. Colonial archival 
documents do not record any statistics on African unemployment, and so this is 
evidenced from qualitative sources, and the hypothesis is confirmed.  
3. Wages – The labor circulation schema predicts that there will be an initial drop in 
wages in both colonies, though this will continue to play differently through the 
secondary dynamics of the Great Depression. Because of the unemployment 
expected in Kenya, a reserve army of labor will keep wages low in Kenya. If 
agriculture is to recover in Tanganyika, it will have to attract workers through the 
pull factors of higher wages. Data is both scarce and unreliable on wages, though 
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some preliminary data do buttress this hypothesis.  
4. Peasant Production – Though the Great Depression would initially hit peasant 
cash cropping in Tanganyika, we would expect that on the rebound, peasant cash-
cropping would be stronger, as workers displaced from the paid labor sector 
would be reabsorbed in the cash-cropping sector. It is hard to disentangle peasant 
production from estate production for all crops, as coffee, copra, and cotton were 
grown both on estates and by peasants, but it is possible for other crops. Sisal was 
grown exclusively on estates, and groundnuts (peanuts in the American lexicon) 
were grown exclusively by African peasants. It is observed in Tanganyika that 
through the Great Depression, groundnut production grows at a higher rate than 
sisal production, demonstrating peasantization was a feature of the Great 
Depression in Tanganyika. I explore the relative growth of groundnuts and sisal, 
and it confirms higher growth rates in the peasant sector than the paid labor 
sector. This is one strong evidence of the Great Depression as a peasantizing 
event for Tanganyika.  
EMPLOYMENT 
In the paid labor sector, the Great Depression first hit estate owners, who would 
then be constrained in their wage bill offering. They cut wages and employment. In the 
1930 Tanga District Report (Tanganyika), the District Officer writes that “In August this 
year the Sisal Growers Association decided that owing to the great drop in the price of 
sisal that it would be necessary for them to reduce all of their wages and natives who 
were being paid between 24/- to 30/- p.m. were reduced to 20/- to 24/- p.m. Several large 
estates have closed down and have reduced their numbers considerably,” (District Officer 
Tanga, 1931, p. 12) In Kenya, a letter from the Labour Officer in 1935, addressing the 
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Grey Report, recorded that “There is no doubt that the depression in Kenya, during the 
last few years, has resulted in employers becoming more economical in the use of 
labour[…] in 1933 there was a drop of 37,800 acres i.e. 6.37 percent in the area under 
cultivation,” (Labour Officer, 1935).  
Figure 8, above, shows the levels of daily agricultural employment in Kenya and 
Tanganyika through the Great Depression. As employers cut back on wages and 
employment (the two constituent parts of their wage bill), we would expect that the levels 
of employment in Tanganyika to be cut more drastically. That is, while both Kenyan and 
Tanganyikan workers would see the ‘pull’ factors of paid labor (wages) fall, Kenyans 
would have relatively more ‘push’ factors and would need to stay engaged in paid labor 
because of these push factors, while Tanganyikans would be more free to circulate to 
other parts of the economy.  Indeed, we see only a small decline in the daily agricultural 













Average Daily Ag Employment
Tanganyika Kenya
Figure 10                                 Source: Blue Books 1926-1940 
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We investigate the relative strength of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors by examining a 
simple causal relationship between daily agricultural unemployment and value of export 
cash crops. In Tanganyika, where more market and less non-market factors are present 
than in Kenya, we expect a robust relationship between export level and agricultural 
employment, as the Tanganyikan labor schema depends more on economic relationships 
of trade and employment. In Kenya, where non-market factors are stronger in the 
occasioning of a labor force, we expect there to be a weak at best relationship between 
changes in agricultural output and changes in agricultural employment.  
We run a very simple OLS model, where ln 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖 = 𝛽0 +
𝛽1 ln 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖 + 𝜀1. This essay predicts that in Tanganyika there will be an 
economically and statistically significant relationship between levels of agricultural 
employment and value of agricultural output, while that will be a weak relationship, if 
existent at all, in Kenya. Figure 9, above, shows the natural log of change in agricultural 
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1927-1938, with a linear trendline attached.  
We regress this relationship in three other ways with slightly different measures 
for a robustness check. The four equations regress change in agricultural employment as 
a function of change in agricultural output. Equation 1 regresses that relationship, in 
natural log form, for the same year or ln 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +
𝛽1 ln 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀1. To check for the effect of last year’s change in ln 
employment, Equation 2 regresses, in natural log form, change in employment with last 
year’s change in output, ln 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀1 
. Further, dropping the natural log, Equation 3 regresses the change employment (average 
daily employees in agriculture, with the change output (in pounds), 
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀1. Finally, Equation 4 regresses 
the change in agricultural employment with last year’s change in agricultural output, 
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜀1.        Figure 12, below, 
shows the results. 
  ln actual 
changes in 













𝛽1 0.130 0.020 0.003 0.000 
P>|t| 0.449 0.888 0.316 0.848 




𝛽1 0.360 0.240 0.017 0.015 
P>|t| 0.005*** 0.120 0.015** 0.089* 
R2 0.560 0.224 0.465 0.262 
These regressions demonstrate that a positive relationship between output and 
employment existed through the Great Depression in Tanganyika, while the relationship 
was weak and certainly never at any level of statistical or economic significance in 
Kenya. This confirms the hypothesis that the Tanganyikan labor force, though held in 
       Figure 12 
 
- 109 - 
 
place with some non-market ‘push’ factors, still maintained robust relationship to market 
factors. Kenya, on the other hand, had a labor force which was held in place to a much 
larger extent by non-market ‘push’ factors, and its levels of agricultural unemployment 
were not significantly affected by the changes in agricultural output during the external 
shock of the Great Depression.  
UNEMPLOYMENT 
As the Great Depression hit East Africa, many people engaged in paid labor lost 
their jobs. Did this mean unemployment? If a laid-off worker could transfer to cash-
cropping or pre-existing sector production, they would not be considered unemployed in 
the sense of looking for a job and not finding one9.  We expect this to be more the case in 
Tanganyika, where there was more porous circulation between modes of labor. However, 
laid-off workers unable to transition to peasant cash cropping or pre-existing sector 
production would be unemployed. These workers required work to sustain themselves 
and their families, and to pay their Hut & Poll Tax. In Kenya, the institutions of the labor 
circulation control system held African proletarians more firmly in place, making it more 
difficult to circulate between different kinds of labor. At the same time, these institutions 
were also pushing more and more Africans out of the pre-existing sector economy and 
the small cash-cropping sector, so the labor force was increasing. Thus, we would expect 
to see unemployment in Kenya. The colonial Blue Books do not record African 
unemployment, so this essay looks to qualitative sources for evidence of African 
unemployment. The record shows unemployment was a persistent feature of the first 
several years of the Great Depression in Kenya. In Tanganyika, there was momentary 
 
9 This of course does not include ‘disguised unemployment,’ or those in the peasant sector whose capacity 
is underutilized.  
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unemployment, but records of any sustained unemployment drift away after that.  
Numerous reports attest to widespread unemployment in Kenya.  Through the late 
1920s, Kenyan policy was just finally able to secure a labor supply sufficient for the labor 
demand of the European estates. In the 1929 Annual Report, the Governor writes that 
“the flow of labour was sufficient to meet the demand, but this might not have been so 
had both native and non-native crops been good,” (Annual Report on Kenya Colony and 
Protectorate, 1930, 1931, p. 77). In 1930, the Governor writes that “towards the end of 
the year many natives willing to work found employment unobtainable owing to 
agricultural and trade depression… for the first time in many years the supply of native 
labour slightly exceeded the demand,” (Annual Report on Kenya Colony and 
Protectorate, 1931, 1932, p. 52). In the 1931 Annual Report for the Rift Valley Province, 
the District Officer of Eldama Ravine notes that “labour is plentiful for the following 
reasons: (i)Economy on the part of the farmers, (ii) smaller crops due to locust 
infestation, and (iii) scarcity of food in native reserves,” (Annual Report of the Rift Valley 
Province, 1931, 1932). Stichter (1984) generalizes this observation, noting that that 
unemployment was a feature of the Great Depression in Kenya “because of the increasing 
congestion in the African reserves, not all migrant workers could shift out of wage labor 
during the Depression” and that “population increase and social differentiation in the 
reserves had already created a landless and land-poor stratum,” (p. 120).The Native 
Affairs Division reports of 1931 and 1933 document bands of young men wandering 
through the countryside and inquiring about work at different farms, and many episodes 
of unemployed workers approaching District Officers in search of work (Stichter, 1984, 
p. 120). For example, the Rift Valley Provincial Officer writes in 1932 that: 
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 “By the end of the year the effect of a lack of employment was becoming 
apparent. A considerable number of Natives, especially Lumbwa, were 
wandering about, nominally in search of employment, and thefts were on the 
increase. This state of affairs was of course foreseen, but it makes the work of 
the police, with a reduced force, considerably more difficult.” (Annual Report 
of the Rift Valley Province, 1931, 1932, p. 12)  
The next year, the Provincial Officer again records that “during the year [labour] 
supply has exceeded demand. This has hit particularly hard the Kamasia, who were sadly 
in need of the economic assistance represented by wage earning). (Annual Report of the 
Rift Valley Province, 1933, 1934, p. 17). 
Similar reports abound in neighboring Central Province. In 1931, the Provincial 
Commissioner writes that:  
“Reports received from the settled areas indicate that the supply of labour has 
everywhere exceeded the demand. As a result of the trade depression, 
employers in general have reduced the number of their employees and also 
cut the wages of those who remain… The Meru appear to be in the worst 
plight in this respect and the District Commisioner reports that the difficulty 
which they experience in finding work is increased by the enforcement by the 
police of regulations with regard to crossing private land and sleeping on 
farms.” (Annual Report of Central Province, 1931, 1932, p. 20) 
In 1934, the same Provincial Commissioner of Central Province writes that “For 
still another year the lack of employment in European areas has been severely felt by 
Reserve natives and many settled areas have a floating population of natives looking for 
work what are proving a decided nuisance and difficult to cope with,” (Annual Report of 
Central Province, 1934, 1935, p. 47). Indeed, this became a general pattern. However, 
while agricultural employment in Kenya decreased from 1928 to 1932 (from 92,371 to 
79,604), it was on the rise by 1933 and back up to 89,000 in 1934. The persistent 
unemployment across various regions of Kenya must have meant an increase in labor 
force while demand was shrinking. Clayton and Savage write that “the slow rise [in 
employment] failed to match the increased population…which, in the Kenya context, 
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meant small parties of lean-looking men presenting themselves hopefully at the settlers’ 
farms looking for work…for almost all, the problem of finding the few shillings 
necessary to pay the annual tax became of the greatest difficulty and unhappiness,” 
(Clayton and Savage, 1974, p. 174).  
The drop in agricultural employment in Tanganyika unfolded very differently. 
While average daily employment in Tanganyika had a much steeper drop than in Kenya 
(from 185,000 in 1929 to 110,000 in 1931), there is little evidence that this resulted in 
widespread unemployment. Much of the agricultural labor in Tanganyika was centered in 
the sisal plantations of Tanga District. The Tanga District Commissioner’s reports 
through the Great Depression show that the loss of employment did not result in 
unemployment. In 1929, the District Commissioner records that 26,585 laborers are on 
the ‘estate books’ of various sisal estates – 4,288 contract laborers, 12,572 squatter 
laborers, and 9,725 casual laborers (District Officer Tanga, 1930). In the 1930 report, the 
District Commissioner (awkwardly) writes that: 
“The depression in trade has practically stopped all development in the 
District, the natives who have been thrown out of work have been either 
returned to the central line and my opinion is that not only has the native town 
not been flooded out by natives out of work, who have come in from sisal 
Estates, but that the Native Population of Tanga Town is absolutely normal 
and this is the opinion of the responsible natives of Tanga the Labour 
commissioner informs me that this is borne out by the large number of natives 
who have been registered at the Kilosa and other Labour Camps on their 
return journey to the Central line,” (District Officer Tanga, 1931, p. 37).  
Of note here is the worry, perhaps bolstered by reports of unemployment in 
Kenya, that unemployed sisal workers would become a nuisance in Tanga town. 
However, this does not occur as most workers thrown out of work appear to have 
returned. In 1931, at the deepest point of employment loss in Tanganyika, the District 
Officer’s fears are realized: 
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“The general trade depression has been responsible for the flooding of Tanga 
with natives of an undesirable class. Many of these people are from remote 
up-country areas and the difficulty of work has led, in any cases, to the 
commission of thefts and acts of violence” (District Officer Tanga, 1932, p. 
4). 
This appears to be a very temporary phenomenon. The next year, 1932, the 
District Commissioner’s Report contains no mention of unemployed people in Tanga 
town, and instead reports that workers have left the district and are ‘untraceable.’ 
Large numbers of natives have left the district. The numbers will not be 
known with accuracy until next March but I think 5000 is a conservative 
estimate. Many of these were accustomed to obtain a livelihood partly from 
labour and partly from family agriculture on smallholdings. They are now 
untraceable. (District Officer Tanga, 1933, para. IV).  
In the 1934 report, the District Commissioner notes a high degree of absenteeism 
among workers, attributing this absenteeism to four factors: “(1) Labour must vary with 
the season for agricultural reasons; (2) a lack of incentive to work owing to the pernicious 
system of advantages, (3) under-nourishment through lack of proper and regular food; (4) 
very low rate of wages offering,” (District Officer Tanga, 1935, p. 4). 
The focus on of the Tanga District Commissioner here is on former workers who 
are ‘untraceable’ or absent. Absence – at least to European looking towards at sites of 
capital accumulation – is not consistent with unemployment, or workers who are looking 
for work but cannot otherwise find it. Meanwhile in Kenya era in the immediate 
aftermath of the Great Depression, there were widespread and consistent reports of 
unemployment.  This is consistent with the hypothesis of the labor flow circulation 
schema. 
WAGES 
Unfortunately, data on wages in East Africa during the Great Depression are very 
frustratingly sparse and unreliable, and the subject of ongoing inquiry and research. Still, 
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some indications do show that the predictions of the labor circulation do hold. In Kenya, 
the push factors compelling paid labor – both squatter and wage labor – meant that 
people pushed out of employment would become unemployed, rather than returning to 
the cash-cropping or pre-existing sector. In the classical Marxian sense (or even in the 
logic of the Phillips Curve), this reserve army of the unemployed would weaken the 
bargaining power of labor and lower wages. In Tanganyika, if the paid labor sector was 
to make a bounce back, it would have to pull back those previously employed who had 
found their way to cash cropping. As such, the ‘pull’ factors would be more operative, 
and would need to be sufficiently high to pull workers back to paid labor, relative to the 
benefits of cash-cropping in Tanganyika. As such, the labor circulation schema predicts 
opposite movement in wages – decreasing wages in Kenya, and rising wages in 
Tanganyika, after an initial drop-off.  
One strong archival piece of evidence comes from the papers of a settler in Kenya 
named Major Ridley, who polled all 39 of the workers on his coffee estate in Uasin-
Gishu in 1936, asking them the wage of their most recent job, their best wage since 1930, 
and their wage in 1930, in addition to the wages that Major Ridley currently paid them. 
The staggering results are shown below in Figure 13.  Major Ridley paid his coffee 
workers 6/- per month. In their last job, the workers averaged 6.32/- per month. In their 
highest wage since 1930, workers averaged 6.97/-. Workers made 9.04/- per month in 
1930. These data, from the heart of settler agriculture, show significant downward 
pressure on wages10 in Kenya during the Great Depression, and show that this downward 
 
10 Two notes: first, these are nominal wages, so the real wage drop would be even greater, even with low 
inflation. Second, economists often assume sticky wages which don’t adjust downward like the prices of 
other commodities. That Kenyan wages had such a sharp and sustained drop – against the common 
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pressure is sustained.  
 
Data are similarly scarce in Tanganyika, though we can find evidence that wages 
initially fell and then recovered.  In 1930, the Provincial Commissioner of Tanga 
observed that all wages were falling for sisal workers (District Officer Tanga, 1931). 
However, by 1936, unskilled wages in Tanga were between 10/- and 12/- per month, and 
rose to between 10/- and 15/- pre month in 1937, the same range as in nearby Bagamoyo 
in 1928(Annual Report of Bagamoyo, 1928, 1929; Annual Report of Tanga, 1936, 1937; 
Annual Report of Tanga, 1937, 1938). This shows rising wages, a significantly higher 
floor than wages in Kenya, and a return to the wage range before the depression. Though 
done with limited data, this confirms the hypothesis that wages moved in opposite 
directions in colonial Kenya and Tanganyika, owing to the different socio-institutional 
ecosystemic interactions of each colony.   
 
assumption of sticky wages – further evidences that the institutional constellations in Kenya made it very 























Average Wages of Workers on Ridley's Estate, Kenya, 1936
Figure 13 Source: Major Ridley’s Documents, Kenya National Archives 
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PEASANT PRODUCTION 
The Great Depression, by hitting global commodities circuits, affected all sectors 
of the economy linked into those circuits. This included the large Tanganyikan peasant 
cash-cropping sector. Cash cropping in Kenya was confined to crops for domestic 
consumption (e.g. maize) as well as domestic production (e.g. wattle bark). Fibaek and 
Green (2019) do estimate an increase in wattle bark production in Kenya through the 
Great Depression, though this was impossible for coffee, tea, and pyrethrum in Kenya 
(Fibaek and Green, 2019). In Tanganyika, because crops grown were exposed directly to 
global markets, we would expect that while the shock of the Great Depression would 
initially hurt peasant production, there would also be an influx of peasant cash croppers 
laid off from the paid employment sector, and that this would be significantly larger in 
Tanganyika. Also, Tanganyikans still had the pressure of the Hut & Poll tax, which could 
be gathered either in the cash cropping sector or in the paid labor sector. With heavy 
layoffs in the paid labor sector, we would expect an increase in the peasant cash cropping 
sector.  
Summaries in the Blue Books note these trends. First, the Blue Book for 1931 
notes an initial retreat to the pre-existing sector: 
In 1931 the effects of the slump in prices were accentuated and partly on 
account of the low prices paid in 1930 for their produce native cultivators 
gave less attention to cash crops and more to food crops. Thus the production 
of cotton and groundnuts shows a heavy decrease. (Tanganyika Territory Blue 
Book 1931, 1932, p. 226)  
However, this trend began to reverse, as noted in the 1933 Blue Book: 
This depression, however, was more than offset by the increase in the 
Territory's production. Record tonnages in exports were achieved in sisal, 
cotton lint, groundnuts, coffee, beeswax and rice. This increase, in spite of the 
very low prices offering, is mainly due to the efforts which have been made to 
encourage the native cultivator to further efforts and in particular to the 
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introduction of cash marketing in place of barter, resulting in a steady flow to 
the main producing areas. (Tanganyika Territory Blue Book 1933, 1934, p. 
247).  
District Officer reports give granular clarity to this broader picture, showing that 
Tanganyikans sought to meet their tax obligations by intensifying efforts in agriculture, 
as well as by switching from paid employment to peasant cash cropping: 
Tax has been difficult to collect from both Natives and Non-Natives. The 
tribesmen have responded to the urge to grow more crops, while improvement 
in the quality of ghee produced enabled many to pay their taxes (District 
Officer Dodoma, 1933, p. 1).  
 Although the slump continues, in other respects conditions have been 
reasonably satisfactory. Good rains and the absence of locusts gave good 
crops and although fundis11 and labourers are short of work many of these 
have turned to Agriculture. (District Officer Kigoma, 1934, p. 1).  
 This phenomenon of peasantization in Tanganyika can also be shown 
quantitatively. While it is difficult to finely trace the peasant and estate production for all 
crops (as coffee, copra, and cotton were grown in both), it is possible to appreciate the 
different Depression era trajectories for groundnuts and sisal. Groundnuts were grown 
exclusively by African peasants in Tanganyika, and sisal was grown exclusively on non-
native estates. Figure 14, below, shows the domestic output for groundnuts and sisal from 
 
11 Specialist worker in Kiswahili 
 Figure 14                                                                          Source: Blue Books 1929-1936 
 
grounduts sisal 
year cwts £ cwts £ 
1929 155,100 120,448 914,560 1,485,593 
1930 346,660 186,567 999,240 1,172,315 
1931 61,400 28,706 1,118,780 707,177 
1932 317,460 182,010 1,211,080 698,202 
1933 383,540 166,223 1,392,000 881,772 
1934 160,720 60,145 1,450,200 847,562 
1935 328,580 210,018 1,653,520 1,134,732 
1936 455,720 277,226 1,611,180 1,873,312 
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1929-1936, both in hundredweights and total value (in pounds sterling). Figure 13 then 
indexes both crops to their 1929 levels, and then tracks their movement through the Great 
Depression, both in terms of raw production, and value. The relative growth of 
groundnuts vis à vis sisal indexed to their 1930 levels is greater, both in terms of raw 
production and in terms of total export value. Because we know that groundnuts were 
exclusively grown by African peasants, and sisal exclusively by estates managed by non-
Africans, this reveals a growing peasant sector through the years of the Great Depression. 
Though not fully way conclusive on its own, this demonstrates in concert with other 
qualitative evidence showing wage workers leaving that sector and going to the peasant 
sector, combined with state efforts to stimulate the peasant sector, that increased 
peasantization was an effect of the Great Depression in Tanganyika, even as the peasant 
cash-cropping sector was initially hurt by the external shock of the Great Depression.  
VII. THE HISTORICAL INHERITANCE OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
The Great Depression first clearly verified and then intensified the distance in 











































Figure 15                                          Source: Blue Books 1929-1936 
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but less apparent before the Great Depression. This analysis has shown that the external 
price shock revealed that Kenyan agricultural employment had little relationship to 
Kenyan agricultural output, because of the robust presence of extra-economic conditions 
in the socio-institutional ecosystem of Kenya which induced an agricultural labor force. 
The Tanganyikan paid labor sector, as has been shown, had a much stronger relationship 
to agricultural output. Thus, drops in agricultural output pushed Tanganyikans out of the 
paid labor sector, but with little unemployment as they were able to be re-absorbed into 
the peasant sector. This also demonstrated by the relative growth of peasant crops  
(groundnuts) compared to estate crops (sisal). Again, the socio-institutional ecosystem of 
Tanganyika made possible this circulation of labor. The Kenyan paid labor sector, though 
faced with a small drop in the beginning of the Great Depression, continued to grow 
through the Depression as socio-ecosystemic pressures pushed Kenyans out of the 
peasant sector and into the paid labor sector. This happened even as it appears that the 
labor force grew faster than employment in the sector, which resulted in structural 
unemployment that was not apparent in Tanganyika. A bird’s eye view of the Great 
Depression reveals a moment which intensified peasantization in Tanganyika and 
proletarianization (even feudalization, via the squatter sector) in Kenya. 
The constituent institutions of the socio-institutional ecosystems of Kenya and 
Tanganyika responded in turn. Crudely, peasants and landless proletarians form different 
kinds of organizations to respond to their needs, and state and settler interests react to 
these developments accordingly. The Kikuyu Central Association (KCU) in Kenya and 
the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA), discussed in the introduction, made 
sense as they responded to the realities of the economic and political structures around 
 
- 120 - 
 
them. In Kenya, the KCU was a prominent organization, amongst others such as the 
Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association (KTWA), classified by Bogonko as “welfare-
cum-political organizations” which spoke to the grievances of rural land-squeezed 
proletarians (Bogonko, 1984, p. 29).These organizations were fundamental to the 
growing strike movement of landless rural and urban workers from the 1930s through the 
1950s (Zeleza, 1993). Kanogo identifies the exacerbations of the Great Depression, 
particularly on Agĩkũyũ squatters as foundational to the foundation of the Kenya Land 
and Freedom Army, also known as the MauMau (Kanogo, 1987). In Tanganyika, the 
KNPA would reconstitute itself as the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, an 
agricultural cooperative serving peasant members. Agricultural cooperatives came to the 
fore in the mid-colonial era as an institution of peasant ascendancy from Kilwa on the 
coast to Bukoba at Lake Victoria (Maghimbi et al., 2010).  
The state and settlers also responded to these changes. In Kenya, a colonial state 
aligned with settler interests tried to squeeze the already pressed African population to 
save the viability of peasant agriculture. A 1937 letters from the  Sergoit-Moiben Valley 
Farmers’ Association (a settler association) coyly asks the governor to raise taxes on 
Africans to induce a longer harvest season, writing that the “government be requested to 
consider whether the present rate of Hut Tax be adequate,” (Hawley, 1937). This shows 
close collaboration between the state and settlers. The state also stepped up its 
disciplinary presence to push the African population toward agricultural paid work 
through Great Depression. One way this is evident is through convictions in Kenya and 
Tanganyika for ‘social economy’ offenses, which included hut and poll tax offenses as 
well as offenses against various labor ordinances (such as the Resident Native Labour 
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Ordinance 1925). Kenyan conviction rates had been about double the rate of Tanganyika 
in the 1920s, but the ballooned to four times as much through the Depression, while 
Tanganyikan conviction rates stayed largely the same throughout. While this 
demonstrates an increased disciplinary presence, it also shows an increase in Kenyans 
unable to pay their taxes, likely because of unemployment.  
In Tanganyika, state response seemed to accept the ascendancy of the 
Tanganyikan peasant over settler agriculture and went about a development policy to 
encourage that. The Agricultural Department in Tanganyika launched a campaign to 
encourage peasant production in 1932. At the same time, the Depression pushed down 
possibilities for settler agriculture in Tanganyika. “Kenyan policy,” writes Brett, “was 
very largely determined by the need to maintain the viability of settler agriculture, while 
Tanganyikan decisions stuck an uncertain balance between [settler and peasant 
agriculture],”(Brett, 1973, p. 167). Coming into the WWII era, Kenya was firmly 
established as a settler colony while peasants dominated the Tanganyikan landscape.  
These emergent structures of the East African economies have held some sway 
over historical economic arcs of Kenya and Tanganyika up to today. As these arcs have 
been marked by various eras – the MauMau insurgency and hali ya hatari (emergency 
period) in Kenya, post-independence Ujamaa (socialism) in Tanzania and the struggle 
between capitalism and socialism in Kenya, the persistent land question, the era of 
neoliberal structural adjustment – the traces of some of the features of present structural 
and policy questions were beginning to become apparent in the mid-colonial era. 
For example, the socio-institutional ecosystems of Kenya and Tanganyika, and 
their inflection and compounding in the Great Depression, set them up to address the 
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question of land very differently in the post-independence era. Nyerere, giving a speech 
in Cairo on the challenges of creating socialism in Tanzania and the United Arab 
Republic, remarked: 
Take, for example, the question of land. In Tanzania we abolished the 
freehold ownership of land shortly after independence…but this was not an 
affront to our people…thus only about 1 percent of our land was really 
affected by this law, and no Tanzanian who really wants to farm has been 
unable to find the necessary land – even if not just where he wants it. 
(Nyerere 1968, 84-85).  
In post-independence Kenya, massive land alienation and the precarity of 
squatters and peasants saw the regime try and focus on market-based reforms and 
property titling. Shivji writes that “the post-independence land resettlement program in 
Kenya, which was, in effect, a kind of market-based land reform, resulted in the 
Kenyanisation of settler farms […] it did not change the fundamental relationship,” 
(Shivji, 2009, 76). Kenyan MP J.M. Kariuki, born to Agĩkũyũ squatters in 1929, had 
warned precisely against this just before he was assassinated in 1975, arguing that “we do 
not want a Kenya of 10 millionaires and 10 million beggars. I believe firmly that 
substituting Kamau for Smith, Odongo for Jones and Kiplangat for Keith does not solve 
what the gallant fighters of our uhuru considered an imposed and undesirable social 
injustice,” (wa Gĩthĩnji, 2000). Unfortunately, Kariuki’s premonitions have been borne 
out. Peter Torongei was born just 5 years after Kariuki, in the Gwassi hills after his father 
was dispossessed of 100+ acres in the tea rich hills of Kericho – in the White Highlands – 
by the colonial regime. Today, he lives adjacent to the property his father owned on a 
small 50 by 100-foot enclosure. In 2019, he said: 
“When we came back from Gwassi, we found that other people had settled in 
our lands and we were basically homeless, so we were put into this holding 
area. There were roll calls to make sure that we did not escape from this place. 
We were kept in poverty. [When I see the tea plantations] I feel very sad that 
 
- 123 - 
 
my land is still held by foreigners. All these years after independence – and I 
lived through that – other people benefit from my land. I still don’t know what 
my fate is because I have been told, for all these years, that I will be given 
land. Life here is particularly difficult because I cannot keep animals, we 
cannot keep any livestock, we cannot grow any crops, we are just living on 
subsistence with no income. My children could not go to school because we 
could not afford the fees, so we have lived in poverty all along. I am tired,” 
(Parveen, 2019).  
Thus, Kenya was marked by high degree of land, income, and wealth inequality, 
yet attracted capital which allowed for continued growth and industrialization – 
imaginably in no small part because it was clear a labor force would be there to produce 
value from the initial capital investment. Today, Kenya maintains the highest GDP/capita 
in the region. Tanganyika’s peasantry ad cooperatives led to an outlook which prioritized 
the peasant farmer and rural land and infrastructure access, from Nyerere’s vijiji vya 
ujamaa (socialist villages) to the present policy of maendeleo ya kilimo kwanzaa 
(agriculture first development). Tanzania has been lauded for its degree of equality which 
translates to higher social equality but has stayed relatively poor (in GDP/capita) 
compared to its northern neighbor. The phenomena of linking structural trajectories to 
colonial institutions accords with an established school across development literatures 
(Acemoglu et al., 2002; Bowden et al., 2008b; Khan et al., 2019b). This essay finds the 
roots of these early institutional divergences in Depression era East Africa.  
This underscores the importance of centering the socio-institutional ecosystem as 
a unit of analysis for understanding economic phenomena, as well as for appreciating the 
dialectical dynamism of the interaction between the two. The structures of the labor 
forces of Kenya and Tanganyika in the mid-colonial era were the result of institutional 
arrangements of the colonial states conditioned by international and domestic power 
balances, and shaped the possibility sets for millions of Africans in very particular ways. 
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As the Great Depression exposed and deepened the structural differences of East African 
economies, the changes in economic structure provoked changes in the institutional 
ecosystems of both colonies, and the continued interaction between socio-institutional 
ecosystem and economic phenomena inflects contemporary questions of economic and 
structural possibilities and human dignity in East Africa today. 
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THE SOCIO-INSTITUTIONAL ECOSYSTEM HYPOTHESIS 
FOR THE PROLIFERATION OF WORKER COOPERATIVES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
by Jonathan Donald Jenner 
This essay argues that the socio-institutional ecosystem approach provides 
fundamental and otherwise unavailable insights into the distribution and proliferation of 
worker cooperatives. The economics literature has developed some key insights into the 
general problems that worker cooperatives face in abstracted capitalist space. However, 
these theories cannot fully explain the appearance, persistence, and agglomeration of 
worker cooperatives. The socio-institutional ecosystem can more thoroughly explain the 
appearance, proliferation, and persistence of worker cooperatives across various 
capitalist contexts. We first excavate the economic literature on the appearance of 
worker cooperatives, looking for limits to conventional theory and finding strands which 
lend support to a more complete socio-institutional ecosystem analysis. Next, this essay 
advances a fuller articulation of the socio-institutional hypothesis. Our positive 
contribution is to empirically build a case for this hypothesis by examining the spatial 
clustering of worker cooperatives in the United States and identifying correlates of this 
clustering in elements of the socio-institutional ecosystem. While not seeking to parse 
causality about which socio-institutional features may ‘cause’ worker cooperatives to 
more easily proliferate, we demonstrate that by centering the ‘socio-institutional 
ecosystem,’ economic theory can better shed light on the appearance and distribution of 
worker cooperatives in the United States. It thus demonstrates a way forward for theory 
on the appearance, prevalence, and agglomeration of democratic workplaces.  
Between 2013 and 2017, there were 464 worker cooperatives in the United States 
out of 5.6 million employer firms in the United States. Worker cooperatives are both rare 
and geographically clustered. Most of the literature on the prevalence of worker 
cooperatives has focused on the first stylized fact and sought to explain their relative 
rarity as a function of firm inefficiencies or resultant from structural dynamics of 
capitalist political economy. This essay seeks to account for the general rarity of worker 
cooperatives in the United States, but also to explain their punctuated clusters across the 
United States. The socio-institutional ecosystem hypothesis can do this, incorporating 
general hurdles from structures across capitalism in concert with a demonstration of how 
variation in features of the socio-institutional ecosystems account for differentiation in 
the number of democratic firms across different regions of the US. 
The empirical work geocodes worker cooperatives in the mainland US into 
megaregions developed by Nelson and Rae (2016), and then tests for a range of 
demographic, economic, and ideological correlates of worker cooperative firm density 
(Nelson and Rae, USFWC Census 2013-17). This finds that worker cooperatives are not 
only bunched, but that their density is most closely aligned with ideological correlates in 
the US, while somewhat correlated to other economic and demographic indicators. This 
gives credence and empirical weight to the notion that social relations, institutions, and a 
firm’s environment condition the survival of worker cooperatives. The takeaway: using 
the ‘socio-institutional ecosystem’ as a unit of analysis provides key insights to 
understand the limiting agents of democratic workplaces in the US, which heretofore has 
been absent from the literature, and can inform activist and policy strategy.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Asked why there weren’t more worker cooperatives in the United States in an 
interview with New Renaissance Magazine, Vanek, an economist who studied democratic 
firms, replied that “Co-ops in the West are a bit like sea water fish in a freshwater pond,” 
(Perkins, 1995). Worker cooperatives have been shown to deliver many benefits – among 
them poverty reduction, job stability, higher income equality, lower unemployment – and 
thus many have called for their expansion and proliferation (Alperovitz, 2004; e.g. 
Nembhard, 2014; Schweickart, 1992; Wolff, 2012). However, they remain rare relative to 
capitalist firms, and much work has gone into formulating and understanding their 
paucity. Addressing this point, Vanek argued that for worker cooperatives, the external 
socio-institutional environment of the firm matters more for its appearance and 
proliferation than the internal fitness of the firm. This essay takes up that insight by 
building and empirically testing the hypothesis that the appearance and proliferation of 
worker cooperatives is best understood by analyzing the socio-institutional ecosystem 
which surrounds firms. The hypothesis: worker cooperatives remain generally rare in 
capitalist economies because generalized structures of capitalism inhibit their 
proliferation, yet different socio-institutional constellations across capitalist space are 
more and less amicable to worker cooperative proliferation, explaining the clusters of 
worker cooperatives in particular environments and their absence in others.  
Most economic theory has focused on the firm’s internal deficiency instead of its 
external proximate context, and so Section II focuses on excavating existent economic 
theory on the peripherality of worker cooperatives, while understanding its limitations. 
Neoclassical theory has attributed the paucity of worker cooperatives to problems with 
the form of worker ownership and management that defines a worker cooperative. 
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Political economists, mostly from the Marxian tradition, have held that the power 
dynamics of capitalism will continue to render worker cooperatives peripheral. While 
both schools compile instructive insights, they do not fully explain the empirical record 
on cooperatives. While worker cooperatives remain rare in capitalism, Marxian theory 
does not explain the punctuated existence of worker cooperatives in some capitalist 
contexts. Neoclassical theory predicts that worker cooperatives should be less efficient 
than capitalist firms, but that does not accord to the empirical record on firm efficiency. 
Finally, mainstream argumentation suffers a lack of clarity on the mechanisms of 
selection and proliferation by which different firm types flourish or fade in market 
economies, which leads to tautological reasoning on the appearance of worker 
cooperatives.  
Section III explores the positive case in the literature for the socio-institutional 
hypothesis of worker cooperative appearance and proliferation. First, many scholars have 
called for further research into how the proximate institutional, cultural, and social 
environments which vary across capitalist space have affected the presence and 
proliferation of capitalist contexts. Second, specific external relationships have been 
named and modeled by scholars, and have anecdotal support in primu aspectu, including: 
short-side market power, financial relationships, familiarity, and trust. Then, case studies 
and narratives of practitioners frequently note the instrumental importance of institutional 
relationships for the success of worker cooperatives. This section concludes by drawing 
these various strands together with a synthesis of the socio-institutional hypothesis of 
worker cooperative proliferation. The hypothesis must explain the general rareness of 
worker cooperatives in capitalist socio-institutional ecosystems, but also their punctuated 
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clustering in capitalist space.  
Section IV lays out a methodology and preliminary indicators to test the 
appropriateness of the socio-institutional hypothesis of worker cooperative proliferation, 
by exploring a methodology which compares the presences of socio-institutional 
indicators to the worker cooperative saturation. The method first combines spatial data 
from the US Federation of Worker Cooperatives Census from 2013-2017 with Nelson 
and Rae’s (2016) algorithmic megaregions, which function as stand-ins for an economic 
‘ecosystem’ (Nelson and Rae, 2016). The 57 megaregions in the lower 48 United States 
are given several measures of worker cooperative saturation, to ensure robustness across 
later tests: worker cooperatives per 100,000 people, as well as three other measures of 
worker cooperative saturation. Then, a series of other data – demographic, economic, and 
ideological indicators – are added to the dataset to test which elements of the socio-
institutional ecosystems correlate most strongly to worker cooperative saturation in the 
57 megaregions of the lower 48. After a brief discussion of why each indicator was 
chosen, a simple one-variable OLS model is presented, and the results from all these 
regressors begin to give some indications of which kinds of features correlate heavily to 
worker cooperative saturation. 
Section V explores these preliminary indications further, by developing several 
multivariate regressions based on some emergent trends from the single variable 
correlations. Ideological features of socio-institutional ecosystems display their 
importance in this section. An issue persists between qualitative accounts and quantitative 
data persists: while ethnographic accounts highlight the role of immigrants – particularly 
immigrant women – in creating worker cooperatives, initial correlations do not see any 
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relationship between immigration and worker cooperative saturation. Of course, this may 
be because ‘immigration’ is a category to blunt to capture very particular types of 
immigration captured by the ethnographic literature. Yet, by using Qualitative Control 
Analysis to look for combinatory sets of factors which may influence a megaregion’s 
friendliness towards worker cooperatives, this section explores how immigration may 
matter, given other factors.  
Section VI discusses the implications of this work. There are few single variable 
correlations with demographic and economic indicators, but ideology is particularly 
important. In multivariable correlations, ideology becomes uniquely important. More, 
this can be extended to give quarter to the hypothesis that immigration drives worker 
cooperative development, provided other features are present. The discussion focuses on 
what these findings suggest (and do not suggest) about how socio-institutional 
ecosystems affect worker cooperative saturation. Though cautious about attributing 
causality to particular features, this section explores what the findings might suggest 
about mechanisms which may foster worker cooperative development. In particular, the 
findings seem to show support for the notion that trust functions as an element of the 
socio-institutional environment which supports worker cooperatives, as well as the notion 
that ideologically based consumer support may be crucial.  
Section VII concludes with reflection on the broad case that socio-institutional 
ecosystem analysis brings previously unseen insights into the discussion on worker 
cooperative proliferation. Empirically testing the socio-institutional ecosystem presents 
many challenges, due to the simultaneous, multiple, immeasurable, and dialectic causality 
attendant with the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis, as explored in Essay 1 of this 
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dissertation. However, this essay demonstrates that the socio-institutional ecosystemic 
hypothesis remains consistent with the emerging picture from economic, ethnographic, 
and practitioner literature, but can be supported by macro level data. As such, the socio-
institutional hypothesis for the proliferation of worker cooperatives merits serious 
consideration by economists, thinkers, and policy makers interested in expanding 
economic democracy.  
II. ECONOMIC THEORY & THE APPEARANCE OF WORKER COOPERATIVES 
In certain normative worldviews, worker cooperatives are desirable. In certain 
formulations of neoclassical economic thought, they should abound. That they are 
desirable and should abound yet remain uncommon has been a problem which 
economists have sought to answer. This section reviews just how economists have down 
that. The most common answers come from theorists in the neoclassical tradition and 
political economists in the classical and Marxian tradition. Their answers spring from 
similar, though divergent puzzles. In the neoclassical world of perfect competition, 
worker cooperatives ought to abound, but they do not. Samuelson demonstrated that “in a 
perfectly competitive market, it really doesn't matter who hires whom: so have labor hire 
'capital,'” (Samuelson, 1957, p. 894). Neoclassicals normative thought is indifferent to the 
structure of the firm but seeks to answer why, in the real world, worker cooperatives do 
not abound. They find, accordingly, that worker cooperatives must suffer some form of 
structural deficiency relative to capitalist firms which prevents their widespread 
proliferation. In the tradition of political economy, there is no particular reason why 
worker cooperatives should proliferate, but they are understood as desirable. Mill saw 
them as so advantageous – normatively and technically – that they would come to 
predominate. He predicted in 1848 that, after an intermediary period of capital-managed 
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firms being the dominant form of firm ownership and management in market economies, 
'co-operative associations' would come to dominate market economies (Mill, 1998, p. 
377). Bukharin (1920) makes a similar argument about agricultural cooperatives in the 
Soviet Union. Elster (1989) continued this vein, with the query “if cooperative ownership 
is so desirable, why are there so few cooperatives?” (Elster, 1989, p. 93). Since they are 
not widespread, political economists have ventured that something in the structure of 
capitalism renders their existence impossible. So, the neoclassical set of answers finds 
fault in the form of the firm, while answers from political economy have found fault in 
the absolute form of the system as opposed to its various institutional contexts. Both 
traditions frame some issues of considerable importance, though they both cannot give a 
full accounting of the empirical record, and they both run into some other inconsistencies. 
NEOCLASSICAL THEORIES 
After Samuelson demonstrated that perfect competition ought to be indifferent to 
labor hiring capital or capital hiring labor, theorists in the neoclassical mold were tasked 
with explaining why we do not observe worker cooperatives as robustly as we do 
capitalist firms. They could: a) refute the logic of Samuelson’s claim; b) abandon perfect 
competition as a fundamental part of their schema; or c) locate and model an internal 
structural deficiency of worker cooperatives, which would make them unable to compete 
with capitalist firms by adding information to Samuelson’s challenge. Since Samuelson’s 
logic was unimpeachable, internal to the machinations of neoclassical theory, and 
abandoning perfect competition as a fundament was a bridge too far, neoclassical theory 
began to locate, highlight, and model structural deficiencies of worker cooperatives. If 
this could be modelled, the empirical proof of worker cooperative deficiency was already 
demonstrated by their absence. 
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A variety of theories took shape which found some deficiency in the structure of 
worker cooperatives. Because of substantial difference in the structures of the different 
kinds of firm, from ownership and governance structures to individual income and utility 
functions of workers and managers in the two types of firms, micro-modelling some sort 
of difference represents a straightforward undertaking. Less straightforward, and very 
much up for debate, is whether these differences lead to systemic weakness or strength of 
worker cooperatives. For example, the function of monitoring, done by a firm internally 
to prevent shirking and keep effort high. Should we adopt the archetypal neoclassical 
theoretical frame of homo economicus and contracts, a capital-appointed manager in a 
capitalist firm can more efficiently prevent shirking and keep effort high because the 
manager in a worker cooperative – elected by labor – faces an internal principal-agent 
problem of needing to enforce monitoring while remaining electable by the workers. Yet 
even if we slightly expand the utility space of homo economicus, to include a trust 
function, other-regarding preferences, and reciprocity, it can be shown that the shared 
inheritance of workers in a worker cooperative as labor enhances trust and reciprocity, 
and in turn productivity, relative to the more difficult trust relationships between labor 
and capital in a capitalist firm. And so while many predict efficiency losses to the 
worker-managed firm, a smaller theoretical literature predicts efficiency gains (Bowles 
and Gintis 1993; Thompson 2015). Still, most theorists out to answer the central puzzle 
of why we do not see more worker cooperatives given Samuelson’s conundrum, have 
modelled the differences of worker cooperatives and structurally deficient relative to 
capitalist firms.  
Ward (1958) was one of the first to address the paucity of worker managed firms, 
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attributing their relative absence to a backward bending supply curve (Ward). Though 
Ward’s assumptions have been criticized, Ward did posit a form of deficiency central to 
worker cooperatives that set quite a mold for many to work from, trying to locate the 
source of the relative weakness of the worker cooperative form vis-à-vis capitalist firms. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) claimed that worker-managed firms were rare because their 
monitoring function was not done by the residual claimant (Alchian and Demsetz). 
Olson’s (1965) work, exploring the free-rider problem, has been used to posit another 
form of worker cooperative inefficiency, as individual workers share income not borne 
solely of their individual effort (Olson). Arnold (1994) synthesized these claims about the 
problem presented by monitoring of effort and free-riding by worker-owners (Arnold) . 
Hansmann (1996) claims that the inefficiency of worker cooperatives comes from their 
inability to handle the diverse array of contracts that characterize a firm (Hansmann). 
Those last two are explored in a bit more depth below.  
Hansmann's analysis, in his work Ownership of Enterprise, starts from the 
characterization of the firm as a 'nexus of contracts' between the various parties who 
supply the firms inputs and the various parties that purchase the firms output. Prior to a 
firm’s existence, any of these parties has the formal ability to initiate, own, and manage 
the firm. All contracts are necessary incomplete, and different parties to the firm's inputs 
and outputs have different ways of dealing with this incompleteness, which also varies 
across industries (Hansmann, 1996). Whichever party to the firm's nexus of contracts has 
the cost minimizing method of dealing with the incomplete contracts will represent the 
ownership form that is the most efficient.  Hansmann writes that firm ownership is 
“assigned to the class of patrons for whom the problems of market efficiency are the least 
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severe,” and calls this principle the “lowest cost assignment of ownership,” (Hansmann, 
1996, p. 21). Hansmann does not consider that these costs of ownership may depend on 
social relations, but rather focuses on contracts. As such, Hansmann argues that forms of 
ownership best suited to the management of contracts are those which the problems of 
incomplete contracts represent the least organizational cost, because they are the 
organizational forms, that, given the particularities of a particular industry will survive. 
This important principle – which Hansmann terms 'survivorship,' - is one to which this 
essay will return in the next section.  For example, because customers of rural electricity 
are faced with a natural monopoly, it makes sense for them to own rural electric firms 
because they have the least cost mechanisms for dealing with contracting inefficiency. 
Hence, the rural electric consumer-owned cooperative is prominent. 
Within certain parameters, labor-owned firms represent the least cost management 
of contracts. This parameter is 'homogeneity' of the role of labor in the firm. Hansmann 
notes, for example, that in the case of the plywood cooperatives of the Northwest, given 
the homogeneity of labor's role within the industry, labor-owned firms make the most 
sense because they can most efficiently deal with the incompleteness of the firms various 
contracts. In another example, Hansmann notes that labor- ownership is more concurrent 
with service professions, where homogeneity of firm contracts is higher. However, as the 
heterogeneity of the labor performed by a firm increases, governance costs associated 
with the coordination of these various roles rises. That governance, Hansmann argues, is 
the root of the efficiency problem for worker cooperatives. As most firms of the 
industrial economy contain heterogeneous labor roles and various vertical and horizontal 
relationships, and the most efficient management of these diverse contracts lies in the 
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capital-managed firm. If a worker cooperative exists in this type of industry, it will face 
higher costs of business, lower profit rates, and will lose in the long run.  
Another way of modelling firm inefficiency comes from Arnold’s (1994) The 
Philosophy and Economics of Market Socialism: A Critical Study. Schwartz characterizes 
Arnold’s argument ‘the monitor problem,’ an instance of the more generalized free rider 
problem specific to the structure of worker cooperatives. This argument describes 
production of a firm where multiple workers contribute to output, but their individual 
contributions are difficult to distinguish while incomes are standardized. Individual 
workers maximizing their utility, the argument goes, will shirk. Schwartz summarizes 
Arnold's reasoning: “If shirkers...get the same rewards as workers, it will be rational for 
all not to work (as hard) and productivity will suffer. To minimize this, recourse to a 
monitor with managerial powers is necessary,” (Schwartz 2011, 243). Ceteris paribus, a 
worker owned/managed firm will have less output per worker, which lowers profit by 
lowering total revenue. Similar to the other variants of the efficiency line of argument, 
worker owned/managed firms would not be able to survive in competitive environments 
with capital owned/managed firms, who (imaginably) have easier ways to control 
shirking, according to conventional theory. 
These theories all argue for the inefficiency of the cooperative form in the 
production process. However, other theorists point to inefficient investment functions as 
the key weakness of worker cooperatives. Knight (1921) theorized that worker 
cooperatives suffer from under-investment because workers tend to be more risk-averse 
than capitalists (Knight). That is, suppliers of labor have limited places to deploy their 
labor, while suppliers of capital might diversify their capital in different places, the cost 
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of risk is minimized by the fungibility of capital. Capitalists can apply their capital to 
several ventures at the same time. Because a worker can only diversify their ‘labor 
portfolio’ – where they supply their labor to the production process – to a very limited 
extent, the costs of risk in entrepreneurial activity affect worker cooperatives more than 
capitalist firms, who can mitigate risk with ‘capital portfolio’ diversification. As such, 
over time, due to the variability of income experienced by a firm, the form of the firm 
that is better suited to minimize the costs of income variability will be the forms that 'win 
out.' Workers both desire a fixed (wage) income that minimizes risk, and capital-
managed firms more effectively deal with risk. Bowles summarizes the risk aversion line 
of argument presented by Knight: 
“The approach...explains the structure of the firm by two facts: first, the 
income flowing from a joint production process varies stochastically, and 
second, the cost of bearing this risk is greater for the for the suppliers of labor 
than for the suppliers of capital,” (Bowles, 2009, p. 339) 
Hawawini & Michel (1979) propose that this underinvestment conundrum applies 
not just for startup investment, but for continued investment decisions of the firm 
(Hawawini and Michel, 1979). For others, worker cooperatives fail to make prudent 
investment decisions that allow it to grow relative to capital managed firms. Scholars 
examining Yugoslavian worker-managed firms examine this line of argument: Vanek, 
Furubotn, Pejovich, and Uvalic (Furubotn, 1976; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1970; Pejovich, 
1992; Uvalić, 1992; Vanek, 1971). 
Thompson (2015) points out that there exist two broad groups of theories of the 
purpose, function, and nature of the firm – contract based theories and competence-based 
theories – and that these modes of thought on the firm are largely irreconcilable 
(Thompson, 2015). Hansmann’s work on contracts and the worker cooperative fit the 
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former (contract-based theories), while the other theories here – Arnold’s, Knight’s, and 
others – fit the latter (competence based theories). Still Thompson identifies that “a 
common implication of both schools is that [worker] cooperative firms are generally 
inefficient” and goes on to argue that these theories miss the mark, and do not accurately 
describe worker cooperatives in the real world (Thompson, 2015, p. 3). After examining 
theories of political economy, this essay returns to this theme below.  
POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORIES 
Political economists have also been interested in theorizing the peripherality of 
worker cooperatives. As noted above, classical political economist Mill described not 
only the benefits of worker cooperatives but predicted their eventual rise. In general, 
Marxism has been accused by Jossa, amongst others, of paying scant attention to worker 
cooperatives, or even dismissing worker cooperatives as a misdirected attempt to cure a 
symptom of capitalism, but not its root (Jossa, 2005, p. 29). The debate that has existed 
amongst Marxists on worker cooperatives has not only been about why the form remains 
peripheral, but about whether or not worker cooperatives present a compelling alternative 
to capitalist production that can be seen as a step toward its replacement. However, many 
Marxists have expressed admiration for the immediate form of worker cooperatives.  
Though Marx did not frequently address the topic, he did speak enthusiastically 
about the benefits of worker cooperatives, while also warning about their limitations. For 
example, in his address to the International Working Men's Association in 1866, Marx 
said: 
We acknowledge the co-operative movement as one of the transforming 
forces of the present society based upon class antagonism. Its great merit is to 
practically show, that the present pauperising, and despotic system of the 
subordination of labour to capital can be superseded by the republican and 
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benificent system of the association of free and equal producers  (Marx, 1866, 
sec. 5) 
Prychitko points out that Marx was reluctant to name the specifics of such a 
system, and expressed a simultaneous fear that producers cooperatives would devolve 
into joint-stock companies in several other places (Prychitko, 1991). Marx (1875) also 
expressed reluctance about cooperatives in Critique of the Gotha Program.  
Lenin admired worker cooperatives, though thought they would never take root 
without fundamental class structure. After the 1917 revolution he wrote that the “dreams 
of the old cooperators [are] now becoming unvarnished reality,” such that “the only task, 
indeed, that remains for us is to organize the population into cooperative societies,” 
(Lenin, 1923). Before though, he cast the old cooperative dreams of Robert Owen and 
others as “fantastic...because they dreamed of peacefully remodeling contemporary 
society into socialism without taking account of such fundamental questions as the class 
struggle, the capture of political power by the working class, and the overthrow of the 
exploiting class,” (Lenin, 1923). 
A range of early political economists looked favorably upon worker cooperatives. 
As they noted the peripherality of cooperatives through the end of the 19th and into the 
20th century, they too had to set about to explain this. Echoing some of the concerns of 
Marx and later Lenin, Luxemburg gives perhaps the clearest articulation by focusing on 
how the dynamics of competition with capitalist firms demanded expanded reproduction 
and self-exploitation of workers in worker cooperatives. The structure of capitalist 
competition forced worker cooperatives into a lose-lose dilemma: 
“In a capitalist economy exchanges dominate production. As a result of 
competition, the complete domination of the process of production by the 
interests of capital – that is, pitiless exploitation – becomes a condition for the 
survival of each enterprise. The workers forming a co-operative in the field of 
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production are thus faced with the contradictory necessity of governing 
themselves with the utmost absolutism. They are obliged to take toward 
themselves the role of capitalist entrepreneur – a contradiction that accounts 
for the usual failure of production co-operatives which either become pure 
capitalist enterprises or, if the workers’ interests continue to predominate, end 
by dissolving,” (Luxemburg, 1900, chap. 7). 
Kautsky and Bohn echo this and argue that while workers will seek to form self-
managed firms, and should be encouraged, the structure of capitalism will prevent this 
self-management from ever dominating capitalist forms (Kautsky and Bohn, 1910). 
Though much of this debate occurred around the turn of the 20th century, when workers 
self-management was much more at the fore of socialist activism, the position has been 
carefully and well-articulated today (Gindin, 2016; Gindin and Panitch, 2012). Gindin 
argues that because of the large structural hurdles faced by worker cooperatives in 
capitalist contexts, a successful worker cooperative complex requires mass coordination 
of labor against capital, and that the cooperative movement has been largely incapable of 
that.  
Luxemburg paints a picture wherein capitalism forces the worker cooperatives 
that exist in capitalist economies toward an unsavory proposition: dissolve or become 
capitalist. While Marxists have been sympathetic to the aspirations of worker 
cooperatives, they have also remained dubious of the ability of the form to exist in any 
meaningful way that stands apart from, and opposed to, capitalist production. The 
hypothesis that the structure of capitalism is the limiting agent to worker cooperatives 
presents problems for empirical tests, as the dominance of capitalism renders comparative 
studies almost impossible. However, it does illuminate some of the fundamental 
challenges that worker cooperatives whose immediate causality lies external to their own 
structures. Still, this generalized casting of capitalism as caustic to worker cooperatives 
 
- 140 - 
 
runs into problems – especially that significant experimentations in worker cooperative 
complexes have existed for some time, and their clustering suggests they respond 
differently to different kinds of capitalist contexts. This consideration points to the 
possibility of power differentiation  in the capital-labor relationship conditioned by social 
institutions, which make it possible for the main hypothesis of this essay to hold: while 
the general dynamics of capitalism hold a general antipathy to worker cooperatives, its 
degree can be tempered by socio-institutional context. 
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WITH DOMINANT THEORIES 
While neoclassical and political economy theories appear to account for the initial 
puzzle they set out to solve – why are worker cooperatives relatively rare – they run into 
other problems. First, they do not match the empirical record. Worker cooperatives, while 
marginal, still exist and persist. Where they exist, they exhibit geographical clustering 
which seems to increase the prospects for the success of other worker cooperatives. 
Second, the argumentation lacks clarity on the mechanisms of selection, and engage in 
tautological reasoning. These are explored below.  
Empirical Record 
In response to the arguments of political economists, worker cooperatives do 
exist, and in many instances, they are quite significant. For example, the Mondragon 
Cooperative Corporation accounts for 5 percent of Basque GDP (Osmond, 2012, p. 14). 
Internationally, there are also many spots where we observe the bunching of worker 
cooperatives, including Argentina (particularly around Buenos Aires), the Basque 
Country, Emilia Romagna, Québec, Catalonia, and Kerala, among others. Globally, 
worker cooperatives do not appear to be distributed randomly. If worker cooperatives 
were distributed randomly across the globe, we could suspect that they exist in all 
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contexts with more or less the same ease (or dis-ease) relative their capitalist 
counterparts. More crudely, we might infer that capitalism consists of homogenized 
dynamics against which worker-managed firms struggle to survive. However, since we 
observe the flourishing of worker cooperatives in certain areas and not others, it supports 
the notion that (1) that there are differences in the socio-institutional makeup of capitalist 
contexts across different regions, a claim substantiated by much literature, and (2) there 
are some elements of the institutional environments of certain areas which are beneficial 
to the creation and proliferation of worker cooperatives.  
In response to the neoclassical argument, there is little evidence that worker 
cooperatives suffer from structural flaws which affect their performance. In fact, stronger 
evidence shows that they outperform capitalist firms. As issue is that the empirical record 
for worker-managed firms is relatively scant, owing to the relative absence of worker-
managed firms. Even where worker managed firms do exist, it is often hard to find a 
sample size of worker-managed firms with comparable capital-managed counterparts. 
More, measurement of key metrics becomes difficult in comparisons. As pointed out by 
Schwartz, ‘efficiency’ is hard to measure in comparative contexts, because common 
proxy measures often used by economists, such as profitability, have a very different 
interpretation for worker cooperatives, as well as the fact that labor inputs have very 
different accounting norms (Schwartz, 2011a). The strongest support for neoclassical 
theories is inconclusive.  Dow (2003) writes that “our knowledge is too primitive to 
attach a confident positive or negative sign to the efficiency properties of workers' 
control, which undoubtedly vary with industry characteristics and the specific 
organizational design one has in mind,” (Dow, 2003, p. 262).  
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Many have found, though, that worker cooperatives are associated with higher 
efficiency than capitalist firms. These difficulties in measurement pointed out by 
Schwartz notwithstanding, a fair amount of work shows that different levels of worker 
involvement – from participation in decision-making to outright ownership of the firm – 
demonstrate no negative productivity effects, and often demonstrate positive effects. 
Freeman and Rogers’ (1999) landmark What Workers Want found that employee-
involvement “programs do not harm productivity on average, and, more likely than not, 
raise it,” (Freeman and Rogers, 144). Doucouliagos (1995), in a meta-analysis, surveyed 
43 articles about the productivity of employee participation, and found that “profit 
sharing, worker ownership, and worker participation in decision making are all positively 
associated with productivity,” and further that “all the observed correlations are stronger 
among labor-managed firms…than among participatory capitalist firms,” (Doucouliagos, 
1995, p. 58). Many individual surveys obtain similar results (Kruse, 1993; Levine, 1990; 
Melman, 2001; Schweickart, 1993). Conte & Tannenbaum (1978) write that “Employee 
owned companies appear to be profitable – perhaps even more profitable than 
comparable, conventionally owned companies; and the ownership variable most closely 
associated with profitability is the percent of equity owned by the workers themselves,” 
(Conte and Tannenbaum, 1978, p. 27).  
Perhaps the best comparative on the performance of worker-managed firms 
relative to capital-managed firms comes from Craig and Pencavel, who gathered cross 
sectional data on worker cooperatives and capitalist (union and non-union) firms among 
the plywood industry of the Pacific Northwest, allowing for robust comparison over 
several decades between conventional, unionized, and worker cooperative plywood firms. 
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This study’s comparative aspects were aided by features of the plywood industry – 
relatively homogenous inputs, outputs, and technology. They found that worker-managed 
firms were 13.5 percent more efficient than their unionized counterparts: “it is as if the 
workers in the co-ops could go on vacation for an extra seven weeks a year and still 
produce in total output what the unionized firms would have produced for that year,” 
(Pencavel 2001, 52, see also Pencavel and Craig 1994; Craig and Pencavel 1992; Craig et 
al. 1995).  
More recently, Erik Olsen has argued that “the conjecture that worker 
cooperatives…suffer a competitive disadvantage relative to conventional firms is not 
supported by existing empirical research,” (Olsen, 2013, p. 88). Evidence to the contrary 
is largely absent from the literature. So, the neoclassical idea that worker cooperative 
firms are inefficient simply doesn’t hold up.  
Structure of Argumentation and the Rhetorical Flaws 
Neoclassical theories lack clarity on how firm inefficiency leads to marginality of 
that firm, which leads to tautological reasoning, that uses the stylized fact of marginality 
as proof of inefficiency. While firm inefficiency might result in some form of 
peripherality (or even extinction), it is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for 
extinction. An entity might be extinct for many reasons, and inefficiency is only one 
reason. For example, a dinosaur which once existed and does not today may have been 
outcompeted by more efficient creatures, or may have gone extinct because of outside 
factors - e.g. the Chixculub asteroid striking the proto-Yucatan and causing a mass 
extinction.  It would be incorrect to assume, a priori, that adaptive deficiencies led to its 
extinction. Similarly, it is incorrect to assume that existence means superior efficiency. 
Terrestrial animals have eyes which are efficient for underwater sight – where they 
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evolved – but less efficient in air. These eyes continue with terrestrial animals because of 
inertia, not because of efficiency. Betamax was a more efficient format than VHS, but 
lost the videotape format wars for factors other than efficiency. In this way, it would be 
incorrect to assume that the peripherality of worker cooperatives must be due to their 
inherent inefficiency, particularly when the empirical record suggests no losses to 
inefficiency. Yet, such circular logic predominates neoclassical thought on the topic. 
Gordon, editor of The Mises Review, exemplifies this: 
To show the superior efficiency of free enterprise a simple argument appears 
to suffice. In a capitalist economy, as we have said, people are free to form 
workers cooperatives as they wish. If, then, such cooperatives promoted 
efficiency, why would they not supplant capitalist firms through the force of 
competition? If market socialists correctly judge the benefits of their system, 
efforts to establish it appear unnecessary: the market will accomplish the task 
by itself. If, on the contrary, capitalist institutions flourish in a free economy 
while cooperatives occupy only a minor role, is this not prima facie evidence 
that market socialism fails to work? Legislation to establish market socialism 
is either unnecessary or harmful…Were it not efficient, why would it exist? 
(Gordon, 1996). 
Note that in Gordon’s example, all firms exist in the ‘free economy,’ a thoroughly 
de-socialized and de-institutionalized ether. If firms only and always exist in such 
homogenized space, it seems reasonable to conclude that differences in their proliferation 
accord to differences in their internal qualities. Bur if the context in which they exist may 
vary and affect the firm in any way, external causes enter the frame, and this key 
assumption cannot hold.  
Both Schwartz and Bowles attack this line of reasoning and trace its intellectual 
inheritance. Schwartz calls this framework the ‘evolutionary hypothesis;’ Bowles calls it 
the ‘assumption of efficient design,’ (Bowles 2009; Schwartz 2011.) Both trace this 
framework to Alchian's (1950) article 'Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory' in 
the Journal of Political Economy (Alchian). Bowles includes Williamson's The Economic 
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Institutions of Capitalism and Holmstrom and Migrom's ‘The Firm as Incentive System,’ 
as other grounding works to the the extenshion of the evolutionary metaphor into 
economics (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; Williamson, 1985). Both Bowles and 
Scwhartz separately observe two logical flaws to such an analysis, with respect to the 
proliferation on worker cooperatives. For any Darwinian metaphor to exist, there would 
need to be sufficient worker cooperatives in existence for their form to not be chosen by 
the efficiency rubric. That is, in order to go extinct, firms must exist with a high enough 
population in the first place – the evolutionary framework using efficiency might explain 
why firms die out but tells only one possibility for this phenomena. More, the assumption 
fails to answer why worker cooperatives are rarely initiated in the first place, especially 
when the empirical evidence of the small amount of firms that does exist suggests 
efficiency advantages that would aid Darwinian evolution. Thus, the empirical evidence 
and the logic of neoclassical argumentation cannot be viewed as a leading candidate to 
explain the proliferation of worker cooperatives.  
Sen (1966; 1989), Putterman (1988), and Marglin (1974), read together, offer up 
rich critiques of the notion that capitalist firms dominate because they are the most 
efficient. They first show that the question of one firm types efficiency is not 
immediately obvious from optimization and look to how external social and institutional 
factors influence efficiency. Sen (1966), using conventional neoclassical assumptions, 
shows that labor optimization is eminently obtainable in cooperative enterprise, with any 
mixed combination of ‘needs’ and ‘work’ based distribution principles. That is, 
maximally efficient cooperatives can obtain in conventional neoclassical frames. While 
this article strays from consideration of external factors, Sen (1989) begins to focus on 
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how institutions mediate efficiency, particularly in cooperative contexts – “benefits to all 
parties can accrue from the emergence and use of particular institutions,” (p. 72). 
Putterman (1988), along these lines, examines the case of agricultural cooperatives and 
efficiency in China, and finds that external factors greatly mediate the possibility set: “if 
the general environment had been one providing good price incentives, marketing 
alternatives, and state support for the development of rural infrastructure […] then there 
would have been an opportunity for group farming to take off where it had and could 
demonstrate real advantages,” (p. 447).  Marglin (1974) flips this logic on its head, and 
argues against the common assumption that capitalist ascendancy owes to capitalist 
efficiency, convincingly arguing that capitalist ascendancy owed to social control rather 
than efficiency gains: 
Rather than providing more output for the same inputs, these innovations in 
work organization were introduced so that the capitalist got himself a larger 
share of the pie at the expense of the worker, and it is only the subsequent 
growth in the size of the pie that has obscured the class interest which was at 
the root of these innovations. The social function of hierarchical work 
organization is not technical efficiency, but accumulation. By mediating 
between producer and consumer, the capitalist organization sets aside much 
more for expanding and improving plant and equipment than individuals 
would if they could control the pace of capital accumulation (Marglin, 1974, 
p. 62).  
Given substantive issues – empirical and rhetorical – with the dominant theories 
in economics on the appearance and distribution of worker cooperatives, this essay now 
turns to an examination of the socio-institutional ecosystem hypothesis, which seeks to 
account for the stylized fact of a general peripherality of worker cooperatives punctuated 
by clusters of worker cooperative saturation, and remains consistent with empirical 
evidence on the individual performance of worker cooperatives.  
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III. THE CASE FOR THE SOCIO-INSTITUTIONAL HYPOTHESIS 
The dominant theories on the peripherality of worker cooperatives leave us with a 
significant gap between theory and the empirical record, and they lack argumentative 
clarity on their mechanisms of operation. This section now turns attention to the idea that 
the main limiting agent to worker cooperative proliferation lies in factors outside of the 
firm, determined at least in part by relationships between actors in the proximate socio-
institutional environment of the firm. The complete socio-institutional ecosystem 
hypothesis lacks a full articulation in the literature, so this section first pulls together 
various strands that comprise a part of the whole, including: a) instances in the literature 
which call for more research on the social and institutional limits of worker cooperatives; 
b) theories which name specific relationships and mechanisms which constitute some of 
the relationships of the socio-institutional ecosystem; and c) evidence from case studies 
of successful worker cooperative complexes and from practitioners in the worker 
cooperative sector. The combination of these strands builds a strong case for the socio-
institutional ecosystem hypothesis, articulated at the end of this section.  
CALLS FOR MORE RESEARCH 
The frequency by which authors call for more research into elements of the socio-
institutional hypothesis makes one of the strongest cases for its central consideration. 
Many thinkers, often after testing conventional hypotheses and finding them wanting, 
have then called for further research into social and institutional explanations for the 
appearance and distribution of worker cooperatives. These dynamics return to questions 
of relative power between capitalist firms and worker cooperatives in a social ecosystem, 
exploring both bilateral relationships and relationships whose dynamics run diffusely 
through a complex of social relations. These queries into the nature of institutions and the 
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presence of worker cooperatives respond more directly to Galbraith’s challenge that 
economists have not, in general, asked “why power is associated with some factors of 
production and not with others,” (Galbraith, 2007, p. 47) 
Elster, answering his own query on the rarity of worker cooperatives, writes that 
“the main argument of this paper is apparently inconclusive: we just don't know whether 
the observed lack of cooperatives is due to their inherent inferiority or to interactions 
with the non- cooperative environment,” (Elster, 1989, p. 111, emphasis mine).Thompson 
(2015) writes that “A plausible answer [as to why worker cooperatives are rare] is that 
prevailing institutional environments are generally geared to the prevailing capitalist 
mode of organisation, thus militating against cooperatives and suppressing their ability to 
overcome the cooperation/coordination trade-off,” (Thompson, 9, emphasis mine). Gunn 
(2000) argues that institutions and property relations are essential to the survival of 
worker cooperatives (Gunn). Olsen (2013) explores the idea that barriers to the creation 
of worker cooperatives in the firms environment impede them, but runs into some vexing 
puzzles as to why this doesn’t mean the conversion of more conventional firms to worker 
cooperatives, and calls for more research (Olsen). This matches calls from others have 
been repeated calls for more research into how particular institutional ecosystems have 
influenced the creation and distribution of worker-managed firms in capitalist economies 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1993b; Dickstein, 2016; Stryjan, 1989). Roy et alia (2015) argue that 
institutional ecosystems are the best way of understanding the prevalence of the ‘third 
sector’ in Scotland (Roy et al.). Estrin and Jones (1992) find in their study that French 
cooperatives do not conform to the pessimistic predictions of economic theory and write 
that “probably what is needed is a broad, multifaceted model that includes both economic 
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and social variables and is not wedded to a single traditional disciplinary perspective,” 
(Estrin and Jones, 337, emphasis mine). Doucouliagos (1993) writes that  
“an examination of the revealed preference, transactions costs, team 
production, moral hazard, and investment inefficiencies theories reveals that 
economists often misunderstand labor-managed firms, and fail to realistically 
model the labor-managed firm. Much more research is needed to explain why 
capital hires labor. This research should take several directions…Finally, 
more research is needed in developing joint economic, psychological, and 
sociological explanations, like that offered by the cultural inertia thesis,” 
(Doucouliagos, 1995, p. 250 emphasis mine).  
These invocations for further research, held together, build a compelling case for 
why the socio-institutional hypothesis should be centered in analysis on the proliferation 
of worker cooperatives.  
SPECIFIC RELATIONSHIPS AND MECHANISMS  
Another large body of research in the literature examines specific relationships 
that alternatively challenge or encourage the existence of worker cooperatives. These 
relationships constitute key parts of the socio-institutional ecosystem, and their 
articulation in the literature lends credence to the socio-institutional ecosystem 
hypothesis. This section examines several of these socio-institutional phenomena from in 
the literature as possible mechanisms through which the socio-institutional ecosystems of 
capitalism make worker cooperatives generally rare, but with punctuated clusters: short-
sided market power, finance, familiarity, and trust. From concrete relationships (e.g. 
between firms and financial institutions) to more ethereal dynamics (e.g. trust between 
persons) the connective thread between these various theories is that they are external to 
the firm and can imaginably vary across capitalist space, marking an array of 
constellations possible for any particular socio-institutional ecosystem.  
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Short Sided Market Power 
Bowles and Gintis characterize the absence of worker cooperatives and 
predominance of capitalist firms by showing how those who can most often exercise 
power as those on the ‘short’ side of the labor market (Bowles and Gintis, 2007). This 
postulate descends from the notion that in repeated interactions in the labor market, 
characterized by incomplete contracts, the chosen method of enforcement is for the 
capitalist to offer a rent to some workers – and to exclude others – with a promise to 
renew if work is accomplished satisfactorily for a given period. The incompleteness of 
the contract in labor markets comes from the fact that labor power is contracted for in 
time units, but output is affected by effort units, which are either non-verifiable or non-
enforceable. This situates the employment relationship in the broad class of principal-
agent relationships. If the labor market were a complete contract, 'hiring' would simply be 
called 'buying.' The power of the capitalist, which Bowles and Gintis define as an 
“interpersonal relationship with the ability to impose sanctions,” comes from the ability 
of the capitalist to exclude the worker from the employment rent in future periods – a 
mechanism called contingent renewal (Bowles and Gintis, 2007, p. 2). The power to offer 
and take away an employment rent is concentrated with the capitalist in this relationship 
because they exist on the short side of the market – the “side of the market on which the 
number of desired transactions is less, that is, employers in a labour market with 
unemployment,” (Bowles and Gintis, 2007, p. 5). This power underwrites exchange in 
the labor market and cannot be abstracted away from or confined to the arena of its 
origin. As such, it is levied by capitalists in variety of forms that systematically privilege 
capitalist firms to the exclusion of other forms. Crucially, this power can be affected by a 
range of social institutions (norms about working relationships) and economic dynamics 
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(level of unemployment) which can vary across socio-institutional ecosystems.  
Finance 
Financial limits are a frequently cited reason for why there are not more 
cooperatives, and the limits to finance are seen on several levels. Financial relationships 
are particularly important at two key junctures - leveraging start-up capital and 
maintaining investment.  
The lower wealth of workers relative to capitalists affects the ability of workers to 
generate funds. That is, channels of capital sufficient to engage in production are more 
available to capitalists than to workers. Crucial here, though, is the notion that primitive 
accumulation itself is a social relationship outside the purview of capitalist dynamics, and 
as such may also vary according to variation of social forms. Dickstein cites this as a 
reason that worker owned/operated firms tend to be in more labor-intensive industries 
(Dickstein, 2016, p. 11). This position is echoed by Birchall and Ketilson. (Birchall et al., 
2009). Bowles writes that “the cost of capital supplied to a firm controlled by its 
employees will be higher than the capital costs faced by an otherwise identical firm 
controlled by its capital suppliers...[because] the competitively determined interest cost of 
a loan varies inversely with the wealth of the borrower,” (Bowles, 2009, p. 342). When 
looking for initial credit from financial institutions, the stylized fact that workers lack 
wealth results in loan conditions that are more costly that those received by capitalists 
with more wealth.  
For worker cooperatives already in operation, another obstacle is continued 
financing. McCain, centering the shareholder-firm relationship central to capitalist firms, 
notes that worker cooperatives are not able to leverage equity shares with the same ability 
that capitalist firms can, because equity shares that include ownership and control rights 
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are antithetical to the structure of the worker owned/operated firm (McCain, 1977). This 
means that firms are often forced to finance themselves off of retained earnings, which 
put them at a competitive disadvantage to capital owned/manage firms, which can choose 
an optimal mixture of retained earnings/equity share/and bank financing. Finally, various 
thinkers have postulated that financial institutions are wary to lend to worker 
owned/operated firms because the level of risk is less knowable owing to the fact that 
very few exist and that financial institutions are wary of the idea of claiming collateral 
from many worker-owners as opposed to a few capitalists (Dickstein, 2016; Jackall and 
Levin, 1986). These theoretical observations are largely borne out by the empirical 
record. Gintis found that banks acted very differently with the plywood cooperatives of 
Washington, Oregon, and Northern California than with capital-managed plywood firms 
in the Pacific Northwest, ultimately providing less credit to the worker cooperatives 
(Gintis, 1989). Several other books, articles, and reports also note that financial access 
has been the limiting agent to worker ownership and management(European 
Commission, 1984; e.g. Thornley, 1981). Gagliardi’s findings show that where good 
relationships exist between worker cooperatives and financial institutions, better 
outcomes prevail. Her work supports the “existence of an institutional complementarity 
relationship between the development of local banking institutions and cooperative 
firms,”(Gagliardi, 2009). More, financial institutions more proximately positioned are 
faced with legal hurdles in the United States: Credit unions, which are much more likely 
to share an ideological outlook favorable to worker-managed firms than commercial 
banks, are legally only able to lend 12.5% of their holdings our as commercial loans. 
Anecdotal evidence that this has limited the development and growth of worker-managed 
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firms in the United States (Artz and Kim, 2011). This feature is not a necessity of 
capitalism but a political concession to large financial firms as credit union legislation 
was being drafted. Thus, while financial dynamics share several key similarities across 
capitalism which can present difficulties for worker cooperatives, they are also subject to 
social, institutional, political, and cultural structures which vary beyond the tight 
strictures of economic theory, making the hurdles worker cooperatives more or less 
actual.  
Familiarity 
Perhaps people don’t form worker cooperatives as often because the form is 
unfamiliar to many. As worker cooperatives become more known and pervasive, the 
challenges to establishing them diminish, but this presents a significant challenge. 
Schwartz formalizes the notion that because worker cooperatives are unfamiliar, there 
exists a general hesitancy by people to engage them (Schwartz, 2011a). This results in the 
exclusion of worker cooperatives from a prominent existence in capitalist economies. 
This compounds the (real or perceived) constraints on worker cooperatives: worker 
cooperatives are peripheral because they are peripheral. This falls in line with the idea of 
path dependency as a feature of socio-institutional ecosystems. Schwartz posits the 
worker cooperative as a public good in and of itself, for whom there exists the classic 
undersupply because the benefits added by contributors are not wholly claimed by them. 
He also offers a “more modest version” of the rational utility maximizer, where social 
and benevolent tendencies of the individual are understood next to selfishness). Schwartz 
argues that “the bare fact that labor management is rare makes it less attractive to workers 
and potential sources of finance because of the real, if arguably, irrational, cognitive bias 
in favor of the familiar, including familiar organizational forms,” (Schwartz, 2011a, p. 
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283). Molk writes that: 
Since the [cooperative] form is unfamiliar to most, prospective patron owners 
must first be educated about what a cooperative does, how it succeeds, and 
that it can outcompete better-known, familiar, and existing investor ownership 
competitors. Assembling such a class will take time and effort, reducing the 
broker's expected returns. (Molk, 2013, pp. 937–38). 
Trust 
Thompson argues that the cultural and cognitive aspects of institutional 
environments are key towards success of worker cooperatives (Thompson, 2015). Trust is 
an important part of worker cooperative success, Thompson argues, but “isolated 
cooperatives must vie with the host of ‘pervasive behavior-shaping institutions that 
propagate an instrumental/transactional approach to work,” (Thompson, 2015, p. 9). 
Casadesus-Masanell and Khanna argue that worker cooperatives both promote trust and 
are fostered by its presence (Casadesus-Masanell and Khanna, 2003). Trust conditions 
the relationships between workers in a worker cooperative, and may be instrumental to 
overcome issues of shirking and free-riding, and also plays a fundamental role with 
external relationships. 
Trust and more ethereal aspects can be folded into and written across other 
concrete relationships, such as relationships between the firm and financial institutions. 
Consistent with the multiple and simultaneous nature of causality in a socio-institutional 
ecosystem, anecdotal evidence suggests that the phenomena of trust, familiarity, and 
financial relationships can be compounded, making difficulties for worker cooperatives. 
Vanek stated that “If you go to a bank and ask for a loan to start a co-op, they will throw 
you out,” (Perkins, 1995). Andrew Field, in his testimony before the US Congress in 
1979 on the experience of Vermont miners trying to form a worker cooperative, said 
“when we first went to the big lenders, their first reaction was, ‘Jesus Christ,’ the 
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monkeys are going to run the zoo?’ If any lender suspected that, you wouldn’t get a 
dime,” (Business, 1979, p. 264). 
These mechanisms and relationships articulated in the literature support the notion 
that worker cooperatives should be generally rare, because they face institutional 
environmental hurdles across capitalist contexts. However, these mechanisms are more 
plastic than iron and can vary across different capitalist contexts, opening the possibility 
for the hurdles to be alternatively lowered or heightened in some socio-institutional 
ecosystems. This accoutns for the second feature of the socio-institutional ecosystem 
hypothesis of worker cooperatives: that variance in socio-institutional ecosystems 
accounts for the punctuated clusters of worker cooperatives in certain regions.  
EVIDENCE FROM PRACTITIONERS AND CASE STUDIES 
One of the biggest pieces of evidence for the need to focus on the external 
relationships around cooperatives come from observers and participants in robust 
complexes of worker management. Case studies of successful worker managed 
complexes generally highlight the coming together of various social and institutional 
forces in the creation of successful complexes. For example, the story of the Mondragón 
cooperatives highlights the various pieces of a social/institutional fabric – a technical 
school (which would become Mondragón University (Unibertsitatea)), a savings and 
investment bank (La Caja Laboral Popular), a cooperative incubator, and a social sense 
of shared purpose amongst the Basque citizenry (Whyte and Whyte, 1988). The Working 
World, a financial institution that supplies loans to worker cooperatives with whom it 
maintains close relationships in Argentina, Nicaragua, and the United States, has not only 
found that it is often the only financial institution able to loan to worker cooperatives, but 
that its loans are paid back at 95 per cent, suggesting an unmet demand for financial 
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services for worker cooperatives across several different national contexts (Martin and 
Wong, 2014). In Emilia Romagna, the successful complex of worker cooperativism is 
understood as the product of strong working alliance between communist organizers and 
practitioners of Catholic social teaching who were sympathetic to leftist movements; in 
everyday parlance the alliance is talked about as the uniting of the ‘red’ (communist) 
cooperatives and ‘white’ (Catholic) cooperatives. Thus, powerful cooperative 
confederations were established and were able to successfully lobby and pass legislation 
that aided cooperative development and the establishment of capital funds for 
establishing new cooperatives, as well as teaching and disseminating cooperative values 
(Zamagni and Zamagni, 2011). This work has been fantastic in naming particular features 
which have aided the rise of worker cooperatives.  
Hoover and Abell discuss ‘cooperative growth ecosystems’ to study five clusters 
of worker cooperatives in the United States, San Francisco, New York City, Madison, 
Cincinnati, western North Carolina. (Hoover and Abell, 2016). Though our analyses 
share the notion of ecosystem, our work departs in the sense that the ecosystems that 
Hoover and Abell write about are intentionally created to stoke cooperative development, 
as opposed to naming the prevailing social and institutional context of a situation, which 
my analysis highlights. By way of metaphor, their analysis is akin to ‘managed forest’ or 
‘garden’ still a complex of layered relationships, though distinct from an ‘old growth 
forest’ or ‘coral reef’ which exists outside of human direction. Still, their analysis calls 
attention to the key relationships which structure the possibilities of success for worker 
cooperatives. They identify 11 ecosystemic features which encourage worker cooperative 
growth, dividing those features into building blocks, accelerators, and legitimizers. 
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Internationally, there are also many spots where we observe the bunching of worker 
cooperatives, including Argentina (particularly around Buenos Aires), the Basque 
Country, Emilia Romagna, Québec, and Kerala, among others. If worker-managed firms 
were distributed randomly across the globe, we could suspect that they exist in all 
environments with more or less the same ease (or dis-ease) relative their capitalist 
counterparts, or similarly that capitalism is one homogenous substance against which 
worker-managed firms struggle to survive. However, since we observe the flourishing of 
worker-managed firms in certain areas and not others, we can reasonably suspect (1) that 
there are differences in the substance of capitalism across different regions, a claim which 
seems rather obvious, and (2) there are some elements of the institutional environments 
of certain areas which are beneficial to the creation and proliferation of worker-managed 
firms.  
SYNTHESIS 
Calls for more research, articulations of specific mechanisms of the socio-
institutional environment, evidence from case studies and practitioners, and the bunching 
of worker cooperative complexes across the globe strengthens the case for the hypothesis 
that worker cooperative proliferation is most affected by the proximate socio-institutional 
environment of the firm. This essay looks back at Vanek’s formulation: 
“Co-ops in the West are a bit like sea water fish in a freshwater pond. The 
capitalist world in the last 200 years has evolved its own institutions, 
instruments, political frameworks etc. […] hence, we need some instruments 
and institutions which make this possible,” (Perkins, 1995). 
Extending this thought, we can fully articulate the socio-institutional hypothesis 
for worker cooperatives. Worker cooperatives are rare because the institutions and social 
forms which have co-formed with the development of capitalism have created socio-
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institutional ecosystems which prevent serious hurdles to the creation, viability, and long 
term health of a worker cooperatives. However, the plasticity of institutions and social 
forms means that certain socio-institutional environments are more favorable to the 
proliferation of worker cooperatives, which explains the bunching effect seen for worker 
cooperatives in the United States and across the globe. This essay next turns to an 
examination of how the distribution of worker cooperatives in the United States supports 
this hypothesis.  
IV. EMPIRICAL SET-UP & PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS 
The empirical work of this essay seeks to reinforce the socio-institutional 
ecosystem hypothesis by demonstrating that the variance in the dispersion of worker 
cooperatives co-relates to identifiable socio-institutional variation in different regions of 
the Lower 48 United States. Several constituent pieces are required for this analysis. 
First, there needs to be a mechanism to establish what constitutes a ‘socio-institutional 
ecosystem.’ Then, there needs to be a robust identification of worker cooperatives in the 
United States. This data, when combined, can give an estimation of the worker 
cooperative saturation for each ecosystem - a score for the clustering of worker 
cooperatives of each region. The analysis will then check to see worker cooperative 
saturation varies randomly across the country according to a normal distribution. The 
hypothesis of this essay is that worker cooperative saturation will not vary randomly, as it 
will correspond to socio-institutional variance. Next, there needs to be a way to 
incorporate data on possible correlates of worker cooperatives, which must be fitted so 
that it corresponds to the same unit used for the socio-institutional ecosystem. The final 
step is to run correlations between the estimate for worker cooperative saturation and the 
potential socio-institutional indicators. 
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This work uses the ‘economic megaregions’ determined by Nelson & Rae’s 
(2016) work “An Economic Geography of the United States: From Commutes to 
Megaregions,” (Nelson and Rae). Nelson and Rae’s work responds to the need of 
economic geographers to divide space into “discrete, bounded, internally homogenous 
regions” which can best be used to understand labor markets and capital flows. While 
state boundaries are good for legal distinctions, they do not capture the separateness of 
economic geography well. For example, Card and Krueger’s (1994) intervention into the 
minimum wage made use of the legal distinctions between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 
but simultaneously required the homogeneity of economic fundamentals of the 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey borderlands for the study to approximate ‘laboratory 
conditions,’ (Card and Krueger). Other times, states are too varied: Maryland does not 
constitute a useful unit to study economic phenomena in its relationship to social 
structures, given the variation from Baltimore, the DC suburbs, the Chesapeake Bay 
economies, Cumberland farms, and Appalachian patterns. Nelson and Rae’s approach is 
to “offer an empirical approach to detecting and defining megaregions which takes the 
insights of a relational, flowing concept of geography and puts them to use in service of 
delineating coherent, bounded regions, with a data set of more than 4,000,000 commutes 
as a proxy for patterns of economic interconnection, given the importance of commutes 
in structuring the geography of labor markets,” (Nelson and Rae, 2016, p. 11). Figure 16, 
below, shows the commuting algorithms they used, and the delineations determined the 
megaregions of the United States. The GIS shapefile that Nelson and Rae sent to me 
differs slightly and in ways that don’t affect the final result, as the Yellowstone region 
and Nevada desert didn’t produce enough commuting data to coalesce into any coherent 
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region but need to be part of some discrete region (for a shapefile).  
 Figure 16 
 
Next, the data for worker cooperatives come from the United States Federation of 
Worker Cooperatives, and the Democracy at Work Institute, comprising their annual 
Worker Cooperative Census from 2013 to 2017. 464 worker cooperatives comprise the 
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total population of worker cooperatives in the United States for 2013 to 2017. Compare 
this to the 223 worker cooperatives found by the University of Wisconsin Center for 
Cooperatives in their 2009 census (Deller et al., 2009). It remains unclear whether this 
results from undercounting or new worker cooperative creation between 2009 and 2013-
17, but likely some combination of both. For the 2013-2017 Democracy at Work census 
data that this essay uses, some worker cooperatives would participate in the survey each 
year, while others were added by the Democracy at Work Team. Most worker 
cooperatives appeared in every year, while some only appeared once. Additionally, most 
worker cooperatives, at some point in the 4 years of survey, gave information on their 
number of workers, their income, and the number of hours worked in total that year at the 
cooperative. Though this does not include the whole sample, this allows the use of that 
data as other measures of the cooperative saturation of an area.  
Thus, the data represents worker cooperatives present in the United States 
between 2013 and 2017. There exists the possibility of an undercount, but the Democracy 
at Work Team thinks this is unlikely, given the relatively small number of worker 
cooperatives and the multiple years of running the population census. Most worker 
cooperatives had a physical address, and those that did not were assigned to the ZIP code 
of their incorporation. The location of the worker cooperatives was then geocoded into 
GIS format. Figure 17, below, shows the distribution of worker cooperatives in the lower 
48 United States, shown with state boundaries.  
 




The locational data on worker cooperatives is then joined to the megaregion data 
borrowed from Nelson and Rae. Along with population data for each megaregion – 
broken down to census tract and then spatially joined to the megaregion polygons – each 
megaregion can be given a number approximating its saturation of worker cooperatives: 
worker cooperatives per 100,000 people. Additional measures for each megaregion are 
included in the OLS regressions below, including, workers per 100,000 people, hours 
worked per 100,000 people, and Worker Cooperative GDP per 100,000 people. These 
last three measures are from a smaller dataset of worker cooperatives which fully 
completed a survey in one of the four years. They are used here to check the robustness 
of the first measure – worker cooperatives per 100,000 people. Figure 18, below, shows 
each worker cooperative in the United States from 2013-2017, in the megaregions of 
Nelson and Rae, with each megaregion shaded by the number of worker cooperatives per 
100,000 people (the darker, the higher saturation of worker cooperatives).  
 




The next initial step is to test whether worker cooperatives are distributed 
randomly across the various megaregions of the United States, across a variety of 
measures of worker cooperative saturation. The hypothesis of this paper is that there will 
not be a random distribution of worker cooperative saturation across the United States 
controlled for by population, because the presence of worker cooperatives is not 
determined by probabilistic quantitative agglomerations of economic agents, but by the 
qualitative aspects of social institutions of those agglomerations of people – i.e. the socio-
institutional ecosystems which vary across the country. These measures of worker 
cooperative saturation are: worker cooperatives per 100,000 residents, the raw number of 
worker cooperatives, the number of workers in worker cooperatives per 100,000 
residents, worker cooperative GDP per 100,000 residents, the annuals hours worked in 
worker cooperatives per 100,000 residents, and worker cooperative GDP per megaregion 
GDP. In each of these measures of worker cooperative saturation, a national mean is 
obtained, from which a normal distribution is imputed. This normal distribution can be 
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compared to the actual distribution of these measures of worker cooperative saturation. 
Below, in Figure 4, we see the results of this process for the six measures of worker 
cooperative saturation. In each, we see the same three trends repeated. First, below the 
mean, on the left side of the distribution, the actual distribution has a distribution much 
higher than the normal distribution. Second, this incongruence is made up for in part by 
the actual distribution falling significantly below the imputed normal distribution just to 
Figure 19 
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the right of the mean. Finally, the actual distribution moves back above the mean in the 
right-side tail, as several megaregions stand way out in their measures of worker 
cooperative saturation. This pattern repeats strongly across all measures, and we can thus 
infer that worker cooperative saturation is not randomly distributed across the United 
States, consistent with the hypothesis of this essay.  
Finally, other data was collected which represents certain features of the socio-
institutional ecosystem. These include demographic, economic, and ideological 
indicators. These data are chosen as they relate to various aspects that have been 
hypothesized as causative or anecdotally linked to the presence of worker cooperatives. 
First, demographic data which captures some features of the socio-institutional ecosystem 
are collected. Immigrants have been identified as one of the main demographic groups 
leading the development of worker cooperatives in the United States (Maschger, 2017; 
Schoening, 2005). Others have hypothesized that ethnicity may be a key vector of trust, 
and that ethnic diversity and tension may complicate trust (Alesina and Ferrara, 2002). 
Jose Maria Ormaetxea, one of the founders of the first Mondragon cooperative, told me 
in an interview that the Mondragón model would be hard to reproduce in the U.S. 
because of accelerating diversification (mestizaje) in the U.S. makes it hard to form the 
cultural base necessary for a strong cooperative movement12 (Ormaetxea, 2010). As such, 
data on the percentage white, percentage immigrant, and percentage domestic immigrant 
are collected, with changes in the percentage white and the percentage immigrant in the 
preceding decade also noted. Data is also collected on average years of schoolings.  
 
12 His main point was comparative: that the Basque country, as opposed to the contemporary 
United States, had a social cohesion after the Spanish Civil War that was fertile ground for the 
cooperative to take root.  
 
- 166 - 
 
Next, data are collected on economic indicators which condition the socio-
institutional ecosystem. It is a popular idea, backed by several scholars, that worker 
cooperatives do best as a strategy against economic antagonisms – poverty, inequality, 
and unemployment (e.g. Curl, 2010; Tonnesen, 2012).  Staber (1993) has noted the 
ubiquity of the idea that worker cooperatives grow in response to unemployment, though 
his work casts doubt on that (Staber, 1993). Thus, various data are gathered and imputed 
for each megaregion – income, Gini coefficient, change in the Gini from last decade, 
unemployment, change in unemployment from last decade, and the percentage of 
households in poverty.   
Table 1 
 
Finally, data on individual’s ideology is collected. Respondents to the 
Cooperative Congressional Election Survey are tagged to a ZIP code, making it possible 
to code their answers into megaregions. Data is gathered on political self-identification 















% white 2010 US Census 
Δ% white  2000, 2010 US Census 
% immigrant 2014 American Community Survey 
Δ% immigrant 2000, 2014 American Community Survey,  
% domestic migrant 2014 American Community Survey 













                      per capita income 2014 IRS 
gini coefficient Imputed from 2014 IRS 
Δ gini coefficient Imputed from 2004, 2014 IRS 
% unemployment 2015 BLS 
Δ% unemployment 2005, 2015 BLS 













        political self-identification Cooperative Congressional Election Survey 
            % liberal or very liberal Cooperative Congressional Election Survey 
         % vote for Obama (2012) The Guardian 
         % vote for Clinton (2016) Github 
              structural racism exists Cooperative Congressional Election Survey 
        religion is important to me Cooperative Congressional Election Survey 
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or ‘very liberal’, the percentage vote for Obama in 2012, the percentage vote for Clinton 
in 2016, racial awareness (racial problems are isolated; 1=strongly agree, 5=strongly 
disagree), and religious importance (religion is important to me; 1=strongly agree, 
5=strongly disagree).  
All of these variables and their sources are listed above in Table 1. The combined 
dataset is available in Appendix 1. Finally, a simple OLS regression is run on each of 
these variables, using the equation: 
𝐶𝑗
𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑗 +  𝜖𝑗, 
Where: 
C1 = worker cooperatives per 100,000 people 
C2 = workers in worker cooperatives per 100,000 people 
C3 = hours worked in cooperatives per 100,000 people 
C4 = worker cooperative GDP per 100,000 people 
S = demographic, economic, and ideological indicators from Table 1 
j = each megaregion.  
 
A note on causality: this essay does not claim that any individual feature of a 
socio-institutional system causes worker cooperatives to proliferate. As noted in Essay 1 
of this dissertation, the socio-institutional frame implies causality which is simultaneous, 
multiple, immeasurable, and dialectic. However, due to the small proliferation of worker 
cooperatives relative to the magnitudes of the megaregions, it is assumed that worker 
cooperatives in this study have a negligible impact on the demographic, economic, and 
ideological indicators. As such, the point of regressing these variables is to examine the 
range of β coefficients (socio-institutional ecosystem indicators) across regressions and 
pull meaning from the looking at all the regressions together.  
The results of the 18 regressions, against 4 measures of cooperative saturation, are 
shown below in Table 2. Those results with confidence interval above 95% (in all cases 
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but one, they are above 99%) are highlighted in yellow.  
 WC per 100K People Workers per 100K People 







  % white 0.126 0.585 0.006 .270 0.938 0.001 
Δ% white  -0.064 0.912 0.000 -4.513 0.606 0.002 
% immigrant 0.254 0.395 0.013 5.436 0.224 0.027 
Δ% immigrant 1.836 0.434 0.011 49.115 0.160 0.036 
% domestic migrant -0.159 0.482 0.009 -2.438 0.474 0.009 







per capita income 0.000 0.000 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.376 
gini coefficient -0.048 0.928 0.000 3.521 0.658 0.004 
Δ gini coefficient -0.848 0.387 0.014 -8.264 0.575 0.006 
% unemployment -1.400 0.482 0.009 -29.342 0.325 0.018 
Δ% unemployment 1.036 0.665 0.003 6.486 0.856 0.000 







political self-identification -.5316 0.000 0.492 -7.014 0.000 0.3812 
% liberal or very liberal 2.808 0.000 0.503 37.084 0.000 0.390 
% vote for Obama (2012) 0.801 0.000 0.229 10.640 0.001 0.178 
% vote for Clinton (2016) 0.674 0.000 0.213 8.754 0.003 0.159 
structural racism exists 0.952 0.000 0.304 11.525 0.001 0.1986 
religion is important to me 0.504 0.000 0.396 6.186 0.000 0.266 
  WC per 100K People Workers per 100K People 







 % white -846.6 0.842 0.001 140053 0.675 0.003 
Δ% white  -5139 0.650 0.004 33543 0.969 0.000 
% immigrant 8122 0.137 0.039 412615 0.340 0.017 
Δ% immigrant 54734 0.202 0.029 4636325 0.170 0.034 
% domestic migrant -3802 0.361 0.015 -260679 0.427 0.034 







per capita income 0.452 0.000 0.365 33.1 0.000 0.315 
gini coefficient 9077 0.350 0.015 88881 0.908 0.000 
Δ gini coefficient -6192 0.732 0.002 -66857 0.638 0.004 
% unemployment -34965 0.338 0.017 -1654271 0.566 0.006 
Δ% unemployment 14973 0.733 0.002 1758716 0.611 0.005 







political self-identification -7562 0.000 0.300  0.000 0.379 
% liberal or very liberal 38853 0.000 0.286  0.000 0.374 
% vote for Obama (2012) 11217 0.007 0.132  0.001 0.202 
% vote for Clinton (2016) 8972 0.014 0.111  0.002 0.175 
structural racism exists 11444 0.006 0.131  0.000 0.201 
religion is important to me 6678 0.000 0.201  0.000 0.310 
Table 2 
V. EXTENSIONS – MULTI-VARIATE CORRELATIONS & QUALITATIVE CONTROL 
ANALYSIS 
Several interesting observations emerge from these correlations, and this section 
explores those relationships further. First, several indicators highly correlate to the 
presence of worker cooperatives. Those are: average years of school (the only 
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‘demographic’ indicator), per capita income and percentage in poverty (the economic 
indicators), and all of the ideological indicators. Those significance of each of these 
correlates is substantially similar across all four measures of worker cooperative 
saturation: worker cooperatives per 100,000 people, workers in worker cooperatives per 
100,000 people, hours worked in worker cooperatives per 100,000 people, and worker 
cooperative GDP per 100,000 people. From this data, this essay seeks to build out a 
further extension – a multivariate regression incorporating all of the indicator groups 
which highly correlate to the presence of worker cooperatives. Next, this section seeks to 
explore combinations of sequences using Qualitative Control Analysis to examine the 
puzzle of immigration and worker cooperatives – attested to in ethnographic literature but 
absent from the above correlations.  
MULTIVARIATE CORRELATION  
From the correlations in the previous section, we see that average years of school, 
per capita income, percentage of population in poverty, and all of the ideological 
indicators are significant. Because of heavy correlation between the various ideological 
regressors, as well as between the two economic indicators (per capita income and 
percentage of population in poverty), this section chooses one of each of those, in order 
to avoid issues of multicollinearity. However, the multivariate regression is run several 
times, by changing the measure of worker cooperative saturation, as well as the stand-in 
economic and ideological variables. The variables chosen for ‘ideological indicators’ are 
the average self-rating of residents of a district, and the percentage of people who identify 
as liberal or very liberal. These two measures had the strongest R-squared values in the 
single variable correlations run above. As such, we run the following regressions: 
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1. 𝐶𝑗
1 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑗
1+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑗
1 + 𝜖𝑗; 
2. 𝐶𝑗
2 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑗
1+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑗
2 + 𝜖𝑗; 
3. 𝐶𝑗
3 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑗
2+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑗
2 + 𝜖𝑗; 
4. 𝐶𝑗
1 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑗
1+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑗
2 + 𝜖𝑗; 
Where,  
C1 = worker cooperatives per 100,000 people 
C2 = workers in worker cooperatives per 100,000 people 
C3 = worker cooperative GDP per 100,000 people 
D = average years of school 
E1= per capita income 
E2= percentage of population below poverty 
I1 = percentage of population that is “liberal” or “very liberal” 
I2 = average self-rating on political scale 
j = each megaregion 
 
Table 3, below, shows the results of these four multivariate regressions, with the 
indicators which have confidence intervals above 95% highlighted in yellow.  
 Years Schooling Economic Indicator Ideological Indicator  
Equation P > |t| Coeff. P > |t| Coeff. P > |t| Coeff. R-Squared 
1 0.274 0.579 0.684 0.000 0.000 2.250 0.53 
2 0.916 0.091 0.106 0.000 0.018 22.37 0.44 
3 0.520 64134 0.874 -234292 0.000 3032409 0.38 
4 0.15 0.076 0.891 0.000 0.000 -0.434 0.52 
Table 3 
Notably here, in four different regressions testing similar hypotheses with slightly 
different measures, ideological indicators remain the only indicators which retain levels 
of significance above the 95% confidence interval, and they do so in all four regressions. 
In each regression, the economic indicators and the lone demographic indicator (years of 
schooling) lose all of the significance they had when they were regressed as the lone 
correlate. This underscores the importance of ideological indicators as a very strong 
correlate of the socio-institutional ecosystem, to the presence of worker cooperatives. 
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CRISP-SET QUALITATIVE CONTROL ANALYSIS 
The single variate correlations in the preceding section are also interesting for 
what does not appear. Primarily, immigration does not show up as significantly correlated 
to any of these measures of worker cooperative saturation. This is strange, because of the 
strong practitioner, ethnographic, and news literature attesting to the growth of 
cooperatives led in large part by immigrants. “Immigrant worker-owners are the largest 
and fastest-growing segment of worker-owners in the United States,” says a report from 
the Democracy at Work Institute, “growth in worker cooperatives is currently driven by 
immigrant communities using the form to create jobs and business ownership 
opportunities for themselves,” (“Support for Immigrant Cooperatives" 2016). “In the past 
few years, immigrant-owned worker cooperatives have emerged as a vehicle for asset 
building and community resilience,” writes the Sustainable Economies Law Center 
(Runyeon, 2017). New York Public Media writes that “female immigrant entrepreneurs – 
many of whom are undocumented – are driving the current surge in New York City 
worker cooperatives, according to organizations that work closely with the groups […] 
the vast majority of workers are women of color, largely Hispanic,” (“Immigrants fuel 
the rise of worker cooperatives,” 2016). Raymond (2019) connects the marginalization of 
immigrant communities to the marginalization of African Americans, and, pulling from 
Nembhard (2014), argues that marginalized people use worker cooperatives to escape the 
mechanisms of marginalization. More recently the Movement for Black Lives has 
worked closely with New Roots Farm, a farm run by Somali immigrants in Lewiston, 
Maine, to maintain operations through the COVID-19 pandemic (Gural, 2020). Others 
have hypothesized that trust developed by shared experience in a new country is 
instrumental to immigrant entrepreneurship (Turkina and Thai, 2013). Yet despite the 
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discussion on the link between immigration and worker cooperatives, the increased 
presence of immigrants does not correlate to an increase in worker cooperatives in our 
megaregion correlation analysis. This could be for several reasons, including the fact that 
‘immigration’ is a huge category composed of different kinds of trajectories and 
dynamics, only some of which might translate to increased worker cooperatives. This 
may be true. However, we hypothesize that this may have more to do with the context in 
which immigration occurs. So, this section examines that further by exploring 
combinations of sequences that may allow for the growth of worker cooperatives in 
socio-institutional ecosystems. Because of the importance of ideology, revealed in both 
the single variate and multivariate regressions, this section hypothesizes that immigration 
is important to the creation of worker cooperatives, as attested to by qualitative literature, 
but that that can only occur in socio-institutional ecosystems which are sufficiently 
friendly to worker cooperatives in the first place. That is, immigration alone may not be 
able to account for the presence of worker cooperative creation, but immigration which 
occurs in environments friendly to worker cooperatives may account for a significant 
portion of worker cooperative growth.  
Thus, this section uses crisp set Qualitative Control Analysis (QCA) to examine 
the combinatory sequences of ideological alignment and a higher proportion of 
immigration, to test whether that may account for worker cooperative growth. The 
hypothesis is that higher immigration in areas with more liberal political ideologies will 
correlate highly to worker cooperative growth since the crisis of 2008. Put differently, 
immigrants may seek to form worker cooperatives as an economic strategy but may be 
differently constrained by their environments. Immigrant communities in Houston may 
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not live in an environment sufficiently supportive of worker cooperatives to realize 
worker cooperatives desires, but immigrants in Seattle may. In the crisp-set Qualitative 
Control analysis explored by Nagin (2008), discrete areas are categorized into whether or 
not a particular outcome is present, and whether or not a particular causal combination is 
present. They are ‘crisp-set’ distinctions because the decision about whether or not a 
causal combination or outcome is present depends on meeting a particular threshold. The 
categorizations are grouped in a 2x2 square, and the hypothesis is judged by the 
proportion of causal combination areas which display the outcome against causal 
combination areas which do not display the outcome, as shown below in Table 4 (Ragin, 









 to the assessment 
Cases here support  
the hypothesis 
Outcome absent Not directly 
relevant  





For the outcome, this section examines the creation of worker cooperatives since 
2009 and sets a threshold of 3 worker cooperative firms created since 2009 for “outcome 
present” to count. Because of the focus on new cooperatives in the ethnographic 
literature, this section looks to cooperative creation. Otherwise, the outcome is absent. 
For the causal combination, this section examines those places which are ‘liberal’ as well 
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as with a higher proportion of immigrants. “Liberal” is defined as an average political 
self-identification less than 3.9 for a particular megaregion from the Cooperative 
Congressional Election Survey, where 1= “Very Liberal” and 7= “Very Conservative”. 
The average identification is 4.12; so a score of 3.9 was chosen to represent areas with 
even more liberal ideology than average. The average proportion of foreign-born 
residents of all the megaregions is 11%, so “more than average proportion of immigrants” 
is any megaregion which has more than 11% of its population born in another country. 
Given the ethnographic literature underscoring the importance of immigrants in driving 
the creation of worker cooperatives, as well as the indications here that ideology of a 
megaregion is highly important, the hypothesis of this section is that areas which are 
liberal and with a higher proportion of immigrants will likely have worker cooperative 
creation since 2009. Table 5, below, shows the results of crisp-set assessment for this 
hypothesis. 












Eight megaregions are more liberal and have a higher proportion of immigrants. 
Of these eight regions, seven have initiated three or more worker cooperatives since 
2009. This represents half of the 14 megaregions which have created three or more 
worker cooperatives since 2009. So, while being a heavily immigrant megaregion does 
not imply the creation of worker cooperatives, this shows that a heavily immigrant 
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megaregion with friendly ideological socio-institutional ecosystemic features makes the 
development of worker cooperatives highly likely. Still, this analysis does not interrogate 
the questions of qualitatively different types of immigration, which may also exert heavy 
influence on the kinds of cooperatives developed, and more research should develop that 
point further. Yet, this combinatory sequence analysis brings some of the insights from 
ethnographic and qualitative work on worker cooperative development in the United 
States together with mezzo-level socio-institutional indicators developed in this analysis, 
and shows that immigration, in combination with a friendly ideological admixture, does 
correlate to a more robust presence of worker cooperatives.  
This section has underscored the importance of ideology by showing that in 
multivariate regressions, the importance of ideological factors remains while other kinds 
of indicators lose their significance. Then, it has shown that while the immigration 
hypothesis which appears in ethnographic literature but does not originally appear in the 
initial OLS regressions, a socio-institutional ecosystem approach can improve this 
hypothesis by showing that immigration is indeed a good predictor of worker cooperative 
development, provided that that occurs in an environment with features friendly to a 
socio-institutional ecosystem. Not only does this confirm elements of the ethnographic 
literature, it underscores the mutual and simultaneous nature of the various levels of 
interaction in a socio-institutional ecosystem.  
VI. DISCUSSION 
The first point of departure in the empirical work above is that worker 
cooperatives do exist, and they are geographically clustered in the United States, as 
opposed to a random geographic distribution. Conventional economic thought in 
economics cannot account for this, because worker cooperatives are theorized in abstract 
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space, where at best, their appearance can only vary randomly as opposed to socialized, 
peopled space of the real world. The preceding analysis has shown that worker 
cooperatives are not randomly distributed and has identified some features of socio-
institutional variation which can explain this using the socio-institutional ecosystem 
hypothesis. This work then shows those clusters are heavily correlated to a host of some 
socio-institutional indicators and in particular to ideological correlates. When we account 
for those ideological correlates, other hypotheses from the qualitative, ethnographic 
literature find quarter, such as the idea that immigration is a driver of worker cooperative 
development. This essay does not claim that any particular socio-institutional correlate 
causes worker cooperatives to exist. However, the correlation demonstrates that worker 
cooperatives thrive in megaregions which also exhibit certain socio-institutional features. 
This supports the idea that the socio-institutional environment of worker cooperatives 
matters greatly for their creation and survival.  
These data respond to several guideposts in the literature on worker cooperatives 
which builds the case for the socio-institutional ecosystem hypothesis. While it is beyond 
the scope of this essay to ‘prove’ aby of the following mechanisms, this section still 
gestures at how the data in the preceding section may buttress the case.  To begin, the 
clustering of worker cooperatives supports Schwartz’s notion that unfamiliarity is a block 
to worker cooperative success, and remains consistent with the notion of path 
dependency (Schwartz, 2011b). As more cooperatives become known, this lowers the 
cost of participation in the public goods game that Schwartz describes, exposing people 
to the idea of worker cooperatives, and in so doing, making them more possible.  
Another implication of this data is that worker cooperatives are not particularly 
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correlated to some of economistic and demographic postulations about the creation and 
dispersion of worker cooperatives. They are not correlated in any meaningful way with 
income inequality, unemployment, changes in income inequality, or changes in 
unemployment, as has been postulated by some in the literature. While worker 
cooperative saturation is significantly correlated to per capita income and the percentage 
of people in poverty, the coefficients are quite small and as such may be statistically, but 
not economically, significant. More, these initial considerations fall from significance in 
a multivariate regression, while ideological indicators remain highly significant.  
The importance of ideological data obtaining high significance across several 
robustness checks lends support to some of the particular socio-institutional hypotheses 
in the literature, on a macro level. This may be direct causality – perhaps liberal areas, 
because they are liberal, are more likely to establish worker cooperatives, or maybe they 
have a customer base more willing to go out of their way to support them. Or, the 
correlation with ideology may indicate a shared underlying trait, which is expressed as 
both a higher saturation of worker cooperatives, and as more liberal political ideology. To 
revisit Thompson’s hypothesis, trust is fundamental to the performance of worker 
cooperatives, and one reason for their rarity might be that institutional contexts don’t 
prioritize trust, because trust is much less fundamental to the performance of capitalist 
firms, which most institutions cater to (Thompson, 2015). The correlates to megaregions 
with more worker cooperatives suggest this may be the case, by making inferences about 
trust through other literature. Putnam has found that increased education also increases 
trust (Putnam, 2001). Other literature traces trust and political ideology, and finds that 
trust to be higher amongst self-liberals or Democrats (Anderson et al., 2005; Carlin and 
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Love, 2013). Alesina and Ferrara find that increased expression against racial integration 
undermines trust (Alesina and Ferrara, 2002). All of these factors were strongly 
correlated with the distribution and persistence of worker cooperatives in the United 
States, in ways that align with increased trust from the literature above – places with 
higher education, more liberal political affiliation and self-description,  and with more 
tolerant attitudes about race – were more correlated with the presence of worker 
cooperatives. These signs point to the idea that increased trust fosters a socio-institutional 
ecosystem more supportive of worker cooperatives – either directly through trust or by 
institutions, norms, and mores that are built up from increased social trust. While this 
research still may be premature to definitively name causal relationships, it is possible to 
stitch together a rough outline of what a supportive socio-institutional ecosystem looks 
like. More assuredly, we can certainly say that certain qualitative features of the socio-
institutional context really seem to matter for the appearance and proliferation of worker 
cooperatives.  
The contribution of this essay has been to examine which factors stoke or frustrate 
the presence of worker cooperatives by looking not just at areas of worker cooperative 
presence, but comparing those areas to areas of worker cooperative absence. This 
comparative approach highlights the centrality of ideology which not only correlates to 
worker cooperative presence but importantly, to worker cooperative absence. In turn, that 
has allowed for qualification of other trends in the literature, especially the notion that 
immigration leads cooperative development. The institutional constellations of an 
ecosystem which encourage worker cooperative presence are explored here, building on 
the work of Hoover and Abell (2016), but this work is strengthened by a horizontal and 
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comparative look across institutional ecosystems in the US.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
The foundational idea of this essay was that economic theory has struggles to 
explain the appearance and proliferation of worker cooperatives because it has 
disregarded social and institutional constellations around that firm. While theory has 
helped point to a general hurdles that worker cooperatives face in capitalist contexts, it 
has been unable to explain the persistence and clustering of worker cooperative 
complexes. This essay has offered the socio-institutional ecosystem hypothesis for 
worker cooperatives as a theoretical approach which can explain that. As such, this essay 
has: (1) demonstrated shortcomings with the conventional theories on the prevalence of 
worker cooperatives; (2) pulled together various strands of the extant literature which 
support the socio-institutional ecosystem hypothesis for the proliferation of worker 
cooperatives; (3) shown that macro-level data on the features of socio-institutional 
environments broadly supports this hypothesis, calling particular attention to the 
ideological coordinates of socio-institutional ecosystems as particularly correlated to 
worker cooperative saturation in the US; and (4) shown that socio-institutional ecosystem 
qualifiers can support other observations made from qualitative, ethnographic work, such 
as the hypothesis that immigration drives worker cooperative development, if it occurs in 
a friendly socio-institutional environment. Statistical work on the existence of the socio-
institutional hypothesis presents major difficulties because of the multiple, simultaneous, 
immeasurable, and dialectic flows of causality. However, this essay has demonstrated 
that certain kinds of features – particularly ideological basis of socio-institutional 
contexts – significantly correlates to the proliferation of worker cooperatives. Moreover, 
when viewed in concert with other features, such as immigration, a clearer picture of 
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which mechanisms may contribute to a beneficial ecosystem for worker cooperatives 
begins to emerge. From this, connections can be made to other literatures which suggest 
that in the context of the observation on the correlation between ideology and worker 
cooperative proliferation, one fundamental mechanism for proliferation of worker 
cooperatives may be trust, where worker cooperatives succeed in socio-institutional 
contexts which promote trust between people and institutions of trust.   
This essay buttresses the idea that socio-institutional contexts greatly influence 
worker cooperatives. More specific hypotheses, such as those about trust explored above, 
should be explored further by future research. Academics, policymakers, and workers 
should look to the socio-institutional ecosystem as a relevant unit to analyze the 
appearance and distribution of worker cooperatives should be an important one for. 
Rather than conventional research which suggests that worker cooperatives are 
impossible institutions, this frame suggests that worker cooperatives are eminently 
possible given the right socio-institutional ecosystems.  That makes it possible for the 
expansion of worker cooperatives and the growth of economic democracy from capitalist 
contexts, and the capture of benefits by workers and citizens. To borrow from Vanek’s 
ecosystemic metaphor, the focus should be on identifying and obtaining the appropriate 
water for the particular fish.  
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CONCLUSION 
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please;” writes 
Marx (1852) in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, “they do not make it under 
self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and 
transmitted from the past,” (para. 2). Marx calls attention to the context in which activity 
occurs and highlights that context’s fundamental importance in conditioning that activity 
which occurs in it. Pushing the point with linguistic metaphor, Marx compares historical 
movement to learning a language: “in like manner, the beginner who has learned a new 
language always translates it back into his mother tongue, but he assimilates the spirit of 
the new language and expresses himself freely in it only when he moves in it without 
recalling the old and when he forgets his native tongue,” (para 2). The contexts of 
economic life, like idioms, vary in their terrain, grammar, and meaning, shaping the set of 
possibilities for economic activity in a context or speech in an idiom. This requires a 
frame which can appreciate the variance of context and circumstance, and so this essay 
looked to ‘ecosystem’ as a grounding metaphor.  
Biologists situate ‘ecosystem’ as a scaled unit of analysis of the natural world, 
ranging from ‘subatomic’ to ‘universe.’ Each of those scaled units of analysis give 
insights into natural processes, yet the kinds of insights – the kinds of truths – vary based 
on choice of scaled analytical unit. Deploying ‘ecosystem’ as a unit of analysis allows for 
an appreciation of the relationship of organisms to their non-living environment and can, 
say, help an ecologist understand why a particular species flourishes in one ecosystem 
vis-à-vis another. Similarly, the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis frames economic 
activity as it occurs in relationship to the non-economic social and institutional 
environment in which economic activity occurs, and can help economists understand why 
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certain economic phenomena exist in a particular social and institutional arrangement but 
not in another. Calling back to Marx, these truths call attention to the circumstances – the 
socio-institutional terrain, grammar, and meaning – upon which people make their own 
history.  
Yet the models of mainstream economics most often preclude variability of socio-
institutional terrain, grammar, and meaning. Methodological individualism, like 
molecular chemistry, prescribes a set of constant rules from which a whole is determined. 
This leads to particular kinds of insights which advance particular knowledge but misses 
other phenomena at other scalar units. And formal modelling – from microeconomics’ 
utility space to macroeconomics factor productivity – requires the structural fundaments 
of the model to stay the same.  That different entities have different experiences depends 
on cardinal changes of inputs – preference, factor endowments, savings rates, etc. While 
the power of these models comes from their ability to compare by holding structure 
constant, their weakness comes from their inability to understand how the very rules and 
categories of the game shift in different context. If context matters – and we have good 
evidence that it does – what do these models miss? And what does that augur for the 
ways in which take economic action?  
The socio-institutional ecosystem analysis enables us to name and describe the 
circumstances and context upon which economic activity occurs and through which 
people make history. By focusing on and naming the social and institutional 
constellations which structure economic activity, the socio-institutional ecosystem 
analysis enables policy makers and strategists to develop plans specific to a particular 
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ecosystem. I conclude here with some thoughts on how the analysis undertaken in the 
preceding essays of this dissertation contribute to that.  
A renewed discussion about the East African Union – which raises the possibility 
of a federal union of Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan – has 
grown in recent years. The socio-institutional ecosystem analysis can meaningfully 
contribute to this conversation. Such a state would comprise a huge domestic market and 
productive potential, and the scale of the venture allows consideration of a set of 
macroeconomic policies difficult for each country to explore on its own. Yet policy is 
only successful to the extent that it meaningful responds to actual circumstances. So, for 
any set of policies to be useful, it must apprehend the basic institutional and social 
ecosystems which vary within and across each country. The politics and policies of land 
and those who work it, for example, play very differently in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 
preceding essay on East African labor in the colonial era lends contextualization to this in 
the long historical arc from the colonial era to the present. If we pause to consider the 
scope of economic categories which have currency in policy debates, we quickly 
encounter discussions which speak of formalization of titles, savings rates, randomized 
control trials, Sub-Saharan Africa, developing countries, capital controls, inflation 
targeting, and so on. These may or may not be fundamentally important categories – and 
some much more so than others – but they do not speak to many of the fundamental 
relationships and their variance which condition the politics and possibilities of land and 
the people who work on it. As such, understanding these different relationships as 
relationships which carry significant historical inertia into the present underscores the 
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gravity of those relationships and shifts policy to consider the structural issues which are 
created, compounded, and inflected by socio-institutional ecosystems.  
Also, a renewed conversation by activists and policymakers looks to develop 
worker cooperatives as answer to various malcontents of contemporary economic 
dynamics. However, the factors which influence the survival of worker cooperatives are 
not well articulated by economists and have largely hinged on discussions of firm 
efficiency with little discussion of the firm’s context. For an ecologist, it would make no 
sense to discuss the efficiency of an organism as the crux of its survival without a 
discussion of its ecosystem. A vicuña and a dik-dik might be perfectly efficient 
organisms, but any prediction about their relative prevalence would depend on its 
ecosystem, from alpine sierra to tropical scrubland. Previous research has shown that 
worker cooperatives are just as efficient as capitalist firms, if not more so. The research 
in this dissertation has called attention to some of the socio-institutional features which 
seem to stoke or frustrate their presence. Certainly, more research is required to fully 
understand this, but this work has shown strong evidence to support the notions that 
socio-institutional features condition the likelihood of a robust cooperative sector. With a 
fuller understanding of this, activists and policymakers can better support and grow the 
sector, capturing their benefits for working people.  
At its best the socio-institutional ecosystem analysis functions to make the 
peopled environment in which economic activity occurs visible. New economic 
knowledge can be built from this analysis and marshalled to emancipatory strategies.   
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